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5Abstract
This thesis argues that Derrida democratizes phenomenology in demonstrating that 
transcendental and empirical difference is an illusion. By demonstrating that 
transcendental empirical difference is an illusion, Derrida shows that the struggle over 
claims for truth or the primacy of the transcendental or empirical have been sustained 
over illusory hierarchies and that this presents a false dichotomy and 
conflict. Phenomenology is not hierarchy but exchangeability, and the implication of 
transcendental-empirical difference being an illusion is that truth is not localizable to 
either transcendental or empirical, but translates as paradox, aporia and the quasi-
transcendental. The transcendental and empirical are the same and the transcendental 
is nothing outside the empirical, just as the empirical is the trace of the transcendental 
through iterability. Phenomenology is rather determined by aporia- the third space of 
the quasi-transcendental which produces both transcendental and empirical through 
the distinguishing movement of the trace. Aporia, the third space, the quasi-
transcendental and differance as the interval between the transcendental and empirical 
that determines both are shown to be the meta-conditions that govern metaphysics. 
This thesis thus posits the space of the third and between, namely the quasi-
transcendental, as the root condition that governs metaphysics and allows it to 
function. Where phenomenology has historically defined truth as either transcendental 
or empirical, this thesis will proceed to demonstrate that truth is rather quasi-
transcendental, neither transcendental nor empirical but a space between that enables 
the thinking of both. Against current scholarship that defines the quasi-transcendental 
as immanence and contamination, I will argue that the quasi-transcendental is a 
relation of paradox. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical 
in simultaneous identity and difference, identity in non-identity, sameness in 
6difference. Paradoxically, distinctions translate into non-distinctions because the 
difference between the transcendental and empirical translates as a nothingness, an a
priori difference which is not a difference. Death thus lies at the heart of 
phenomenology and constitutes it as a priori difference, differance, distinguishes and 
separates nothing. Derrida reconfigures phenomenology through his discovery of the 
quasi-transcendental, the space of the third, paradox, aporia and the between, that 
which is neither transcendental nor empirical, as the conditionality of thinking both 
transcendental and empirical. This quasi-transcendental determines metaphysics by 
being prior to transcendental and empirical and conditions its production and 
functioning. Derrida thus democratizes philosophy in demonstrating that its 
distinctions, its privilege of transcendental or empirical and its divide into materialism 
and idealism is based on illusion and myth of origin. Phenomenology is thus 
determined by its other and its unthought, true phenomenology acknowledges that 
which has escaped its structure in transcendental and empirical determination, or the 
third space, between, aporia and interval of the quasi-transcendental, as the true 
condition that governs, produces, and upholds metaphysics. Derrida thus inscribes 
phenomenology in a more powerful form by bringing it to terms with its condition of 
possibility as the quasi-transcendental. I define the democratization of 
phenomenology as a site of inclusion, expanding phenomenology’s horizons to 
include the other and unthought of phenomenology as its condition of possibility. As 
texts such as Monolingualism of the Other demonstrate, there is no pure language that 
is uncontaminated by the Other as all language is acquisition and assimilation. Also, 
The Politics of Friendship shows that the Other has to precede me before friendship is 
possible, just as Narcissus relates to Echo only by seeing the Other in himself. Along 
similar trajectories, phenomenology’s Other or unthought is shown to be the basis for 
7the One or thought.What this thesis thus proceeds to show is the unthought that forms 
the basis for thought, thereby expanding phenomenology beyond its territorial 
concerns of an either/or kind of truth because phenomenology is always determined 
by difference, the neither/nor, and the ghost of the text that returns to haunt it.At the 
same time, this thesis argues that Derrida’s move to save phenomenology inscribes in 
it a measure of fallibility through his demonstrations that thought is always 
contaminated by its unthought, the ideal is always contaminated by contingency and 
undecidability, Derrida’s arguments are not absolute treatises to be taken at face value 
but a mode of interrogation in which he questions the basis of presence, fully given to 
itself, uncontaminated by absence, contingency, the empirical, the Other, and as such 
inscribes the necessity of incarnation and a necessity for the mark to fail as presence 
has to differ from itself materially in order to be realized. In order to succeed thus, 
phenomenology has to fail as it has to survive itself as the trace.  Derrida thus 
democratizes phenomenology in showing its success depends upon its incarnation and 
death to self presence in order to realize itself through living on after its death as the 
trace. In Positions1, Derrida defines history as the history of the metaphysical concept, 
which does not exist outside of a system of differences and play. Derrida’s work is 
thus a reworking of teleological history into histories, showing that transcendental and 
empirical do not exist outside relationality to each other as supplements and traces.
Derrida demonstrates that phenomenology has proceeded through the exclusion of 
metaphor, or suppressing the metaphoricity of texts by privileging an either/or side of 
the binary, where phenomenology is to be viewed as constituted by metaphor, 
dynamically relating both transcendental and empirical rather than privileging either 
side.
                                               
1 Jacques Derrida.Positions. University of Chicago Press. 1981. p. 58
8Preface
In this chapter I will review Derrida’s intervention in phenomenology.I will 
describe Derrida’s intervention as the location of truth in that which is neither 
transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-transcendental, the paradoxical space between 
that enables the thinking of both. As Husserl requires the exclusion of the empirical 
and Heidegger, Blanchot, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur require the exclusion 
of the transcendental, or the transcendental to be accounted for on empirical grounds,
for their philosophies to stand, transcendental and empirical require each other to 
determine phenomenology through differance and iterability. Phenomenology is 
determined rather by the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor 
empirical but the a priori difference between that allows the thinking of both.
Phenomenology has become a science of knowledge divided against itself. 
Originally founded by Husserl on the doctrine of intentionality to return to the things 
themselves as a purer science of knowledge that was presuppositionless and based on 
strict observation of phenomena, phenomenology has witnessed a split into opposing 
camps of transcendental idealism espoused by Husserl and an empirical psychology 
espoused by his followers and detractors, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas and Ricoeur. Subsequently phenomenology has seen a split along the lines of 
idealism and post-metaphysics, not unlike the split in metaphysics between idealism 
and realism. Has phenomenology broken away from metaphysics only to fall into a 
similar paradox and division? The debate has implications for a conception of truth: 
which version of phenomenology is a more accurate reading of the thing and the 
event? 
An aporia or impasse has occurred in the development of phenomenology – in 
the debate between transcendental idealism and empirical psychology, or the radical 
9empiricism of Levinas, Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty. The question arises as to which 
can claim to be a more rigorous and faithful reading of phenomena. The act of 
bracketing, which takes place in Husserl’s phenomenology as an exclusion of the 
empirical witnesses a reversal in Heidegger’s phenomenology. This is because 
bracketing radicalizes intentionality, to return to the anthropological and situated 
realm of Being. Likewise, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Blanchot espouse a 
negative phenomenology or radical empiricism. What both camps share is a form of 
purist idealism- be this transcendental idealism or empirical idealism. This thesis will 
examine this tension in phenomenology as an aporia that Derrida’s post-
phenomenology addresses. Derrida’s post-phenomenology recognized the paradoxical 
division that had taken place in phenomenology and tries to perform a tracing to the 
roots of both transcendental idealism and empirical psychology or radical empiricism 
by examining the a priori conditions that structure both versions of phenomenology. 
This thesis will examine whether Derrida’s intervention and negotiation of the debate 
is convincing and whether it accounts for the meta-conditions that produce the 
structurality of structure in the phenomenology espoused by both camps.
Derrida locates the aporia at the center of phenomenology: that its distinctions, 
such as those between the transcendental and empirical, and between metaphysics and 
non-metaphysics or representational thinking and post-representational thinking, 
translate into paradoxical similarities. This happens because in his readings the 
transcendental turns out to be nothing outside the empirical. Non- metaphysics is 
repetition of metaphysics and representational thinking and post-representational 
thinking retain resemblances to each other. Paradoxically, the distinctions that hold at 
the heart of phenomenology are repetitions of the same, governed by the principle of 
iterability. That which makes the distinctions impossible is precisely what makes 
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them possible :  differance. This is because expression and indication translate as the 
same, the transcendental and empirical translate as the same, metaphysics and non-
metaphysics translates as the same, as translates representational and post-
representational thinking. The difference or differance between these 
phenomenological distinctions translate into a distinction which is paradoxically a 
sameness, a distinction that differentiates, and distinguishes, nothing. Derrida thus 
discovers the aporia that the distinctions that hold in phenomenology translate into a 
paradoxical sameness, or differance, which separates and distinguishes nothing.
In this section I will be examining Geoffrey Bennington’s reading of 
deconstruction and the quasi-transcendental. Bennington’s lucid and clarifying work 
on the quasi-transcendental will form the foundations of my thesis. I extend 
Bennington’s reading of the quasi-transcendental to readings of phenomenology.  
Bennington’s readings on the quasi-transcendental are cogent as they define the 
fundamental conditions of possibility for reading metaphysics: excluded and a priori 
difference is necessary to think the economy of metaphysics. Bennington locates 
excluded difference or differance : the quasi-transcendental as the condition of 
possibility for metaphysics, the third sphere of excluded difference, that which is 
neither transcendental nor empirical but between, as the founding condition that 
determines metaphysics. Bennington defines the quasi-transcendental as an excluded 
difference which structures the very possibility of reading: “The reading work carried 
out by Derrida consists in the location of these excluded terms or these remains that 
command the excluding discourse- the supplement (masturbation or writing) in 
Rousseau and the index in Husserl, the parergon or vomit in Kant.”2
                                               
2 Geoff Bennington. “Derridabase,” Jacques Derrida.Chicago- University of Chicago Press, 1993. 284.
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Bennington defines Derrida’s work as a work of reading. This work of reading 
refers to the active act of elucidation and illumination, to understand and shed light on 
a written text. In the context of Derrida’s work, the work of reading is the elucidating 
of certain oppositional structures in philosophy which are informed by a double bind 
or shadow, which Derrida’s work of reading locates as a binary structure that 
suppresses or relegates as secondary one element. This element in fact, governs and is 
crucial to informing the primary structure as it forms its basis and functions as its 
conditionality for understanding the primary structure.
Read in this context, the transcendental, which has historically been read as 
the source of the empirical, must be understood as that which is simultaneously 
conditioned by the empirical through the dynamic relation of iterability, differance 
and repetition. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that Derrida is simply 
locating oppositional structures only to reverse them, as his concern is to elucidate the 
fact that these exist in a dynamic relation of differance and iterability, transcendental 
does not exist outside the empirical just as the empirical is but the trace of the 
transcendental and cannot function outside its conditioning. The transcendental and 
empirical do not exist outside the structure of repetition and differance. It is the 
repeatability of the mark, its ability to differ from itself, which defines the structure of 
transcendental and empirical interaction, or differance. In other words, it is 
transcendental-empirical difference, differance, the trace or the quasi-transcendental, 
which determines the structure of metaphysical production and functioning through 
the action of iterability, or repetition with a difference. It is this system of differences, 
that relays signifier to signifier, in an infinite chain of supplements, that determines 
metaphysics as arche-writing.
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Deconstruction according to Bennington is thus the location of the 
supplementary as that which is the conditionality of the primary as it forms the 
oppositional structure which governs and conditions the primary. Derrida’s work of 
reading elucidates such oppositional structures or binaries to demonstrate that it is the 
fundamental principle of repetition that produces metaphysical structures.
Transcendental and empirical only exist in a dynamic relation of repetition with a 
difference, it is not conceivable for the transcendental to exist without the empirical or 
the empirical to exist without the transcendental. In Husserl for instance, expression is 
not separable from indication as a sign by its very nature refers to something else and 
hence no exclusive expression without indication exists as an ideal sign has to be 
indicated in order to be communicated even in solitary mental life. In other instances, 
Husserl reduces metaphysics to mind and Merleau-Ponty reduces metaphysics to body 
while Derrida demonstrates that these exist only in and through each other, mind and 
body exist in a state of dynamic interaction, iterability and differance. Mind is not 
reducible to body, just as body is not reducible to mind. These exist only in dynamic 
interaction as the transcendental and empirical exist only in a state of repetition with a 
difference or iterability. Mind is mediated only through body and vice versa and 
hence it is absurd to conceive body without mind or mind without body, they exist in 
a dynamic relation of interdependency, iterability and differance. Likewise, love is 
only experienced through concretely manifested acts of love just as physical acts of 
love without the transcendental spiritual experience of love does not mean anything. 
God exists only in and through differance, through history and through Christ, just as 
these mean nothing without the founding principle of God.
In other words, the negative determines the positive just as the positive 
determines the negative. Derrida’s argument, according to Bennington, is that the 
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excluded terms are not secondary but essential to determining the primary structures. 
The “supplement in Rousseau, the index in Husserl, the parergon or vomit in Kant”
3are all terms that have been relegated to a secondary place in philosophy but which 
determine the positive as a condition of possibility in Derrida’s reading, functioning 
as the index, differance, or quasi-transcendental which determines both positive and 
negative. It is transcendental empirical difference, the quasi-transcendental, or 
differance that determines both transcendental and empirical and upholds 
metaphysics. Derrida’s act of reading elucidates that such pairings are interdependent 
and not exclusive to each other, existing in and through each other with the structure 
of repetition, and that oppositional structures thrive on their dynamic pairing and 
oppositionality in order to function. In other words as will be demonstrated by this 
thesis, transcendental is not conceivable without the empirical and vice versa, self is 
not conceivable without the other and vice versa, metaphysics is simultaneously 
determined by non-metaphysics. Metaphysics is thus not determined by the 
transcendental but the difference between the transcendental, differance or the quasi-
transcendental.
Truth will be demonstrated by this thesis to be neither transcendental nor 
empirical, but situated in the space between that is differance. On Bennington’s 
reading, Derrida’s work highlights through his reading the fundamental 
oppositionality of structures which are dynamically inter-related and co-dependent, 
existing through a structure of repetition rather than statically depending upon one 
term to determine the other. Binary structures are thus organic and dynamic inter-
dependencies which depend essentially on both terms to elucidate and determine the 
functioning of each term, truth is then the paradox that is situated in the space 
                                               
3 Geoff Bennington. “Derridabase,” Jacques Derrida. Chicago- University of Chicago Press. 1993. 
284.
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between as one cannot conceive of one term without the other. In other words, 
phenomenologists have been caught up in situating truth as either transcendental or 
empirical, but this thesis will demonstrate that because of the dynamic 
interdependency and differance between the transcendental which determines both as 
the quasi-transcendental, truth is neither transcendental nor empirical but quasi-
transcendental, located in a paradoxical space of aporia between the transcendental 
and empirical. 
The aporia is the paradox that transcendental is not conceivable without 
empirical and empirical is not conceivable without transcendental, truth is thus the 
paradox that transcendental and empirical are simultaneously similar and different, 
identical and non-identical, bearing sameness in difference. The transcendental is and 
is not the empirical, their difference translates into a non-difference or sameness, and 
hence the fundamental relationship between the transcendental and empirical is the 
aporia of sameness in difference. It is paradoxical that difference should translate into 
non-difference or sameness, yet this is the conditionality of metaphysics that Derrida 
discovers, for transcendental exists in and through the empirical through repetition 
just as the empirical is but a trace and repetition of the transcendental. Radical 
empiricists such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Blanchot negate idealism 
only to affirm it by repeating its ontological structure.
Building on Bennington’s thesis that Derrida’s work is a work of reading that 
elucidates oppositional structures in order to show the dynamic interaction between 
them and interdependency, this thesis will argue that the quasi-transcendental in 
Derrida’s work functions as that which determines metaphysics by relating the 
transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and 
non-identity. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in a 
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paradoxical relation of sameness in difference. My work is essentially an extension of 
Bennington’s reading of the quasi-transcendental to readings of phenomenology, 
demonstrating that the quasi-transcendental is the conditionality that determines 
metaphysics in phenomenology. The transcendental and the empirical exist in a state 
of dynamic interaction and repetition rather than existing as ontologically separate 
substances as has been historically determined by metaphysics.
Taking the cue from Samuel Weber, who cogently argues for the condition of 
metaphysics as iterability, I will be extending his notions of iterability as a necessary 
condition of metaphysics to phenomenology. I build on Weber’s notion of iterability 
as a power or capacity of a concept to be translated.  Weber argues that it is the 
fundamental structure of repetition and iterability or translatability and citability that 
determines metaphysics, which I affirm and incorporate into my readings of 
phenomenology. Weber’s arguments about the a priori necessity for iterability that 
actualizes a concept are indeed convincing, cogent and a faithful rendition of 
deconstruction where other commentators fail, as they do not grasp the fundamental 
condition of mediation as key to understanding Derrida’s take on metaphysics. 
Rather, they privilege the empirical mostly, leading to misconceptions of Derrida as 
Nietzschean and Heideggerean. Where Bennington had defined the quasi-
transcendental as an excluded a priori difference which was necessary to thinking 
metaphysics, Weber defines the fundamental structure of metaphysics as necessitated 
by repetition and iterability. In Benjamin’s Abilities, Weber draws a parallel between 
Benjamin’s philosophy and Derridean deconstruction in noting the affinity between 
“translatability” and “iterability”. Essentially, Derrida argues that the structure of the 
mark is its repeatability, its ability to differ from itself a priori, and Weber transposes 
this concept of the ability of the concept to be repeated to Benjamins’ work in noting 
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that the Absolute has to be translated to be instantiated. Weber notes that the concept 
is defined by its “ability” to be translated and iterated, the concept is a certain power 
or potential to be repeated with a difference as the material, as Aristotle noted with his 
dynamis / energeia distinction or the difference between potentiality and actuality as a 
power to be translated and repeated with a difference, or iterability.
In this illuminating re-reading of Benjamin, Weber applies Derrida’s meta-
concept of iterability, or the ability of a concept to be repeated, to bear on Benjamin’s 
texts. Accordingly, Weber traces the conditions of possibility for Benjamin’s 
Absolute to its translatability, as Benjamin has read the Absolute in “The task of the 
translator” and “The Work of Art in Mechanical Reproduction” as that which has to 
be translated and reproduced, or repeated. Weber draws an analogy between this 
repeatability of the Absolute with the actualization of the virtual in Deleuze. The 
hallmark of a concept, as it appears to Weber for Benjamin, Deleuze and Derrida, is 
thus its translatability and repeatability, or iterability. This again applies to Weber’s 
reading of epic theatre in Benjamin as a citability. What Weber successfully performs 
in his readings of Benjamin, Deleuze and Derrida is a tracing of the conditions of 
possibility that has informed all their readings of the Absolute to iterability or 
repeatability. Weber thus successfully traces the meta-concept that has sustained their 
readings of the Absolute in a thoroughly engaging and convincing manner.
According to Weber’s Derridean rereading of Benjamin, the structure that 
informs their interpretation of the concept is a certain structural necessity for citability 
and repeatability or iterability is the a priori condition of a concept- its necessity to 
actualize itself. This is Deleuze’s translation from virtual to actual and Benjamins’ 
translation of the transcendental Absolute in his work, which many have interpreted 
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as a Kantian a priori form, into empirical conditions as the transcendental is nothing 
outside the empirical, the virtual is nothing outside the actual, it is the nothing that 
separates transcendental and empirical which enables its paradoxical differentiation. 
On Weber’s interpretation, this a priori difference as a nothing which separates the 
transcendental and empirical, or iterability, is precisely what enables the actualization 
of the concept. The hallmark of a concept is its ability to be repeated and actualized.
Weber describes, in deconstructive fashion, this actualization of the concept as 
a death of the concept and a relation to its afterlife, in other words, the concept has to 
go through a certain annihilation or death as an idea and survive itself afterwards in 
the material world in order to be actualized. In Derridean readings the structure of this 
repetition as death and survival is the production of the trace. The very act of hearing-
oneself-speak presumes a need for signs, and thus solitary mental life needs indicative 
signs to communicate to oneself. Thus absence and the empirical have invaded 
solitary mental life, which cannot be reduced to pure expressive signs or ideality. At 
the heart of life is death. Death and non-presence is the condition of possibility for 
life. Death constitutes life, it is the impossible possibility that enables life. 
The hallmark for the Absolute that Weber thus draws as an affinity between 
Benjamin’s philosophy of the Absolute and Derrida’s deconstruction is thus the 
structure of the concept as repeatability, iterability, the ability to be repeated, and a 
priori difference. The concept survives its death to the ideal world to live on in the 
material world as that which has been translated as concepts are irrevocably mediated, 
the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, form has to actualize itself as 
content. Weber thus argues for the pertinence of deconstruction to an interpretation of 
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Benjamin as both believe in the translatability of the Absolute as repetition with a 
difference, and a priori difference.
Might it seem problematic to superimpose Derrida onto Benjamin as 
Deconstruction as a school of thought comes much later than Benjamin’s writing? 
One would have to concede that Weber’s drawing of an affinity between 
Deconstruction and Benjamins’ translatability of the Absolute is quite convincing as 
both presuppose a priori difference and retrospective division between the 
transcendental and empirical which Derrida terms differance or the movement of the 
trace. That a concept has to die to itself ideally and survive itself in an empirical form 
or to live on after its death in the world is a idea that has been around since Hegel, 
who has argued for this similar death and survival with his notions of the Begriff 
surviving itself through the mediation of Love, in Hegels’s early work.4  Derrida’s 
discovery, and thus Benjamin’s, is an a priori condition of possibility that structures 
the very notion of concept. One would thus hardly read Weber’s re-reading of 
Benjamin as a forced analogy and retrospective superimposition of one form of 
thought upon another. Likewise I will be extending Weber’s reading of iterability as a 
certain power and ability of a concept to translate itself into the actual in my readings 
of metaphysicians such as Husserl and Heidegger. I extend Weber’s notion that the 
concept is nothing outside the structure of its repetition and iterability to readings of 
phenomenology.
I have just discussed Bennington and Weber whose cogent readings of 
deconstruction I will be extending to phenomenology. I build on their readings 
because they render deconstruction faithfully where other commentators fail, since 
                                               
4 Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, Early Theological Writings. tr. by T. M. Knox, with an introd., and 
fragments tr. by Richard Kroner. Chicago , Univ. of Chicago Press.1948.
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they privilege the empirical and construe Derrida as Nietzschean or Heideggerean, 
which is an inaccurate assessment of deconstruction. In the next section I discuss 
Barry Smith, a vocal opponent of deconstruction who has popularized misconceptions 
of Derrida common in the phenomenological field today, and seek to address and 
dispel such misunderstandings of Derrida as these do not do justice to the rigour and 
complexity of his work. 
“Now with respect to Derrida, I don't think that you can even begin to 
formulate a defence of Derrida by saying that he is trying to save metaphysics from 
the rigorous nature of analytic philosophy. That just does not fit, and it does not fit for 
this reason most of all- just as analytic philosophy has witnessed a renaissance in 
recent years of work in political philosophy, society, ethics, theories of justice, and 
these areas of human inquiry, so in recent years has analytic philosophy experienced a 
revival of  metaphysical theorizing. Analytic metaphysics is probably the most vibrant 
branch of analytic philosophy that there is today.”5
Above we have Barry Smith, a vocal opponent of Derrida. This section 
addresses common misconceptions of Derrida popularized by critics such as Barry 
Smith. Barry Smith is an analytic philosopher who was trained in Mathematics and 
Philosophy under Michael Dummett at Oxford. His disinclination towards Derrida’s 
philosophy is based on a misreading of him as someone who destructively subverts 
truth, science and rationality. He violently objected to the conferment of an honorary 
doctorate on Derrida from Cambridge because he was of the opinion that it 
represented a betrayal of philosophy to confer such an honour upon a destructive 
nihilist and subvert. His hostility to Derrida’s philosophy is directed towards its lack 
of rigour and respect for truth and absolutes.  A common mistake made by critics such 
                                               
5 Barry Smith “Revisiting the Derrida Affair with Barry Smith”. Barry Smith, interviewed by Jeffrey 
Sims. Centre for the Study of Religion,University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.152-3.
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as Barry Smith, as indicated in the quote above, is that Derrida is a destructive nihilist 
who subverts truth, reason and science. Barry Smith alleges that analytic metaphysics 
is far more rigorous that Derrida’s reading of metaphysics. This thesis will counter 
that claim by demonstrating Derrida is no nihilist or destructive critic of rationality 
but a philosopher who examines the very conditions in which truth, reason and 
science are made possible. The Absolute is not subverted in Derrida but demonstrated 
to be fundamentally mediated through time and history, with the passage of 
differance. Derrida’s readings of metaphysics are to be viewed as more rigorous even 
than analytic philosophy because Derrida examines the very conditions in which 
metaphysics is made possible and how metaphysics is communicated through space 
and time, through the passage of differance. Derrida’s work is all about ethics and 
justice as well, contrary to Barry Smith’s claims, Derrida seeks to locate excluded 
differences and think the Other and unthought of language. What is missing from 
Analytic metaphysics is a certain self reflexivity about the conditions of possibility for 
metaphysics and thought, and it is this reflexivity about meta-conditions that 
determine metaphysics that Derrida’s work addresses. Analytic metaphysics, with its 
logical and predicative statements, its deductions and logical production of 
conclusions, reads far more like a word game, contrary to Barry Smith’s allegations 
about Derrida’s philosophy being games and puns, than the rigorous reflexive analysis 
of the conditions of metaphysics that Derrida propounds. 
Barry Smith claims that Derrida plays linguistic games and puns which are not 
to be taken as serious philosophy. Contrary to this, this thesis will demonstrate that 
Derrida is the philosopher par excellence as he performs meta-philosophy in 
establishing the conditions in which Truth is made possible and communicated 
through history, time and space. Derrida is no empiricist or nihilist as I will 
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demonstrate through his readings of radical empiricists such as Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, Levinas and Blanchot. Derrida is a philosopher of the conditions in which 
metaphysics is made possible and how it functions through the principle of iterability, 
or repetition with a difference. Derrida is no counterfeit philosopher with pretensions 
to subverting truth and authority as Smith claims, but a master philosopher who 
establishes the conditions in which truth is made possible and conveyed through time 
and history. It is also naive to assume as Barry Smith does, that Derrida’s work is no 
more than a continuation of Heidegger and Nietzsche as Derrida explicitly criticizes 
their radical empiricisms in their failure to acknowledge aporia and differance as the 
conditionality that structures metaphysics. Barry Smith takes on a poorly understood 
conception of Derrida that is widespread even among contemporary 
phenomenologists, that Derrida is nihilistic, subverts truth, and is empiricist. My 
thesis will address such misconceptions and demonstrate that Derrida affirms, rather 
than destroys metaphysics. Another critique of Derrida in undertaken by Ian Hunter in 
“The History of Theory”.6 Hunter argues that Derrida, by taking a transcendental turn, 
had undermined history and empiricism in the social sciences. Quoting Hunter, “In a 
striking reprise of the history of Christian university metaphysics, Derrida posits the 
transcendent onto which philosophy opens as the domain of infinite omnitemporal 
being as truth, in relation to which all merely finite, time-bound viewpoints—the 
domain of history—must remain uncomprehending and subordinate: requirement.”7
This is quite simply a remarkable misreading of Derrida. Derrida demonstrates in 
texts such as Introduction to the Origin of Geometry that the ideal requires history and 
its empirical medium to realize itself. Indeed for Derrida, the “Absolute is Passage.” 
There are no grounds for claiming that Derrida undermines and subordinates history.
                                               
6 Ian Hunter. The History of Theory. Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Autumn 2006), pp. 78-112
7 Ibid. pp. 82-83
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For Derrida, history and empiricism are the conditions by which the ideal is realized.
Instead of suppresssing history or empiricism, what Derrida’s work performs is an 
opening up of philosophy to see these terms as necessary conditions of possibility to 
the actualizing of the ideal. Derrida demonstrates that the condition of the idea is its 
history and actualization as the empirical; hence Hunter does not do justice to Derrida 
by misreading him. Readings of Derrida as ahistorical are common but unfortunately, 
misled. Derrida’s work demonstrates the necessity of the medium as history to the 
realization of a concept. 
For instance, the subject is nothing without its historicity, because it is through 
these acts, characteristics, performances and utterances that a stake to the “I” can be 
claimed. The self does not exist in a vacuum, but in and through its history. This is the 
necessity of iterability to the realization of every event and phenomenon. Just as the 
subject is nothing outside its staging and performance, the ideal is nothing outside the 
material.
To discuss the matter in more concrete terms, every designation of a 
phenomenon requires its opposite to delineate itself against to be realized. Just as 
Hunter is opposing history to the transcendent and then expelling the transcendent as 
something which has fundamentally contaminated the social sciences, Derrida 
demonstrates that truth cannot function without fiction, philosophy cannot function 
without non-philosophy. In a moment I will respond to charges that Derrida is 
nihilistic, but the supposition that Derrida is a nihilist likewise cannot function 
without the opposite claim that Derrida is more of an idealist, which this thesis will 
claim at some points. The supposition that Derrida shares more in common with 
Nietszche and Heidegger is a moment in the history of philosophy, at which Derrida 
took a turn, claiming to be neither Nietsczhean nor Platonist, but between. This is
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because each term requires its opposite to define itself against. Just as the idea cannot 
survive without its history, transcendental and empirical require each other as 
opposing terms to define themselves as I will demonstrate throughout this thesis. The 
same can be said of philosophy and non-philosophy. Without its opposition to non-
philosophy, idealisms such as Husserl’s cannot stand. Likewise without their 
opposition to idealism, materialisms such as Merleau-Ponty’s and Heidegger’s cannot 
derive any meaning because it is only the dividing moment of a priori difference and 
the separation of each term from its opposing term that each term acquires its 
meaning and coherence.
In this thesis, I will argue about the necessity of exemplarity or iterability to 
the realization of a concept. In response to the charge that this thesis sublates all 
differences into anonymity and thus brings Derrida to nihilism, my response is that 
Derrida is affirmative ultimately of difference and singularity in his move to respond 
ethically to the Other and reinscribe the Other into phenomenology. This thesis will
show consistently how thought is generally shadowed by its unthought, as the ghost of 
a text returns to haunt it. Hence Derrida’s move is a move to include this shadow of 
philosophy and Other of the text in showing that it is necessary to thinking and 
conceptualizing the One. Where I argue that difference is sameness, this move is not 
to flatten philosophy into an ahistorical mass, but to suggest that philosophy, in its 
various forms, is an expression of the Absolute and transcendental-empirical 
difference. Transcendental idealism and radical empiricism both require 
transcendental-empirical difference or difference in order to function, and what I will 
suggest throughout this thesis is that this a priori or transcendental-empirical 
difference should be foregrounded rather than suppressed by confining philosophy to 
either idealism or empiricism. Each thinking of the transcendental or empirical 
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requires its opposite in order to be conceptualized, hence the suggestion that 
difference translates into sameness is not a nihilistic suppression of identity, but 
affirming ultimately that metaphysics is essentially a structure that requires opposites 
to define itself. Since both transcendental and empirical are essential to the thinking of 
this structure, it makes no sense to define the transcendental without the empirical or 
the empirical without the transcendental. Rather philosophy is a double writing, 
dynamically consisting of both ideal and material, and if there is any anonymity or 
suppression of identity it is only the recognition that historically, philosophy has been 
constituted by metaphysics – which consists historically of both transcendental and 
empirical. These terms have not changed despite reconfigurations of philosophy either 
into pure idealism or pure empiricism. However each reincarnation of philosophy as 
either pure idealism or pure empiricism affirms the structurality of structure whether 
in affirming it as a centre or deviating from it as a non-centre. What does not change 
is the language of metaphysics and its terms such as transcendental and empirical 
which have haunted phenomenology and philosophy throughout. In all its 
incarnations thus, whether as pure idealism, or as pure empiricism, Derrida has 
demonstrated the necessity of repetition to thinking these terms as they do not exist 
separately but through iterability, or incarnation. Mind does not exist outside body, 
transcendental does not exist outside empirical, what remains is the essential dual 
nature of metaphysics that requires its opposite in order to be delineated and defined, 
philosophy is thus democratized by coming to terms with the equal necessity of both 
terms to thinking each other.
Against charges of nihilism, I would argue that reducing difference to 
sameness is not a move that suppresses identity but enables it. Where Derrida argues 
that Christian theology does not differ essentially from Heidegger’s atheistic 
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ontology, he is not consigning identity to nothing but demonstrating that these share 
more in common than is supposed in a strict division. Each term requires the 
exclusion and repudiation of the opposing term in order to be defined, and thus shares 
ultimately, the same metaphysical and ontological structure. It would be impossible to 
conceive of Christianity without its opposite, atheism, and thus upholding their 
similarity is not a move of suppressing identity but a move to recognize the structural 
necessity of thinking the ghost or shadow of a text in order to conceptualize it. Also, 
Derrida does not maintain the difference is ultimately a non-difference, but a 
paradoxical simultaneous similarity and difference. The transcendental is and is not 
the empirical because it precedes it but has to be realized through it. Hence it both is, 
and is not the empirical. The difference is not suppressed but doubled into a 
paradoxical relation of simultaneous similarity and difference.
I will also take pains to suggest throughout this thesis that Derrida is not a 
materialist but a thinker of paradox and aporia. It is the aporia that the transcendental 
both is and is not the empirical that has sustained metaphysics, due to the fact that the 
phenomenological reduction can only be  enabled if the difference between the 
transcendental and empirical is a difference which is nothing. Hence the difference is 
paradoxically a simultaneous similarity and difference. Hence against the charges of 
nihilism, Derrida is not a suppressor of differences but a democratic thinker of the 
Other that is necessary to thinking the one. Derrida is a thinker of the double writing 
that is necessary to conceptuality and thus does not suppress identity but only expands 
and multiplies it in showing that opposites require each other to sustain the 
metaphysical project. Hence in suggesting that differences are ultimately similarities, 
Derrida is not homogenizing philosophy, rather he is elucidating the base conditions 
necessary to thinking philosophy – each term requires its Other to delineate itself 
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against, and hence there can be no strict ontological division or either/or logic, rather 
it is the thinking of the third space, the neither/nor and ultimately transcendental-
empirical difference which will allow us to view philosophy as a whole which is 
organic and constituent of parts rather than a strict idealism or strict empiricism. 
Derrida is thus a democratizer of phenomenology to the extent that he recognizes that 
transcendental and empirical are empty terms which mean nothing separately, but 
only exist in relation to each other and metaphysics as an organic structure and whole. 
Derrida is then not a nihilist but a thinker of opposites and the paradox that one term 
cannot function without its opposing term, phenomenology’s quest for an either/or 
truth in a pure idealism or pure empiricism thus cannot hold because these terms only 
mean something in relation to each other. In response to charges of nihilism then, my 
argument is that Derrida doubles identity instead of relegating it to nothing. Derrida 
does this through demonstrating that the unthought forms the basis of thought and the 
ghost of a text always returns to haunt it.
In this sense, this thesis maintains the right to viewing Derrida as a thinker of 
paradox in simultaneous similarity and difference rather than a thinker of pure 
difference in the vein of Deleuze, Zizek, Badiou or Delanda. While these thinkers are 
valuable in bringing insights to the tyranny of homogeneity and the Same, these 
thinkers paradoxically commit the same crime that they accuse idealists of by 
committing philosophy to pure materialism. As argued throughout this thesis, because 
materialism exists only in relation to idealism, one would suppress transcendental-
empirical difference in committing to a pure empiricism, materialism or pure realm of 
difference. Derrida is a thinker not committed to thinking pure difference but paradox, 
simultaneous similarity and difference, identity in non-identity, but in doing so he 
does not commit all to the realm of the Same of an ahistorical mass because he 
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doubles ontology. He does this by committing us to see opposing points of view, in 
their separate uniqueness and integrity, without committing and consigning these to a 
realm of a sublated ideal a la Hegel. Derrida is then far from being a nihilist but a 
thinker that enables us to see that philosophy consists dynamically of opposites and 
each term is essential to illuminating the other, hence a pure idealism or pure 
empiricism does not stand. Derrida is a thinker of irreducible difference in 
transcendental-empirical difference being the ultimate difference that grounds 
philosophy, hence far from being destructive or a nihilist, Derrida is profoundly 
affirmative. Derrida affirms opposites, but shows their necessity to thinking each 
other, and thus includes the Other and democratizes philosophy by demonstrating that 
philosophy cannot function without this a priori difference or oppositionality.
Building on a priori difference, my readings of the quasi-transcendental also 
take a point of departure from contemporary readers of Derrida such as Leonard 
Lawlor, Rodolphe Gasche, and Paola Marrati. Leonard Lawlor argues that the quasi-
transcendental is defined as immanence- “In Derrida, there is a double necessity 
between an indefinite series of opposites, such as presence and absence, genesis and 
structure, form and content, law and arbitrariness, thought and unthought, empirical 
and transcendental, origin and retreat, foundation and founded, and so on.” 8 Lawlor 
then pronounces “Immanence is complete”. I will argue that the relation between the 
transcendental and empirical is not immanence but paradoxical identity in non-
identity, sameness in difference rather than an immanent relation that relates 
transcendental to empirical in a straightforward mutual implication as immanence 
implies. Paola Marrati defines the quasi-transcendental as the contamination of the 
                                               
8 Leonard Lawlor. The Implications of Immanence- Toward a New Concept of Life. Fordham 
University Press, 4.
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transcendental and empirical- “In Derrida’s work, the confrontation with Husserl and 
Heidegger, with a thought of the transcendental and an ontology of temporality, takes 
the form of an irreducible contamination, a contamination, first of all, of finitude and 
infinitude, of life and death.” 9  I will argue that it is not a mere contamination of the
transcendental and empirical as this implies a sort of conflation and straightforward 
mutual implication but the relation of the transcendental to empirical in a relation of 
paradoxical identity in non-identity. Rodolphe Gasche comes closer to my 
interpretation of the quasi-transcendental when he writes, “The quasi-transcendentals 
are, on the contrary, conditions of possibility and impossibility concerning the 
conceptual difference between subject and object and even between Dasein and 
Being.”10 However while I agree with Gasche that the quasi-transcendental is a meta-
condition of metaphysics determining the transcendental and empirical through the 
dynamic relation of iterability and differance, I diverge from his interpretation of the 
transcendental and empirical as a relationship of infrastructure as I do not conceive 
the relation between the transcendental and empirical as infrastructural or systemic, 
but something that exceeds the very thinking of system. This is because it is primarily 
a paradox and non-system of simultaneous identity and difference, sameness in 
difference, identity in non-identity which is irreducible to the conceptualization of this 
relation as systemic or infrastructural.
In this thesis, I will be discussing the relation of phenomenology to 
deconstruction. The relation between phenomenology and deconstruction has been 
misconstrued by contemporary phenomenologists to be one of interruption and 
disruption. Contemporary phenomenologists regard Derrida as a destroyer of 
                                               
9 Paola Marrati,  Genesis and trace- Derrida reading Husserl and Heidegger. Stanford, Stanford 
University Press; 2004.2.
10 Gasche, Roldophe. The Tain of the Mirror. Harvard University Press, 1988. 317.
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phenomenology. Contrary to this assertion, my thesis will suggest that Derrida 
contributes to the phenomenological project by discovering its conditions of 
possibility and thus strengthens it by offering a meta-phenomenological critique of it, 
critique that does not serve to destroy but affirm and strengthen by bringing 
phenomenology to terms with its conditions of possibility. In my discussion of 
Husserl I will demonstrate, through Derridean readings of phenomenology, that 
transcendental is nothing outside the empirical through iterability and differance. 
Likewise, I will demonstrate that radical empiricists such as Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, Levinas, Blanchot and Ricouer require the transcendental as a point of 
exclusion from their philosophies in order to maintain their respective empiricisms. 
Husserl’s transcendental requires the empirical to be excluded in order to establish his 
idealism, just as the radical empiricisms of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Blanchot, 
Levinas and Ricoeur require the transcendental to be excluded from their empiricisms, 
accounting for the transcendental on empirical grounds, in order to establish them. 
Derrida shows that each text is inescapably haunted by its double, and hence 
deconstruction becomes a double science and a double-writing, in which the ghost of 
a text returns to haunt it through aporia and the delimitation of limit. Truth is thus 
neither transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-transcendental as the transcendental is 
nothing outside the empirical and vice versa. Truth is differance, or the difference 
between the transcendental and empirical rather than belonging to either side as the 
transcendental is simultaneously the empirical, related in paradoxical simultaneous 
similarity and difference, identity and non-identity. The transcendental is and is not 
the empirical, their difference translates into a sameness, as the transcendental and 
empirical are separated by a difference which is not a difference, differance. 
Transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion, hence the divide of 
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phenomenology into strict idealism or empiricism is based upon an aporia because 
these exist only in relation to each other through iterability and differance. This thesis 
thus demonstrates that Derrida saves phenomenology by addressing the problem of 
transcendental and empirical genesis through his concepts of differance, iterability 
and the quasi-transcendental. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology in a more 
powerful form through bringing it to terms with its condition of possibility as the 
quasi-transcendental. This is because it is the quasi-transcendental which institutes the 
possibility of transcendental-empirical distinction and the impossibility of their 
separation as the transcendental and empirical exist only in dynamic relation to each 
other through differance and iterability. Derrida thus enables phenomenology to be 
reflexive about the conditions that bring about its mode of production and 
functioning. In this way, Derrida strengthens and renders the phenomenological 
project more powerfully than it would have otherwise been without his intervention. 
Differance, the quasi-transcendental and iterability will be shown to be conditions that 
phenomenology cannot function without. Derrida’s meta-phenomenology thus saves 
phenomelogy from its fixation over a pseudo crisis or struggle over transcendental or 
empirical truth, because truth is neither transcendental nor empirical, indeed these 
terms are incoherent as entities separate from each other as the transcendental is 
simultaneously the empirical and does not exist outside a dynamic relation to the 
empirical through iterability and differance. As transcendental empirical difference is 
an illusion, truth rather is quasi-transcendental, neither transcendental nor empirical 
but the paradoxical space between that allows the thinking of both. This thesis thus 
argues that Derrida rescues phenomenology from its crisis of origins and truth by 
demonstrating that the relationship between the transcendental and empirical is 
dynamic and interdependent, through iterability and differance, hence one cannot 
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define one term without the other as each term requires the exclusion of the other for 
the distinction to be upheld. Hence, truth is differance and the quasi-transcendental, 
the difference between the transcendental and empirical which is the foundation for 
thinking both.
In this chapter I have outlined the reception of Derrida in phenomenology as 
well as discussed definitions of the quasi-transcendental by Bennington and Weber. I 
have also discussed Barry Smith, a critic who has popularized misconceptions of 
Derrida and addressed such misconceptions. I also discussed my points of divergence 
from Barry Smith and contemporary readers of Derrida. In the next chapter I further 
review secondary resources from the phenomenological field and outline Derrida’s 
response to phenomenology through his discovery of the quasi-transcendental – that 
which is neither transcendental nor empirical but determines the thinking of both.
32
Review of the phenomenological field and Derrida’s intervention
In this chapter I will review literature in the phenomenological field and 
outline Derrida’s response. Derrida demonstrates that transcendental is not 
conceivable without the empirical and vice versa as these come into being through 
differance and iterability. Truth is thus neither transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-
transcendental, a space between that allows the thinking of both. Upholders of the 
transcendental such as Husserl require the empirical to be excluded to establish 
idealism, whereas empiricists require the the transcendental to be accounted for on 
empirical grounds, thus excluding the transcendental. Hence truth is neither 
transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-transcendental. The quasi-transcendental is the 
difference between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of 
both.
Joseph J Kockelmans, in his book, Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology, 
represents wide-spread conceptions in Husserlian scholarship, such as that the 
transcendental reduction was necessary to bring about a rigorous a priori science of 
phenomenology. This is to be distinguished from the natural attitude or empirical 
positivism and relativism of the sciences in Husserl’s time. Critics such as 
Kockelmans uphold Husserl’s transcendental-empirical distinction, as they see the 
need to distinguish phenomenology as an a priori science, or transcendental idealism,
from the natural attitude or empirical, positivistic, and hence relative and contingent 
sciences. As we will explore in subsequent chapters on Derrida’s readings on Husserl, 
this distinction between the transcendental and empirical is incoherent, as Derrida 
argues that the transcendental is nothing outside its iteration or repetition as the 
empirical. The transcendental is nothing outside the empirical and has to be repeated 
with a difference through the distinguishing movement of the trace. The trace only 
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retrospectively produces the transcendental and empirical.  Kockelmans concurs with 
Husserl on the purifying function of the transcendental reduction to produce an a 
priori science. An a priori science brackets the empirical or the life world as 
contingent and relative to produce an absolute science grounded in transcendental 
idealism. This would ground phenomenology as a rigorous science, in a solid, 
unshakeable fashion. Kockelmans, as with most other critics, takes pains to 
distinguish essence and intuition from fact and the empirical, and to posit 
transcendent and noema as the basis of immanent and noesis. 
In other words, Kockelmans, as with most other Husserlian scholars, posits the 
transcendental as the a priori condition of possibility as the empirical. With our 
subsequent readings of Derrida on Husserl, we will show that the condition of 
possibility of phenomenology is differance, rather than the transcendental. It is the 
distinguishing movement of the trace that produces the transcendental and empirical 
through the movement of iterability, rather than solely the transcendental. 
Traditionally the transcendental is thought to constitute the empirical, but this thesis 
will show that it is differance which produces both transcendental and empirical, 
through the distinguishing movement of the trace. Derrida’s phenomenology posits 
differance and the trace as the meta-condition that produces transcendental genesis 
and the retrospective division of transcendental and empirical as such - which Derrida 
acknowledges as an illusory distinction. This is because differance or the trace 
distinguishes nothing and separates nothing. The rigid distinction between the 
transcendental and empirical which many scholars of Husserl such as Kockelmans 
hold, is thus shown to be an illusory distinction, and a theatricality, which produces 
the illusion that transcendental and empirical as distinct when they are in fact, the 
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same. The transcendental is nothing outside the empirical and the trace or differance 
distinguishes nothing and separates nothing as a priori difference. 
Likewise, renowned Husserl scholar J N Mohanty, in The Philosophy of 
Edmund Husserl, upholds that the reduction was necessary to purify transcendental 
phenomenology and to distinguish phenomenology from naturalist psychologism. 
Mohanty defends the anti-psychologism of Husserl as necessary to preserve 
phenomenology as an eidetic and a priori science of foundations, which forms the 
basis of naturalist science or the life-world. Mohanty defends Husserl’s anti-
empiricism and criticism of naturalist psychologism as necessary for the institution of 
his transcendental idealism as a purified and absolute phenomenology. In his readings 
of Logical Investigations, Mohanty takes similar pains to uphold the distinctions 
between fact and essence, ideal and real, Sinn and Bedeutung, expression and 
indication. The argument of Mohanty follows Husserl’s thesis that the ideal or 
transcendent forms the basis of the real or immanent. Mohanty thus upholds the 
distinctions between transcendental and empirical that Husserl makes in Ideas and 
Logical Investigations and seeks to establish Husserl as an idealist in the tradition of 
Descartes, Plato and Kant. As we will eventually see with our readings of Derrida’s 
Speech and Phenomena, expression does not exist without indication, expression is as 
much a sign as indication. The impossibility of the distinction between expression and 
indication is its own possibility. Expression and indication are the same, rather than 
mutually exclusive, just as the transcendental is nothing outside its iteration as the 
empirical. The transcendental comes into being only through iterability, or repetition 
with a difference of the transcendental in the empirical. The transcendental thus has to 
be mediated in the empirical through iterability in order to come into being, indeed it 
is only an illusion that the transcendental and empirical are distinct as these are 
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produced only through the retrospective division of the trace. The trace, or differance, 
distinguishes nothing, and separates nothing, and thus maintains the illusion that the 
transcendental and empirical are distinct; when they are the same. Mohanty defends 
Husserl as an essentialist, as we will see with our readings of Derrida on Husserl, the 
phenomenological reduction that isolates the transcendental is a theatrical 
performance. It is theatricality rather than a strict ontological divide, as nothing 
distinguishes the transcendental and empirical. As we will read with Derrida, the 
transcendental is not the condition of possibility for the empirical. Instead it originates 
from the meta-condition of differance, or the interval between the transcendental and 
empirical that produces both, through the retrospective division of the trace.
Matheson Russell, in Husserl- A Guide for the Perplexed defines the 
transcendental reduction as the operation which brings into view the fundamental 
subject matter of Husserlian phenomenology : i.e. pure intentional consciousness and 
isolates it as a sphere of being for investigation. According to Russell, “before Husserl 
developed the method of transcendental reduction, certain features of intentional 
consciousness had already announced themselves to philosophers and psychologists 
but had done so in a relatively haphazard and ad hoc fashion. Until a clear 
methodological way of access to transcendental subjectivity is secured, Husserl 
thought, these initial insights into intentionality would remain partial and unscientific. 
Phenomenology cannot hope to attain the status of a fully-fledged science, so long as 
it captures only occasional, and fleeting glimpses of intentional being. The 
phenomenon of intentionality needs to be brought into captivity and studied under the 
microscope.”11 For Russell, “transcendental reduction” is the tool to do just that. 
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Russell describes the reduction as “the suspension of the natural attitude”, “the 
turning of regard (or the gaze),” the “exclusion of transcendencies”, the “bracketing of 
existence” the “refraining from positing”, and the “placing of objects into inverted 
commas”. Russell defends the reduction as necessary to resolve the crisis of the 
European sciences, which was lapsing into relativism and uncertainty. Russell thus 
discusses the reduction as the tool to put intentionality into intense focus, and bracket 
out the contingent and relative life-world. As I will discuss in my chapters on Husserl, 
the phenomenological reduction is theatrical rather than ontological as the 
transcendental does not exist outside its iteration as the empirical. The reduction can 
only be enabled if the transcendental and empirical is distinguished by nothing, so 
paradoxically the reduction is more a staging of difference than an actual difference. 
Differance, or a difference which translates as nothing, separates the transcendental 
and empirical, and hence the reduction is not an ontologically dividing act but the 
theatrical performance of the illusion of difference. 
J L Mehta, in Martin Heidegger- The Way and the Vision, holds that 
Heidegger’s enterprise was an attempt to overcome metaphysics, to think the 
unthought of Western philosophy. This was a move to go beyond essence and 
idealism, gearing towards thinking of philosophy as ontology or existence and Being. 
Heidegger, for Mehta, represented an attempt to overcome metaphysics in order to 
return philosophy to ontology, or a thinking of philosophy as Being-in-the-world or 
existential facticity. Like the scholars on Husserl, Mehta’s defence of Heidegger’s 
reversal of metaphysics is a form of theoretical essentialism. We will eventually see 
with Derrida that truth is neither transcendental nor empirical, but located in the space 
of differance or the quasi-transcendental. Derrida’s meta-phenomenology posits 
differance as the meta-condition that structures both forms of phenomenological 
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scholarship, truth is to be located in the space of the between, neither transcendental 
nor empirical, but quasi-transcendental. Husserlian idealism and Heideggerean 
existentialism represent two extremes of philosophy and non-philosophy or 
metaphysics and anti-metaphysics. What Derrida’s intervention does is show the 
impossibility of choosing between the two, truth is rather the aporia or space of 
undecidability, between transcendental and empirical, philosophy and non-
philosophy. As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth is mediation, 
the between, differance, or quasi-transcendental. Mehta describes the fundamental 
tenets of Heidegger’s thought as a thinking of Being or ontology and existential 
facticity or Being-in-the-world as a more fundamental form of philosophy, the 
essence of Being being its temporality and thrown-ness rather than in an ideal 
essence. This reversal of metaphysics to embrace existence and Being, as we will see 
with our readings of Derrida on Heidegger, is a repetition of metaphysics as it 
borrows from the metaphysical vocabulary and ontological structure of metaphysics. 
It thus remains bound to metaphysics, only repeating it in a negative metaphysics or a 
reversal of Platonism, which remains a Platonism, and a form of metaphysics. Derrida 
thus shows that Heidegger does not manage to overcome, destroy, or escape 
metaphysics as he sets out to do, with his emphasis on philosophy as destruction or 
the overcoming of metaphysics. 
Richard Polt, in Heidegger- An Introduction, describes Heidegger’s 
destruction as a meticulous analysis and criticism. Polt describes Heidegger’s 
deconstruction as necessary because “Dasein is its past. Without our inherited 
interpretations of the world, we would not be Dasein at all. We would be an animal 
without a culture, language or norms. “12Polt describes our past as “active in the 
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present, making it possible for us to operate as Dasein. This applies to philosophy as 
well.”13 Polt describes the problem as “the fact that we take our inherited 
interpretation as self-evident. We assume that our own way of acting and thinking is 
the only way, and we suppress the fact that it has historical origins.” 14While Polt 
argues that Heidegger was not trying to escape from the past altogether, Heidegger’s 
rhetoric about destruction as the overcoming of metaphysics and its inheritance, and 
his pronouncements about the “end of philosophy”, tend to confirm Derrida’s 
suspicions that Heidegger reverses metaphysics only to repeat it by being bound to its 
vocabulary and ontological structure. As I will argue in my chapter on Heidegger, to 
destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology means to overcome metaphysics by 
moving beyond philosophy as realism and idealism, which are primarily 
epistemological, into philosophy as ontology, which involves a primordial grasp of 
philosophy as the disclosure or unconcealing of Being. As Heidegger has argued, 
destruction is not liquidating but putting aside and dismantling assertions about 
philosophy which are merely historical. In Derrida’s reading, Heidegger’s destruction 
of metaphysics as non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics remains a form of 
metaphysics. Thus it is ultimately a destruction of metaphysics is simply a repetition 
of it. Derrida thus demonstrates that metaphysics is repeated even in its destruction 
and thus is no different or the same as non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics as 
they share the same ontological structure and vocabulary.
Kevin J Vanhoozer, in Biblical narrative in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 
argues that Ricoeur sacralises secular hermeneutics and brings to phenomenology 




theological concepts of grace, hope and love. 15Vanhoozer argues that Riceour’s 
hermeneutic is a theology of mediation that brings together finite and infinite, divinity 
and man, and explores the interweaving and intersections between the two with his 
concepts of disproportion, fallen-ness and sin, in which the finitude of man mediates 
the infinite through, as man is fallible, and fallen. 16Vanhoozer argues that in Fallible 
Man “Ricoeur shows that human being is ‘fallible’- evil is here admitted as a 
possibility.”17 Vanhoozer argues that “fallibility is for Ricoeur the constitutional 
weakness of human being, its ‘disproportion’ between the intended meaning of 
freedom and the experience of finitude.”18 As I will examine in a later chapter on 
Ricoeur, Ricoeur’s fallibility and disproportion differs from Derrida’s differance in its 
interest less in the conditions of possibility for phenomenology than with theological 
conceptions of man as fallen and finite. Derrida’s mediation accounts for the genesis 
of the transcendental and empirical, through the differentiating movement of the trace, 
thus constituting a meta-phenomenology. In contrast, Ricoeur’s notion of mediation is 
a theological interest in the disproportion and fallen-ness which man’s existential 
condition brings to bear on expressing the infinite in an inadequate and 
incommensurate manner.
W. David Hall, in Paul Ricoeur- The Poetic Imperative argues that Ricouer set 
Levinas and Husserl in dialogue on the constituting of the self in relation to Other. 
Hall argues that Ricoeur mobilizes Levinas against Husserl, in concurring that both 
criticize Husserl’s phenomenological reduction of the other to an alter-ego, that is, 
another self. Hall argues that Levinas thought this “is not an encounter with the other, 
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but rather, an exclusion of the other, by reducing the other to an alter-ego. I do not 
encounter the other but my projection of him/her.”19 Hall argues that “Levinas turned 
Husserl’s idea of constitution around- the self does not ‘constitute’ the other through 
the reduction to alter-ego. Rather, the self is passively constituted in the confrontation 
with radical alterity, the fundamental ‘otherness’ of the other. This movement of the 
self toward the other, that is, from the reduction to ownness through pairing and 
analogical appresentation to the position of a community of intersubjective monads, is 
precisely what Levinas called into question.”20 Hall argues that “ Levinas reversed the 
order of priority in the constitutive relationship that exists between self and other- the 
other is not constituted through my intentional consciousness, which appresents the 
other as my alter-ego. Rather, I am the face of the other, which calls me in the 
accusative.” 21Hall points out that “against Husserl, Levinas argued that the self does 
not exist as an ego. While Husserl conceived the ego as a solitary monad intentionally 
apprehending the world through the reduction of everything that is not self, Levinas 
claimed that the condition for the genesis of the self is proximity and 
communication.” 22Hall argues that “ the self only exists in the first person of a 
dialogic summons as the I who answers the call with the response ‘Here I am’.”23 The 
self is constituted primordially as an ethical relationship, as a responsibility that is 
called into existence by the Other. In his essay, “At this moment, Here I am” Derrida 
argues that Levinas' ontology of the relation to the self to other in the pronouncement 
of “here I am” is predicated on a notion of being as presence, which is not strictly 
possible, because the self is always iterated and produced as a trace with the utterance  
                                               







“here I am”. Hence Derrida argues that Levinas has not overcome Heidegger's notions 
of being and presence. Derrida also criticizes Levinas' designation of woman as 
“wholly Other”, as this is equally essentialist and subscribes to a metaphysical notion 
of essence, in which woman as wholly Other is parasitic and secondary to Man. 
Derrida deconstructs the male and female relation to reveal that these are essentially 
the same rather than “wholly Other”. Derrida also criticizes Levinas' notion of the 
traumatism of the Other, and the idea that the Other obligates one, because the 
ontological definition does not hold between self and Other, self is an unstable 
concept and indistinguishable from the Other, indeed we see in auto-affection that self 
has to relate to itself primarily before it contemplates a relation with the Other 
because it does not otherwise have a concept of difference, division from the self or 
separation from the self.  
David Pellauer, in Ricoeur- A Guide for the Perplexed argues that “ the 
disproportion of human being renders it ‘pathetic’, the moment when the concept of 
fallibility links up with the lived experience of an impoverished or wretched existence 
that does not actually fulfil its promise.”24 As a first approximation of this moment, 
Pellauer argues that “he returns to the connection between knowing and feeling as it 
involves degrees of feeling, where feeling itself, like knowledge, is intentional in that 
it refers to something other than itself.” 25Pellauer argues that “whereas knowledge 
sets up a cleavage between the knowing subject and known object, feeling ‘restores 
our complicity with the world, our inherence in and belonging to it, something more 
profound than all polarity and duality.’ Philosophical reflection can talk about this, 
but never quite really capture it experientially or ‘know’ it except indirectly, leading 
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many philosophers mistakenly to reduce feeling to something merely subjective or at 
best having to do with ‘values’ that themselves are subjective and not objective. 
Feeling, instead, is like knowing, but also different from it, pointing to something like 
an inner conflict within ourselves”. 26Pellauer argues that “here is where degrees of 
feeling come into play, running from love of the world through need to desire and 
introducing the possible mistake of confusing pleasure with happiness.”27 Pellauer 
argues that “while pleasure is always finite, the perfection of happiness is infinite 
because it is meant to be all encompassing. But that we can mistake pleasure for 
happiness, prefer it, already points to the possibility of a bad choice, and through it to 
evil. Indeed, while it may look as though the origin of evil may lie more on the 
affective than on the cognitive level, it is intimately intertwined with both of them.” 
28As I will argue in my chapter on Ricoeur, this concern with fallibility and 
disproportion with the infinite is to be distinguished from Derrida’s differance, which 
is more meta-phenomenological with its concern with iterability and transcendental-
empirical mediation rather than theological or Christian in its concern with fallen-
ness, finitude and sin. Derrida also does not emphasize the affective aspects of 
phenomenology such as misery as a human condition or subject-object conflation like 
Ricoeur as his interest is rather, the meta-conditions for phenomenology such as 
iterability and differance, instead of re-situating phenomenology as an affective; or 
finite science of mind like Ricoeur. 
Colin Davis, in Levinas- An Introduction, points out that Levinas’ philosophy 
is a rescue of the Other from the oppression of the Same.  As Davis explains Totality 
and Infinity, Levinas establishes a vocabulary to replace the categories of traditional 
thought- instead of totality, Being and ontology, he offers infinity exteriority and 
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metaphysics. As Davis argues, “Totality and Infinity revolves around an encounter 
between self and Other. This encounter cannot be explained in exclusively ontological 
terms because it involves more than Being, entailing a breach which cannot be 
understood as part of Being’s relationship with itself. The encounter is also not an 
empirical event (though it may be enacted in any number of empirical events). Rather 
it is, in terms continually used by Levinas, original, essential, fundamental. This is 
because the encounter with the Other lies at the origin of the separateness of the self, 
only by discovering the irreducibility of the alterity of the Other can I understand that 
I am neither solipsitically alone in the world not part of a totality to which all others 
also belong.”29 This encounter, Davis argues, Levinas insists is ethical, and the ethical 
bond with the Other is the most fundamental subject for philosophical reflection, 
because there is nothing that precedes or has priority over it. 
According to Amit Pinchevski in By Way of Interruption, Levinas and the 
ethics of communication, “Levinas’ contention is ethical- ethics is not a secondary 
level of knowledge, nor is it an outcome of a certain social structure- Levinas regards 
ethics as first philosophy. The critique of ontology brings Levinas to conceive of the 
relation to the Other ‘otherwise than being’ and to found it ‘beyond essence’. Ethics, 
as an involvement with that which escapes definition and incorporation but still 
confronts, is irreducible to ontology- it does not have an essence. Its ‘essence’ is 
precisely to unsettle essences, and its ‘identity’ is not to have an identity, to undo 
identities”.30 According to Pinchevski, “concern for the Other is not a product of 
rational thought or calculation, nor is it a result of an agreement enforced by social 
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institutions. Concern for the Other is the very basis of subjectivity. The involvement 
with an irreconcilable otherness is preontolopgical and prior to any social contract 
since the experience of alterity is the most fundamental experience of subjectivity. 
Subjectivity is subjection to the Other, inasmuch as it is an exposure and openness to 
otherness.” 31 Picnchevski describes the self as “fissured by the Other ‘despite itself’, 
always already in relation to the Other, an unthematizable relation, which comes to 
pass by awakening the self’s sensibility.”32 Derrida however will critique this flight 
towards the Other as a Jewish variant on metaphysics, rather than a reversal or 
negation of metaphysics. It remains a repetition of Greek philosophy in a Jewish sense 
rather than a departure from metaphysics, as I will examine in my chapter on Levinas.
Derrida argues that Jewish metaphysics repeats the fundamental ontological structure 
of Greek metaphysics and hence is no divergence from it but essentially the same.
Gerald L Bruns, in Maurice Blanchot- The Refusal of Philosophy, argues that 
according to Blanchot “thinking responsibility is something more than an ethical 
concept in The Writing of the Disaster. More exactly, its ethical meaning consists 
precisely in the encounter with the foreign that “separates me from myself (from the 
‘me’ that is mastery and power, from the free, speaking subject) and reveals the other 
in place of me, or it turns me into an autrui 33, situates me on his site as an exile or 
outsider face to face with something other than a face. In the Outside, responsibility is 
no longer to another, that is, it is no longer strictly philosophical or ethical, it is now a 
response to the impossible. Responsibility is encumbering and a burden of one to the 
Other. Levinas defines ‘responsibility’ as responding to the Other in an indeclinable 
fashion, as responding for oneself to the other person and its demand, and as 
responding for the other in the sense of substituting onself for the other person in its 
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responsibilities.” 34As Bruns argues, for Blanchot, this ethical demand of 
responsibility for the Other weighs heavily on the self as it denies one agency and 
places one at total command and domination of the Other.
Bruns argues that “Blanchot never hesitates to turn Levinas inside out on just 
this point ín the relation of the “Other to me” he says everything seems to reverse 
itself , by which he appears to mean I become the other to the other’s Same: ‘When 
the other crushes me into radical alienation, is my relation still a relation to the other? 
Is it not rather a relation to the ‘I’ of the master, to absolute egotistical force, to the 
dominator who predominates and ultimately wields the force of inquisitorial 
persecution?’. If so, then my response to the other must be one of ‘refusal, resistance, 
combat. However, this refusal, this resistance or combat, is not a counterattack- it is 
non-dialectical, like Bartleby’s ‘Í would prefer not to,’ which Blanchot thinks of as 
“the core of refusal.”35 Bartleby is Melville’s fictional American hero who refuses to 
submit to the demands of society by constantly reiterating “I prefer not to” to the 
demands of his employer. As Bruns argues, “this, Blanchot explains, ís why there 
must always be at least two languages, or two requirements- one dialectical, the other 
not, one where negativity is the task, the other not, one where negativity is the task, 
the other where the neutral remains apart, cut off from being and from not being.  The 
dialectical is an engagement of the Other on his terms, the taking on of encumbering 
responsibility, whereas non-dialectical response is a Bartlebyan one, the core of 
refusal, in refusing to participate in the asymmetric power-relation that responsibility 
for the Other puts one in.”36 As argued with the previous section of Levinas however, 
Blanchot’s phenomenology of suffering at the hands of the Other remains a repetition
                                               





of metaphysics through inverting the self-other relation into an assymetrical one 
rather than the traditional symmetrical relation of metaphysics. Derrida would thus 
argue that Blanchot, like Levinas, does not manage to escape metaphysics. As 
transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth is rather to be located in the 
quasi-transcendental, or the difference between self and other, presence and absence, 
or difference; rather than raising the Other to a totalizing and absolute concept as 
Blanchot and Levinas do. In his “Demeure” essay, Derrida deconstructs the division 
between fiction and testimony to show that they are not distinguishable but complicit.
Indeed, fiction is the condition of possibility for testimony, as the public and true 
notion of testimony has to be defined against the private and fictitious notion of 
literature, to establish itself as such. Death is also the impossible possibility that 
determines life, the division between them does not hold strictly because life is 
conditioned by an awareness of its limit as death. We thus see a blurring of 
boundaries between fiction and testimony, life and death in Blanchot's work because 
these dialectical oppositions are necessary to the definition of each term. Blanchots' 
work examines the space of the neuter, that which belongs to neither end of the 
dialectic and this is somewhat similar to Derrida's quasi-transcendental.
Remy C Kwant, in The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, 
argues that Merleau-Ponty “endeavours to understand the whole man, he sees man as 
a kind of unfolding of the body-subject. According to him, man is nothing else than a 
body-subject, provided we see this body-subject on all levels of its unfolding.”37
Kwant argues that Merleau-Ponty “repeatedly denies the existence of a separate 
principle in man, distinct from body. He would not be able to do so if in man, apart 
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from body-subject, there would be another form of subjectivity, for otherwise dualism 
would re-enter his philosophy by the back door.”38 Kwant argues that Merleau-
Ponty’s “philosophical thought shows a general tendency to reduce that which often is 
called the ‘light of the spirit’ to the chiaroscuro of the body.”39 As I will argue in my 
chapter on Merleau-Ponty, this reduction of man to corporeality likewise repeats 
metaphysics like Heidegger in a negative sense, and hence does not manage to escape 
metaphysics or overcome metaphysics. Phenomenology, according to Derrida, is the 
aporia between the transcendental and empirical rather than the privileging of either 
since transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. Phenomenology is 
conditioned by differance and the quasi-transcendental, or the difference between 
transcendental and empirical.
Derrida will argue that the reversal of the cogito and rethinking subjectivity in 
terms of embodiment and corporeality is a non-philsophy and anti-metaphysics that 
repeats metaphysics by negating and reversing it. Derrida’s notion of truth is quasi-
transcendental rather than anti-metaphysical like Merleau-Ponty’s, which locates truth 
in the difference or differance between transcendental and empirical. Rather than 
privilege idealism or empiricism as both camps have done, Derrida posits the quasi-
transcendental, differance, or the mediation between transcendental and empirical as 
the space of truth. Differance enables the thinking of both transcendental and 
empirical, and thus a thinking of the conditionality of structurality as differance is the 
true resolution to the impasse between idealism and post-metaphysics, or philosophy 
and non-philosophy. 
A common misconception of Derrida is that he continues the legacy of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger by negating the positive or the transcendental in favour of 




the negative or empirical, as Stanley Rosen argues in Hermeneutics as Politics. Rosen 
argues that Derrida’s differance is a nihilistic embrace of nothingness over the 
transcendental and an inversion of Hegel, as well as that contrary to Derrida, speech is 
superior to writing because of the politics encoded in the hierarchy: while one can 
adjust conversation according to the nature of the interlocutor, in the way that the 
equity of the judge adjusts the written law to the individual case, writing says the 
same thing to everyone. Rosen misses Derrida’s point entirely, which is to bring about 
democracy through his emphasis that speech is a form of writing and writing is hence 
prior to speech. Rosen also misses Derrida’s point on metaphysical conditioning by 
accusing him of being a nihilist and empiricist, Derrida rather locates the conditions 
of possibility of metaphysics as that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, but 
the difference between them, or differance. Out of differance arises the differentiating 
trace that distinguishes transcendental and empirical. This thesis argues, contrary to 
Rosen, that Derrida is not an empiricist, or nihilist, but posits the meta-conditions that 
enable metaphysical perpetuation and production- which are differance and iterability. 
The transcendental is nothing outside its iteration as the empirical, and hence arises 
not from transcendental as condition of possibility, but through the movement of 
repetition, or the trace. The trace retrospectively distinguishes transcendental and 
empirical. Derrida’s deconstruction is thus a meta-phenomenology rather than a 
negation or inversion of phenomenology as critics like Rosen argue.
Another critic who holds a view that Derrida continues Heidegger’s legacy is 
Paul Manithottil, in Difference at the Origin- Derrida’s Critique of Heidegger’s 
Philosophy of the Work of Art. Manithottil argues that deconstruction radicalizes the 
task of destruction inaugurated by Heidegger. I would like to demonstrate that 
Derrida’s work does not represent an extension of Heidegger’s as I do not believe, as 
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Manithottil argues, that Derrida is critical of Western metaphysics or that the aim of 
Derrida’s deconstruction is to undo the transcendental absolute of Western 
metaphysics. Derrida argues that the absolute is constituted by iterability and the 
trace, but does not in any way negate or invert the absolute, only investigating the 
conditions of possibility for its production. Manithottil further argues that Derrida 
reduces every concept to the play of the text. I contest Manithottil’s view that 
Derrida’s work negates presence and reduces everything to textuality. Rather, Derrida 
investigates the conditions of possibility for the perpetuation of presence and 
logocentrism, his arguments about textuality are not a reduction to the empirical but 
an argument about the fundamental mediation of meaning. The transcendental has to 
be iterated as the empirical and repeated in the empirical through the movement of 
differance and the trace rather than existing without a medium or in a vacuum as 
Husserl’s Cartesian reduction would have it. The transcendental exists only in and 
through iterability. This is what Derrida means by the statement, “There is nothing 
outside the text” 40, that truth or the absolute is irrevocably mediated, rather than 
existing without a medium, through iterability and repetition with a difference. 
In Structure, Sign and Play Derrida describes history as “a detour between two 
presences- between structure, sign and play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of 
deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and 
which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer 
turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, 
the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of 
metaphysics has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and 
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the end of play.”41  Derrida argues that there is no “question of choosing between the 
two, but to conceive of the common ground, differance of irreducible difference”42, 
the monstrous birth of the quasi-transcendental. The quasi-transcendental conceives of 
differance, or the interval between transcendental and empirical, as the condition of 
possibility and common ground for both transcendental and empirical idealism.
This passage from Writing and Difference was written while Derrida had been 
working on his subsequent manuscript Speech and Phenomena, and in it we see the 
genesis of Derrida’s thoughts on metaphysics. It is no longer a question of simply 
choosing between transcendental idealism or a metaphysics of presence and radical 
empiricism with Nietzsche and Heidegger, because each thought of either requires the 
opposing term as its relational other and defining axis. Idealism means nothing when 
defined in isolation from the empirical, just as empiricism is an empty term without 
its relation to the transcendental. In Husserl for instance, his maintenance of the 
transcendental subject depends on his exclusion of the indicative, just as Heidegger 
requires the exclusion of the ideal from his situated Being in order to maintain a pure 
Being untainted by Christian spirituality. Transcendental is not conceivable without 
the empirical and empirical is not conceivable without the transcendental, they are 
only related dynamically through iterability and repetition with a difference. Truth is 
then not localizable to transcendental or empirical, but situated in between as 
differance and the quasi-transcendental. Deconstruction thus proceeds by revealing 
the aporia that thought cannot do without its ghost or unthought and then proceeds 
towards transgressing the limit toward thinking the unthought of discourse and 
bringing it to light. Deconstruction is thus justice as it reveals the dynamic 
interdependency between discourse and its shadow or ghost. It proceeds to 
                                               




demonstrate that thought cannot do without its ghost or unthought. Deconstruction is 
the thinking of simultaneous identity and difference, identity in non-identity as a 
priori difference is necessary for thinking both terms which thus share the condition 
of being determined by this prior difference, hence difference translates into 
sameness. Deconstruction shows that the possibility of a distinction is simultaneously 
its impossibility as that which makes the distinction impossible, for instance what 
allows expression to exclude indication, is precisely the defining moment that upholds 
the distinction. It is necessary to exclude indication in order to maintain the 
transcendental subject, just as it is necessary for Heidegger to exclude Christian 
spirituality from his anthropological Being in order to maintain its worldliness and 
separation from the transcendental. Each moment of exclusion is necessary for the 
maintenance of the defining term as it means something only in relation to its other or 
unthought. Deconstruction is thus the thinking of the simultaneous similarity and 
difference, identity in non-identity of thought and its unthought. Deconstruction is the 
thought of the simultaneous one and its other, or simultaneous positive and negative, 
because the other or negative is the relational assumption that founds the possibility of 
thinking the one or positive. Deconstruction is thus the simultaneous thought of both 
one and other or both positive and negative, because these exist only in relation to 
each other, through iterability and differance. 
The trap that many contemporary commentators fall into is assuming that 
Derrida privileges the empirical and continues the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
as Martin Hagglund assumes in his book Radical Atheism. Hagglund describes 
Derrida as a materialist who dethrones the sacred in his texts. Likewise Michael 
Marder, in The Event of the Thing argues that deconstruction is a realism that detaches 
the object from ideal origins in a post-phenomenological turn, thus returning to the 
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thing as fundamentally empirical. My interpretation diverges from such 
interpretations of Derrida because I hold that they have failed to grasp the aporia of 
Derrida’s thought: you cannot think the transcendental without the empirical and vice 
versa, the transcendental and empirical are paradoxically similar and different, 
identical and non-identical. Derrida is not to be mistaken as an empiricist, rather he is 
a thinker of paradox, aporia, and the very conditions that make thought possible such 
as differance and iterability. Transcendental and empirical do not exist outside the 
structure of repetition as each term requires the other for the distinction to be upheld 
and only can be defined in relation to the other term as each term, is, on its own, an 
empty term that requires the exclusion of the other to be thought and conceptualised. 
The transcendental has to be excluded from the empirical to be defined, just as the 
empirical has to be excluded from the transcendental to be defined. As we will read 
with the chapters on Husserl, his idealism can only stand with the expulsion and 
exclusion of indication from his philosophy, just as radical empiricists such as 
Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Blanchot require the transcendental 
to be excluded from their philosophies to define them, accounting for the 
transcendental on empirical grounds. This act of exclusion is thus necessary, yet 
mistaken about the fundamental structure of metaphysics because transcendental and 
empirical only exist in relation to each other through iterability and differance. As 
Derrida demonstrates, philosophy since Plato has assumed the ontological structure 
and vocabulary of metaphysics, whether it has affirmed it as philosophy or deviated 
from it as non-philosophy. Transcendental and empirical are thus terms that are 
inscribed in language, whether we associate or disassociate ourselves from these 
terms, these metaphysical terms haunt the structure and vocabulary of our philosophy. 
True philosophy would, thus, as Derrida demonstrates, come to terms with the 
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necessity of both terms to thinking each other and acknowledge the quasi-
transcendental, the between, the neither transcendental nor empirical, as the 
paradoxical space between that determines the thinking of both, or differance.
In this survey of secondary sources on phenomenology I have located the 
problematic of an aporia that lies at its center. Phenomenology has divided itself itself 
into transcendental idealism or empirical idealism and non-philosophy. In both these 
incarnations of phenomenology, Husserl’s transcendental idealism and the radical 
empiricism in the philosophies of Heidegger, Levinas, Ricoeur, Blanchot and 
Merleau-Ponty, lies a form of theoretical essentialism and blindness to the meta-
condition that structures phenomenology. It is differance, the space or interval 
between the transcendental and empirical which conditions and produces both the 
transcendental and empirical through the retrospective movement of the trace. 
Derrida’s contribution to phenomenology, as I will argue in this thesis, is his 
discovery of the quasi-transcendental, or the interval between the transcendental and 
empirical which determines phenomenology. It does this through the productive and
differentiating movement of the trace. As transcendental-empirical difference is an 
illusion, then truth would be neither transcendental nor empirical. Rather the 
difference or differance between transcendental and empirical would be its meta-
condition and that which enables the thinking of its structurality. Truth is neither 
presence nor absence, Jew or Greek, being or non-being, self or other but the 
difference and differance between these two extremes, Derrida emphasizes the 
importance of iterability or repetition of both extremes as essentially the same, truth is 
thus quasi-transcendental or the interval between transcendental and empirical which 
enables both. The concept is marked by its signature, or its breaking away from the 
origin, to signify a different kind of writing in order to communicate – which is the 
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logic of the graft, intervening in order to signify anew, and renovate meaning and 
experience, to mark a double writing, and effect a displacement of the traditional 
hierarchy of meaning and a reversal. Deconstruction examines these principles of 
displacement and reversal, in order to bring about democracy, and emphasize writing 
as a primary form of communication. Writing brings about a force of signification that 
exceeds its origin, so there is always a surplus and excess of meaning, which can 
never be reduced to a univocal signified. In doing so deconstruction turns philosophy 
towards infinite possibility rather than a hierarchy, as meaning always exceeds its 
origin. Origin itself is an illusion and supplemented by the function and logic of the 
trace, which displaces it in order to communicate.  Derrida inscribes in 
phenomenology it a measure of fallibility through his demonstrations that thought is 
always contaminated by its unthought, the ideal is always contaminated by 
contingency and undecidability. Derrida’s arguments are modes of interrogation in 
which he questions the basis of presence, fully given to itself, uncontaminated by 
absence, contingency, the empirical, the Other, and as such inscribes the necessity of 
incarnation and a necessity for the mark to fail as presence as it has to differ from 
itself materially in order to be realized. Derrida thus inscribes failure in 
phenomenology, its necessity for the mark to die and survive itself as the trace to live 
on in the material world, and thus rescues phenomenology by demonstrating that its 




In this chapter I will be examining Derrida’s methodology through reading 
various Derrida texts that describe his method. I will describe differance, the quasi-
transcendental and iterability as essential to coming to an understanding of Derrida’s 
method. Derrida discovers that the transcendental and empirical are dynamically 
related through differance and iterability, or repetition with a difference. The 
transcendental is thus not conceivable outside of its relation to the empirical, and vice 
versa. Each moment of exclusion of the transcendental from the empirical is 
necessary for maintaining the transcendental subject in Husserl, just as Heidegger’s 
empirical Being requires the exclusion of Christian ideology, accounting for the 
transcendental on empirical grounds, for his radical worldliness to be defined. 
Transcendental is thus not conceivable without the empirical and vice versa.
Derrida overcomes logocentrism by exceeding the text in locating the point of 
exteriority and transcending its totality.  This he does through an acknowledgement of 
differance, the point of interaction between philosophy and empiricism, or philosophy 
and non-philosophy. Differance is the acknowledgement of the economy of 
conceptual oppositions of the structure within totality. These conceptual oppositions 
are the condition of possibility for philosophy. This forges a doubling of philosophy 
because empiricism had been traditionally relegated to the place of supplement or 
absence. In place of totality, Derrida acknowledges the play between presence and 
absence which makes philosophy possible. By acknowledging that there is “nothing 
outside the text”43, Derrida is democratizing philosophy by demolishing the hierarchy 
of representation that claims that signified, or ideal, is superior to image, or sign. This 
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is because in Derrida's reading the supplement, or the sign, is interchangeable with the 
signified and is in fact the very condition of its possibility. The hierarchy between 
speech and writing also collapses as Derrida argues that “there never has been 
anything but writing”. 44 There is no external referent or transcendental signified that 
divides representation into signifier and signified, but a chain of supplements that 
infinitely refer to each other. Derrida thus overcomes totality and logocentrism by 
acknowledging the quasi-transcendental, which is the repetition of the transcendental 
in the empirical. Derrida's method is to locate the limit of the text, or the limit of 
philosophy, and transgress it towards what it had negated or what had been 
suppressed within the economy of its conceptual oppositions. Deconstruction 
acknowledges this as a double writing through iterability and the concept of signature. 
The absolute is only perpetuated by the trace. The transcendental is only activated 
through its repetition as the empirical in iterability. The transcendental does not exist 
outside the empirical, just as the empirical does not exist outside the transcendental 
through repetition.
In this section I will be discussing Derrida’s deconstruction of Rousseau in Of 
Grammatology, which also elaborates his question of method. This question of 
method can then be extrapolated to his readings of other philosophers. Derrida’s 
reading performs a singularity which simultaneously exemplifies a general method.  
Derrida's reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, according to Paul De Man in Critical 
Writings45 shows a close affinity with Jean Starobinski's "intellectual biography." It 
is this account that allows Derrida to give a reading of Rousseau's philosophy such 
that the philosophy follows the same pattern as the autobiographical details.
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According to De Man, Derrida begins his essay with the discussion of a philologically 
oriented remark of Starobinski, a matter of determining the date of Essay on the 
Origin of Languages, thus demonstrating the affinity between both texts. 46This 
enables Derrida to  discuss Rousseau’s philosophical issues (the noble savage, speech 
and writing and the origin of languages, the social contract) alongside and closely 
related to the autobiographical elements (the young Jean-Jacques and his wet-nurse, 
mother, his masturbation fantasies). In both philosophy and autobiography, the 
supplement is relegated to a secondary sphere but Derrida demonstrates that this 
supplement is part of the very structurality that enables us to read and think the 
dominant aspects of discourse such as speech and the noble savage. Derrida thus 
demonstrates that the supplementarity of philosophy and auto-biography functions 
through the iterability of Rousseau’s idea that there is such a thing as a foundational 
and originary presence such as speech in his philosophy and sex in his autobiography. 
Derrida then demonstrates the irreducibility of the supplement to thinking the origin: 
writing is necessary to thinking speech because speech is already a form of writing, 
just as masturbation and auto-affection is a condition of possibility for relating to 
others. Hence the inclusion of the autobiography with a reading of Rousseau’s 
philosophy is a demonstration of the supplementarity that exemplifies itself in both 
texts. It thus displays a fundamental iterability to Rousseau’s text.  Hence these 
demonstrate a fundamental exchangeability between origin and supplement because 
everything is already supplementary:  the origin is already a supplement.
Reading Starobinski, it is clear that Derrida has based his deconstruction upon 
Starobinski’s account which attributes to Rousseau a certain desire for immediacy, 
presence and the originary and a distrust of mediation, the supplementary and the 
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substitute such as signs and wet nurses. Rousseau desires the immediacy of God, the 
original mother, nature and the voice, and denigrates as inferior signs, writing, 
masturbation and wet nurses in Starobinski’s account. Hence there is an iterability to 
Rousseau’s account of presence in both his valorisation of nature and the more 
autobiographical details in Starobinski’s account such as Rousseau’s distrust of wet 
mothers and masturbation. In both accounts Starobinski notes a desire for presence 
and the originary over the substitute, which Derrida then deconstructs by noting that 
the sign and mediation or the dangerous supplement is the very condition of 
possibility for thinking the primary term such as sex, Nature and voice. The notion of 
supplementarity is thus another iterable form that occurs in both Rousseau’s 
philosophy and Starobinski’s autobiographical account. Derrida demonstrates that 
autobiography and philosophy are supplementary and that the notion of presence in 
both discourses occurs as an iterable form. Derrida thus demonstrates the iterability of 
Rousseau’s account of the supplement in both his philosophy and Starobinski’s 
autobiography of Rousseau. For instance, in the passage below we have Starobinski’s 
account of Rousseau’s disdain for writing:
Marvellous writer that he is, Rousseau is constantly protesting against the art of 
writing. For even though he recognizes that ‘human power acts through means’, he is 
unhappy in the world of means, in which he feels lost. If he perseveres with writing, it 
is to hasten the moment when the pen will fall from his hands and the essential things 
will be said in the silent embrace of reconciliation and return. In the absence of a 
reconciliation with his perfidious friends, writing makes sense only as a way of 
denouncing any attempt at communication as nonsensical. 47
Above we see that Derrida’s account of Rousseau’s denigration of writing can be 
attributed to Starobinski’s account of Rousseau, who according to Starobinski, 
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distrusts the mediated nature of writing. Derrida locates Rousseau’s disdain for 
absence and the mediated form of writing in Starobinski’s account and hence 
encounters the iterability of the Rousseau text. Elsewhere in the autobiography, 
Starobinski performs a similar characterization of Rousseau’s disdain for the 
mediation of signs, culture, wet-mothers and masturbation. Derrida’s account thus 
bases itself on Starobinski’s account of Rousseau’s distrust for mediation, the 
substitute and the supplement, which Derrida notes that Rousseau personally names 
dangerous and inferior. Hence there is a fundamental iterability to the Rousseau text 
in both his philosophy and Starobinski’s autobiographical account. The supplement is 
labelled secondary, subversive, and inferior to presence in both accounts. 
Autobiography and philosophy thus supplement each other, and presence is an 
iterable form that occurs in both accounts. It is Starobinski’s mediation of Rousseau, 
hence the iteration of Rousseau, that allows us to witness Rousseau’s privileging of 
presence. Hence Rousseau is iterable both in his own philosophy and in Starobinski’s 
autobiography, which Derrida brings to attention by supplementing the Rousseau 
philosophy with Starobinski’s more autobiographical account of him. These accounts, 
philosophy and autobiography, supplement each other and are iterations of the 
Rousseau text, thus demonstrating at a performative level their very content in terms 
of form. 
What Derrida demonstrates in both Rousseau’s autobiography and philosophy 
is that each term is as vital to illuminating the other and thus cannot function without 
the opposing term because it needs to exclude the opposing term to be defined by it. 
There can be no nature without culture, voice without writing as these perform an 
essential function, and these so called original terms such as mothers are already 
supplements of an origin that does not exist. The difference between these terms, the 
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supplement, is excluded from Rousseau’s philosophy but demonstrated to be 
absolutely necessary by Derrida. The supplement which had been designated as an 
absence is in fact not a void but a replacement that is as much plenitude as the 
presence to which it is supposed to be secondary. In this sense it is dangerous because 
it is a doublement of the originary. The sign, as well as writing, which Rousseau had 
marked as something subversive and secondary, is fully capable of functioning in the 
place of the signified. The space between the supplement and the originary that is the 
differance between the two is the a priori condition of both to function. What nature 
had relegated as secondary to presence, such as masturbation is in fact the condition 
of relating to otherness in the first place to occur. Auto-affection that takes place in 
activities such as masturbation and self-contemplation marks the division, the 
temporal delay and differance that is the condition of communication and provides the 
entrance of absence. Absence is the supplementary condition that co-exists with 
presence in order for communication to occur. Presence and absence are not 
hierarchies in this sense but doublings of each other, each replacing the other in what 
Derrida calls the chain of supplements. The supplement exists in the plane between 
presence and absence because it is the differance that enables the functioning of 
metaphysics. Culture is another such supplement relegated to nature which is its own 
a priori condition of possibility. Culture is not subservient or secondary to nature but 
an essential condition of possibility to the forming of the human, hence while 
Rousseau would valorise a sort of naturalist primitivism in the noble savage Derrida 
demonstrates that culture is no less a factor in determining the vagaries of human 
behaviour. 
A “supplement” is an appendage, an addition which is extraneous and not 
neccessary, an artificial aid or technology that is parasitical on the original. Perhaps it 
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is also an inferior copy of the original called upon to perform the tasks of the original 
where the original is lacking. It makes up for a lack, as Derrida calls it, it is a 
substitute. However where Rousseau would denigrate it as something dangerous and 
evil because it lacks the qualities or the “presence” of the original Derrida would 
argue that it is a replacement that is necessary. Analogically, the empirical has been 
named an inferior copy of the transcendental by Plato. Derrida's intervention implies 
that it is not a parasitical copy but a neccessary replacement or a section of an entire 
infrastructure, economy or system. To this it is entirely essential and a necessary 
condition for that which it replaces. Derrida shows that the origin is already a 
supplement and the supplement is necessary to conceiving the primary term. For 
instance, masturbation and auto-affection are the conditions of possibility for relating 
to others, these are not secondary to nature. Wet-nurses are a neccessary substitute for 
mothers when mothers are unable to perform that function. Culture is not secondary to 
but equal to nature (and its condition of possibility).
On Derrida’s account, Rousseau claims that there has never been an 
intermediary between everything and nothing. The supplement is an absence, writing 
and representation are absences, in reality there is only presence and plenitude. 
Speech and nature are examples of this. Derrida argues instead that the supplement is 
not an absence but an intermediary, or the mediation between presence and absence.
The supplement is the differance that enables both the existence of presence and 
absence. Rousseau argues that that writing is only a supplement to speech,
masturbation is a subservient evil to Nature, and for Rousseau only speech or nature 
in its full plenitude or presence is metaphysically concrete. Rousseau has formulated 
such arguments because he believed in the value of presence and origin, or the 
absolute proximity of the signifier to the signified, and in seeking to preserve the 
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value of the origin and voice, or a certain phonocentrism and logocentrism, Rousseau 
prioritizes the originary element in philosophy as its superior element and very 
foundation. Rousseau then denigrates as secondary all that is supplementary in 
philosophy. Derrida demonstrates that such a move occludes and excludes the very 
condition of possibility of his philosophy- the supplement as the a priori difference 
that is necessary to thinking both. Derrida wants to point out the differance between 
everything and nothing, presence and absence that makes metaphysics possible. This
differance is the supplement or writing. This spacing between transcendental and 
empirical, namely the quasi-transcendental, conditions metaphysics through the 
distinguishing movement of the trace. Derrida thus performs meta-phenomenology in 
naming differance and the quasi-transcendental as the conditionality that produces 
metaphysics. Rousseau protects not merely metaphysics, but logocentrism and  
phonocentrism, the absolute proximity of the signifier to the signified, and the priority 
of the signified over the signifier. What Derrida shows is that differance is necessary 
to producing and thinking this very logocentrism and presence that would otherwise 
not hold as that which is supplementary is an a priori condition of possibility for 
thinking the structure of Rousseau’s philosophy. Logocentrism and phonocentrism 
would be impossible to conceive without the supplement which Rousseau labels as 
dangerous and inferior.
Derrida justifies his use of the word “supplement” by using it as a tool to 
explore the status of all that has been designated as the negative or subsidiary pole of 
philosophy or systems of thought. The negative, Other, ghost or shadow, and absence 
have always been relegated to a “supplementary” status in philosophy. In his essay, 
Derrida argues that what is supplementary is essential and necessary, an a priori 
condition of possibility. The quasi-transcendental acknowledges the “between” of the 
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supplement as intermediary which makes philosophy possible, philosophy is neither 
transcendental nor empirical, but enabled by the “between” or “nothing”, or 
“differance” which separates the two. 48 The advantage of Derrida's method over other 
methods of reading is that it accounts for the conditions that make reading possible. 
It makes for an inclusive reading rather than a partial or politically biased 
reading, and there is politics that is being addressed. This politics is an ethics of open-
ness to the other and a hospitality to what had been traditionally been relegated to a 
secondary and subservient status. In this way, the transcendental or the Absolute is 
not reduced but expanded to include Otherness, making for a reading that is 
democratic and just. Reading is thus informed by an ethics of performing justice and 
hospitality rather than blindness and exclusion to the Other and unthought of 
language. Deconstruction is performative as well as a form of testament to forms of 
injustice which it then addresses by performing a reading that addresses excluded 
differences and elements. Derrida demonstrates that the condition of possibility for a 
text’s reception is its repeatability, or iterability. Without this trace or representation, 
nothing would be communicated to consciousness. Deconstruction thus is a doubling 
commentary in the sense that it takes the condition of possibility for the very act of 
reading to occur into account, its necessity for mediation, or iterability. Derrida’s 
question, in place of “What is Philosophy”, is “What makes Philosophy possible?” 
This entails an examination of the conditions of possibility for reading. What 
Philosophy has failed to acknowledge, is that it is precisely that, that it is a reading, or 
a certain method of reading. A text, by its very nature, is open to just that, readings 
that exceed the manifest intent that an author inscribes (what the author means 
[voudrait dire]). Reading, as has been traditionally conceived, is the uncovering of the 
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latent meaning of a text. This is the transcendental signified or external referent of 
meaning that the reader only discovers or sees. Derrida’s intervention shows that 
reading is inevitably an act of production of signifying structures. The reader invents 
and always exceeds what is latent in the text, and as Derrida would have it, is entirely 
capable of identifying its blindspot and reading or seeing beyond the circumscribed 
meaning of a text. This act of exceeding the blindspot of the text is the opening of the 
text towards what had been latent within its manifest structure, or as Derrida would 
put it, a “doubling commentary”. Philosophy has to acknowledge that as a text, not 
indubitable Truth or the Absolute, it is inescapably open to reading, which opens the 
text beyond its circumscribed meaning. As Narcissus only acknowledges Echo49 by 
identifying the Other within himself, reading must be reflexive of its own (theatrical) 
conditions of production in order for justice and love to be part of it. Derrida’s 
intervention shows that reading is not an act of discovery but an act of invention, in 
which one exceeds the circumscribed limits of the text to see beyond its blindspots, 
inventing meaning where meaning is not latent or fixed but radically uncertain and 
undecidable, open to the reader’s act of active invention, seeing, decoding, 
interpretation and deciphering meaning where this had not been determined prior to 
the reader’s intervention. Reading is thus an act of production rather than a passive act 
of decoding latent meaning, and the reader on Derrida’s account is no passive witness 
but an active reader who invents and produces meaning, empowered to render a 
subjective perspective rather than discover an objective reality or transcendental 
signified.
                                               
49 Jacques Derrida. Politics of Friendship. Verso. New York. 1997. 24.
65
De Man has alleged, in “The Rhetoric of Blindness, Derrida’s reading of 
Rousseau”50 that Derrida sets up a straw man in the philosophy that he reconfigures, 
that the texts are not blind to what they negate, but that their purported ‘blindness’ is a 
feature of its rhetoricity, or allegorical nature. While this is a clever way to accuse 
Derrida of only discovering the figural, or metaphor, it fails to acknowledge the fact 
that Philosophy has never set itself out merely as a figural project. Philosophy has 
always claimed to be the repository of Truth. It has never set itself up as mere 
rhetoric. De Man’s reading thus fails to acknowledge what is at stake at the heart of 
the very project of Philosophy. While De Man’s reading accurately notes that what is 
at stake in Derrida’s reading of philosophy is mediation, that is, its allegorical or 
metaphorical nature, what De Man’s reading fails to note is that Philosophy has never 
acknowledged this mediation, has always privileged a logocentrism that translates 
into transcendental or empirical idealism. While De Man accuses Derrida of 
discovering a blindness that is already implicit in the text, this is a clever sleight of 
hand that fails to note that Derrida’s real observation was precisely that this 
structurality and metaphoricity is a condition of possibility for our very ability to 
encounter and read the text.  The text would not function without this mediation or 
iterability, and it is this step towards highlighting the necessary mediation and 
iterability of a text as a condition of possibility for its reading that Derrida performs. 
While De Man rightly acknowledges that Derrida highlights metaphoricity, De Man 
does not acknowledge that Derrida highlights this figurality as a condition of 
possibility for reading as we require the structurality of a text and its capacity for 
mediation to encounter it. De Man thus fails to note that Derrida’s demonstration of 
metaphoricity is a condition of possibility for reading a text and overcoming blindness 
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rather than a simple naming of its structurality that is already implicit. Derrida’s text 
is not blind to the figurality that is implicit in Rousseau, rather it foregrounds this 
figurality as a condition of possibility for reading, and hence while Rousseau’s text 
would elevate the value of presence, Derrida’s text foregrounds the importance of 
metaphor, mediation and figurality to reading a text. Hence Derrida is not blind to the 
figurality already implicit in Rousseau as de Man claims. Reading from de Man:
The critical reading of Derrida’s critical reading of Rousseau shows blindness to be 
the necessary correlative of the rhetorical nature of literary language. Within the 
structure of the system text-reader-critic ( in which the critic can be defined as the 
‘second’ reader or reading), the moment of blindness can be located differently.51
De Man thus argues that blindness is selective and a feature of the rhetorical nature of 
texts, but it is not true that Derrida is blind to this rhetorical nature of texts and the 
figurality of Rousseau’s writing because it is precisely what he wishes to foreground 
in suggesting that differance and iterability are the conditions of possibility for 
reading a text. Derrida is thus not selectively blind to Rousseau’s own figurality as De 
Man alleges, but seeking to foreground this figurality as a condition of possibility for 
reading a text. Derrida is also not selectively blind to presence as De Man alleges. 
Rather he wishes to highlight differance and iterability as conditions of possibility for 
reading a text, so De Man misreads him by accusing Derrida of being blind to 
presence in favour of absence.  It is thus not true, as De Man alleges, that Derrida 
takes a step towards privileging absence which is what Rousseau is trying to protect 
the text from, because Derrida highlights the difference and differance between the 
opposing terms as the condition of possibility to thinking philosophy rather than 
making any move to privilege absence in place of presence. Derrida thus highlights 
differance and iterability as the conditions of possibility to reading a text rather than 
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performing a reversal of opposing terms as De Man alleges. Derrida does not overturn 
presence in favour of absence as De Man suggests, rather he enables us to see that 
presence must be mediated through absence in the law of iterability that enables 
deconstruction. Presence and absence are two sides of the same coin and 
supplementary rather than mutually exclusive, because philosophy is an infinite chain 
of supplements rather than the representation of a transcendental signified as 
Rousseau would have us believe as he raises voice and origin to absolute status. 
This thesis, along with Derrida, questions the relation between the 
transcendental and empirical. Derrida’s reconfiguration of philosophy through his 
positing of the quasi-transcendental will be explored. Bennington defines the quasi-
transcendental as the location, rather than exclusion as what has been supplementary 
in philosophy. Thus, the negative and empirical are incorporated rather than 
introjected to expand metaphysics and embrace alterity and otherness in the process.  
It will ask how this reconfiguration strengthens or weakens the project of 
metaphysics. It will investigate the implications of overturning the metaphysical 
hierarchy as well as the implications of not choosing between the transcendental and 
the empirical, but envisioning the monstrous birth of the quasi-transcendental. The 
quasi-transcendental locates the transcendental and empirical in a paradoxical 
relationship of simultaneous similarity and difference. It will explore the difference 
between concept and metaphor in trying to determine if the distinction between 
philosophy and literature is rigid as has been upheld by institutions.  It will ask the 
question, “Is Derrida a philosopher?” I interpret the quasi-transcendental as an 
acknowledgement of the paradox that governs metaphysics: the transcendental is 
simultaneously identical and different from the empirical. The difference translates 
into a difference that is a non-difference or a sameness. Therefore the quasi-
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transcendental is a thinking of this paradox of identity in non-identity. The 
transcendental and empirical remain separated and distinguished by nothing. 
I will now discuss the relation between the transcendental and empirical as 
accounted by Derrida. According to Derrida, the transcendental and empirical are 
distinguished by nothing. This nothing, spacing or trace refers to the gap between the 
transcendental and empirical which enables the phenomenological reduction. Were 
the transcendental and empirical ontologically separate and distinct, no 
phenomenological reduction would be able to take place. But because the 
transcendental has to be reducible to the empirical, and cannot exist outside its 
repetition in the empirical, which is retrospectively formed through the differentiating 
movement of the trace, the transcendental does not exist separately from the 
empirical. Hence the a priori difference between the transcendental and empirical 
translates as a difference which is nothing and separates nothing. The transcendental 
translates into the empirical. As Derrida argues, the transcendental ego is the 
empirical ego, and cannot exist outside of it. Transcendental-empirical difference is 
an illusion. For instance, in Husserlian discourse, expression is separable from 
indication. But Derrida demonstrates that there can be no expression without 
indication, as expressive signs are, by their very nature as a sign, indicative or 
referential to something else. Hence there can be no pure expression reduced without 
indication, or pure transcendental without empirical, as expression and indication are 
interwoven (Verflechtung) rather than separable. Transcendental and empirical are 
thus not separable. They exist in a dynamic relation of differance and iterability rather 
than being ontologically distinct. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, 
functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the 
conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of 
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impossibility for designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or 
empirical signs in converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and 
empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The 
necessity for the quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical 
makes it impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation 
depends on the other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no empirical, 
then it would be impossible to distinguish, as Husserl does, a pure transcendental 
idealism from it. The empirical thus inhabits the transcendental even as it is separated 
from it through the written mark or quasi-transcendental. Husserl requires the 
empirical to distinguish it from his transcendental idealism. The transcendental only 
exists in relation to the empirical through iterability and differance.
I now move on to the definitions of the quasi-transcendental by Gasche and 
Bennington. Gasche defines the quasi-transcendental as such:
The quasi-transcendentals- metaphoricity, for instance- upon which philosophy’s 
universality is grounded are no longer simply transcendental, for they represent 
neither a priori structures of the subjective cognition of objects nor the structures of 
understanding by the Dasein. The quasi-transcendentals are, on the contrary, 
conditions of possibility and impossibility concerning the very conceptual difference 
between subject and object and even Dasein and Being. 
The question of the quasi-transcendental, of quasi-metaphoricity in this case, is a 
judiciary question in a new sense. Instead of inquiring into the a priori and logical 
credentials of the philosophical discourse, Derrida’s heterology is the setting out of a 
law that is written on the tinfoil of mirrors between which thought can either maintain 
the separation of fact and principle in an endless reflection of one another, or sublate 
them in infinite synthesis. 52
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For Gasche thus, the quasi-transcendental sets out a law of heterology that relates the 
transcendental and empirical in an infrastructural economy that either keeps them 
separate or sublates them together. I will eventually discuss this phenomenon as the 
paradox of simultaneous difference and sameness, paradoxical identity in non-
identity. For Gasche, the quasi-transcendental relates philosophy to contingency 
which opens and closes philosophy’s argumentative discursivity. This is because the 
quasi-transcendental is simultaneously the ground of possibility and impossibility of 
philosophy. It lends to philosophy a quality of undecidability and heterogeneity. The 
quasi-transcendentals reinscribe the opposition between transcendental and empirical 
because it functions as the difference, spacing or gap that allows both to function. The 
quasi-transcendental is thus a meta-condition for philosophy that inscribes its 
condition of possibility as differance, or the spacing and gap between the 
transcendental and empirical which is neither transcendental nor empirical but the 
conditionality of thinking both. I affirm Gasche’s reading of the quasi-transcendental 
as an oppositional difference which determines philosophy as a ground of 
simultaneous possibility and impossibility, but diverge where he describes the quasi-
transcendental as an infrastructure because I read the quasi-transcendental as a 
paradoxical relation which exceeds the limits defined by labelling it as a system or
infrastructure. I define the quasi-transcendental as a paradoxical relation of 
simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity, sameness in diffence 
as transcendental and empirical exist in and through each other as repetitions of the 
same as their distinction is really a non-distinction as transcendental-empirical 
difference is an illusion.
Bennington defines the quasi-transcendental as the difference which had been 
excluded from a philosophical system, the supplementary term which had been 
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relegated to a secondary status such as masturbation or writing in Rousseau. This 
thesis extends Bennington’s definition of the quasi-transcendental as excluded 
difference and oppositional thinking to define the quasi-transcendental as a paradox of 
sameness in difference, identity in non-identity. The quasi-transcendental is the 
spacing or limit and conditionality between the transcendental and empirical that 
allows the thinking of both rather than an infrastructural economy defined by Gasche. 
This builds on the thinking of difference and oppositionality defined by Bennington.
Where philosophy has traditionally defined itself as either transcendental or 
empirical, I will proceed to examine Derrida’s account of it as quasi-transcendental. 
Derrida sees modern social science, both structural and hermeneutic, as aware of a 
lack of a center and yet somehow in search of something more than “mere 
interpretation” : a “best” or more primordial interpretation, or the “dissolution”, as 
Levi-Strauss says, of the human sciences into the physical sciences.
There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The 
one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin, and which lives the 
necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the 
origin, affirms play and tried to pass beyond man and humanism.53
Derrida chooses a third place- the place of the quasi-transcendental, a monstrous birth 
that goes beyond these two interpretations of interpretation. This enlarges 
metaphysics beyond mere idealism or empiricism and is a more holistic embracing of 
the differance which constitutes the two. 
Derrida argues that difference is constitutive of all experience. The economy 
of differance is the condition of possibility of thought. Derrida highlights differance 
and iterability as the condition of possibility for phenomenology and metaphysics. 
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Derrida’s writing is a celebration of play and margin, textuality and difference as the 
limit and the impossibility of a text is precisely what he locates as its possibility. 
Derrida thus juxtaposes the impossibilities of a text with their possibilities, in order to 
show that these impossibilities are precisely the site of possibility.
In this chapter I have examined Derrida’s account of his method in Of 
Grammatology and discussed how it relates to Starobinski’s autobiography. I have 
also discussed Derrida’s account of the quasi-transcendental as accounted by Gasche 
and Bennington. In the next chapter I further outline Derrida’s methodology as 
accounted by several of his texts. Derrida locates truth in the space between the 
transcendental and empirical that is neither, and it is this quasi-transcendental that 
determines phenomenology by being the founding condition of possibility that allows 
us to think both transcendental and empirical. This is because the transcendental is 
simultaneously the empirical, nothing separates them.
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Further questions of method and style
In the previous chapter I discussed Derrida’s methodology as accounted for in 
Of Grammatology and discussed the quasi-transcendental as accounted by Gasche and 
Bennington. In this chapter I will further discuss Derrida’s method as accounted by 
several of his texts. Derrida discovers the quasi-transcendental, differance and 
iterability as the conditions of possibility for philosophy. Derrida demonstrates that 
transcendental is not conceivable without the empirical and vice versa as metaphysics 
functions through iterability. The quasi-transcendental determines metaphysics as we 
would not be able to distinguish transcendental and empirical without it, while it 
simultaneously institutes the impossibility of their separation, because the 
transcendental is nothing outside the empirical and vice versa. Derrida thus inscribes 
phenomenology in a more powerful form through his discovery of the quasi-
transcendental as its condition of possibility.
In the following section I will examine Derrida’s essay, “The Supplement of 
Copula” which explores the relation between the transcendental and empirical. 
Derrida demonstrates that philosophy is not reducible to either transcendental or 
empirical, as both are essential to determining each other through iterability and 
differance. Truth rather is quasi-transcendental, neither transcendental nor empirical 
but the paradoxical space between that determines the thinking of both. In “The 
Supplement of Copula”, Derrida attempts to save philosophy from being reduced to 
linguisticism, such as that espoused by Benveniste. Benveniste claims that philosophy 
is a language, that metaphysical categories such as that espoused by Aristotle are 
arbitrary and discovered by empirical necessity rather than having transcendental 
correspondence. Derrida argues that the very opposition between language and 
thought, which Beneviste attempts to reduce to language, relies on the conceptual 
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foundations provided by philosophy. In this sense philosophy is prior to language. 
Any attempts to reduce philosophy to linguisticism inevitably draws on the very 
oppositions and conceptual categories which philosophy provides, and hence falls 
back into a metaphysics it attempts to destroy. There is a category which eludes all 
linguistic formulations of philosophy, and this is the category of Being. Being is the 
ontological foundation of philosophy which Aristotle and Heidegger defined as the 
basis of philosophy. It is a transcategorial function which enables the thought of both 
Aristotle and Benveniste, and as such is the metaphysical or ontological foundation on 
which their very philosophy or linguisticism is based. To escape this charge that 
Being precedes language, Benveniste attempts to posit the universality of the copula, 
which predicates identity and uses the verb “to be”, and reduces to a supplement of 
copula the nominal sentence, or that which does not use the verb ‘to be’ or designates 
an absence, or the empirical. Yet Derrida argues that this is a reduction of the 
supplement of copula to a historical accident, where it is structurally necessary. 
Benveniste’s thought fails to account for this supplement of copula which becomes, as 
it were, relegated to a place outside language and philosophy in his thought, when it is 
in fact, structurally necessary as it enables the very transcategoriality of presence and 
absence to be thought. Presence cannot be predicated without the category of absence 
that is its conceptual opposition that enables the very possibility of the concept 
“presence” and  “being” to be thought. Derrida’s intervention is that ontology and 
linguistics has to account for this supplement of copula, which philosophy needs as its 
very grounds of possibility.
Derrida returns to the contemporary formulation of this problematic in the 
thought of modern linguist Benveniste, who in “Categories of Thought and
Language” analyzed the limiting constraints which Greek language imposed upon the 
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system of Aristotelian categories. Benveniste had argued that Aristotle’s formulation 
of the transcendental categories of thought could be reduced to the categories of 
language in which he thought. 
Derrida considers the presuppositions of Benveniste’s thesis. The first is the 
conceptual opposition between language and thought, which Benveniste eventually 
tries to reduce to language. Derrida demonstrates that the very possibility of such a 
distinction is grounded in philosophy. The second is the opposition between 
“categories of thought” and “categories of language”. This formulation, likewise, 
borrows the concept of “category” from Aristotle, who grounded this conceptual 
opposition in Being. Being is the root of both language and thought and its site of 
emergence. Derrida argues that the concept of a category is a mode of signification of 
Being. Being grounds the possibility of signification, opening language to non-
language. Derrida argues that Benveniste’s move to reduce thought to language can 
only be possible by allowing language’s pretensions to thought, truth, universality, 
and the ontological. This move is unjustifiable, because this places language in a 
place exterior to Being and allows language to formulate the very notion of category 
as the site where Being is produced, where Derrida argues that Being is prior to both 
language and thought and its site of emergence. Benveniste’s claim that language 
precedes Being as language is the site where the category of Being is produced is 
counter-intuitive compared to Derrida’s argument that Being precedes language and 
founds all signification. Derrida reads Aristotle as formulating language as the 
expression of Being. The notion of “category” thus, is grounded as an expression of 
Being and cannot be formulated outside this ontological framework. The very notions 
of “language”, “category” and “thought”, language as a system, are concepts that 
originate from philosophy as a master-discourse and as such Benveniste’s opposition 
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between language and thought is only made possible by philosophy. Derrida also 
argues that Benveniste fails to consider Aristotle’s transcategorial function of Being 
which opens language to thought, and grounds the possibility of signification. This 
takes place in his opposition of “language” and “thought” as if they had no prior 
history or did not belong to an ontological framework. In doing so, Derrida is positing 
the transcendental notion of “Being” as the meta-discursive condition of possibility 
for signification. Hence, Derrida demonstrates that philosophy is not reducible to 
empiricism. Derrida thus posits Being as a meta-discursive concept which founds the 
very possibility of thought and in this sense it is the transcendental that grounds all 
signification. Subsequently Derrida demonstrates that philosophy however is not 
reducible to the transcendental either as it operates as a relation between the 
transcendental and empirical through iterability and differance.
Derrida examines Benveniste’s attempt to rationalize the absence of the copula 
in certain cultures. Benveniste claims that the fact that there is a “nominal sentence” 
with an absence of the verb “to be” and that this is a universal phenomenon 
contradicts the fact that it has the copula as its equivalent. Benveniste claims that this 
contradiction collides at all points with linguistic reality without satisfying any 
theoretical necessity. Benveniste thus attempts to reduce the supplement of copula to
a historical accident, a mere linguistic contingency. He does this without 
incorporating it into his theoretical framework, thus consigning it to absence and 
excluding it. Derrida asks how this does not invalidate Benveniste’s affirmations on 
the text of the categories, as it admits a contradiction to his argument that the copula 
is universal and all-encompassing, and how one is to conceive that all languages 
dispose of an equivalent of the copula. This follows from Benveniste’s attempt to 
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exclude the supplement of copula from language and thought in his attempts to justify 
his charge that language precedes Being because the copula exists universally. 
Derrida raises three objections to Benveniste’s attempts to relegate the 
supplement of copula to a place outside language and thought. Firstly, the function of 
the “copula” or the “grammatical mark of identity” is absolutely distinct from the 
“full-fledged” use of the verb “to be”.This distinction between the function and the 
meaning of the word points out a contradiction in Benveniste’s thesis that the copula 
grounds the ontological foundations of language.  Yet Benveniste attempts to 
demonstrate the universality of the grammatical function of the copula with an 
abundance of examples, even in languages which do not possess the word “to be” in 
its lexical presence.
Secondly, in all languages, a certain function comes to supplement the lexical 
“absence” of the very “to be”, and in its most general form of this supplement of 
copula is the nominal sentence. Benveniste reduces this supplement of copula to an 
absence, a mere supplement, which does not contradict the universal necessity of the 
copula, so as to posit that the copula grounds all signification. Thirdly, another 
common form of this supplement of copula is syntactic play with the pronoun, for 
example repeating it at the end of a proposition. This process of objectification leads 
to a constant privileging of the third person singular. Derrida notes that the hidden 
relationship between such a privilege and the law of the supplement of copula unfolds 
a problem that linguistics and ontology as such cannot but designate from afar, 
because they privilege presence. This problem is that iterability ensures the 
functioning of metaphysics by reproducing presence in absence. Iterability ensures 
that presence must be reproduced in the non-present, or that the present must be 
repeated as simulacrum in the absent, in order for metaphysics to ground itself at all. 
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The repetition of the present in the absent constitutes the quasi-transcendental and 
extends the domain of the transcendental. This is because presence has to be mediated 
and exemplified in order for presence to be predicated. It is the relationship of 
nothingness between the present and the absent that grounds signification. Presence 
and absence are two sides of the law of iterability, which ensures the repetition of the 
transcendental in the empirical, or the quasi-transcendental. In other words, it is the 
quasi-transcendental which grounds signification. The quasi-transcendental is an 
acknowledgement of the infrastructural economy of both the transcendental and the 
empirical. Derrida cites Heidegger who notes the necessity of the copula in 
designating Being. Derrida notes that there is a temptation thus to posit the copula as a 
falling, an abstraction, degradation or emptying out of the semantic plenitude of the 
lexeme “to be”, marking a desire for a recovery of a lost plenitude and presence. This 
is where Heidegger’s question of Being becomes a question of the meaning of Being. 
Also this seeks to reduce the supplement of copula thus to a historical accident where 
it is structurally necessary, as “presence” must be repeated in “absence” in order for 
presence to be predicated, according to the law of iterability. The quasi-
transcendental, which Derrida posits as the transcategorical function which accounts 
for both categories “presence” and “absence”, saves philosophy from this reduction of 
linguistics and ontology to a mere partial view of Being in privileging presence. It is 
the differance between presence and absence, being and non-being that is the grounds 
of possibility for philosophy, linguistics and ontology. Derrida, by illuminating this, 
provides the powerful insight that what ontology and linguistics had excluded is its 
very condition of possibility. The universal condition of possibility that Derrida 
discovers for ontology, linguistics or philosophy is thus the quasi-transcendental, or 
differance. Without transcendental-empirical difference, or the quasi-transcendental, it 
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would be impossible to conceive of each term as transcendental and empirical require 
each other for the distinction to be upheld and only exist in relation to each other. 
Transcendental does not exist outside empirical and empirical only exists in relation 
to transcendental through the dynamic relation of iterability and differance. It is thus 
impossible to designate a pure realm of ideal signs or empirical signs in isolation from 
each other as transcendental and empirical only exist in and through each other 
through the relation of repetition with a difference or iterability. Derrida thus 
demonstrates in “The Supplement of Copula” that philosophy is reducible neither to 
empiricism or the transcendental. Derrida demonstrates that Benveniste requires the 
transcendental to formulate his empiricism while excluding the nominal sentence to a 
supplement of copula leads to logocentrism as it forgets its very condition of 
possibility as supplementarity.  Derrida thus demonstrates that philosophy originates 
from transcendental-empirical difference, or differance, hence its condition of 
possibility is to be located as neither transcendental nor empirical, but a space 
between that allows the thinking of both. 
In this section I describe Derrida’s methodology as exemplified by several of 
his texts. In “Outwork”, Derrida discusses deconstruction as the structure of the 
double mark which seizes and entangles the binary opposition, one of the term retains 
its old name so as to destroy the opposition to which it no longer quite belongs, and to 
which in an event it has never quite yielded. The history of this opposition is of the 
incessant struggles generative of hierarchical configurations, working the entire field 
within which these texts move. Thus deconstruction renames the old structure through 
displacing the dislodging through the signature and trace in order to displace and 
reverse the hierarchy to which it belonged. The structure itself is worked in turn: the 
rule according to which every concept necessarily received two similar marks: a 
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repetition without identity: one mark inside and the other outside the deconstructed 
system, which gives rise to a double reading and a double writing. Deconstruction is a 
double science. Deconstruction thus challenges the hierarchy of the binary opposition 
through the discovery of aporia which fixates it through its traditional consolidation. 
Through examining the fact that signified and signifier, interior and exterior are not 
opposites but the same and undergo a process of erasure, deconstruction democratizes 
philosophy by demonstrating that there never has been anything but writing. Writing 
is not inferior to speech but its possibility as a system of differences which relays 
signifier to signifier in an infinite play of supplements rather than a referential origin 
or transcendental signified. Deconstruction is the celebration of endless play in 
meaning through the movement of the infinite trace, which opens up signification to 
infinite possibilities as there is nothing outside the text. There is no mythical origin or 
transcendental signified. There is just the play between supplement and signifiers 
which relate to each other in a system of differences and differance. Deconstruction 
thus reverses the hierarchy of transcendental and empirical, signifier and signified to 
celebrate infinite play and textuality to show that philosophy is a form of literature. 
Because reading is invention and not discovery with the movement of the infinite 
trace, as reading is determined within a context of radical uncertainty and 
undecidability, reading is thus a productive act rather than an inheritance of latent and 
decided meaning. Reading is taking chances with a text rather than subscribing to an 
ossified and unshakeable ground of inherited meaning. This act of invention thus 
pluralizes meaning and opens the text towards an abyss and an infinite amount of 
possibilities. Meaning is abyssal and infinite rather than circumscribed and 
predetermined.
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Beginning with Nietzsche’s aestheticization of philosophy, Derrida’s 
philosophy takes on a similar turn towards aphorism and metaphor by showing that 
philosophy proceeds by metaphor and signature to collapse the divide between 
literature and philosophy. Derrida’s collapse of the oppositions between speech and 
writing, transcendental and empirical, signified and signifier demonstrates that there is 
a paradoxical difference which is not a difference but a difference which translates 
into a sameness between the two because concepts are irrevocably mediated. 
Philosophy proceeds by signature and metaphor through having to go through a 
process of repetition or iterability. Metaphoricity, or the quasi-transcendental, is thus a 
condition of possibility for philosophy. Philosophy proceeds by metaphor and thus 
does not exist outside its signification through metaphoricity, or iterability and 
signature.
In “Tympan”, Derrida writes that philosophy has always insisted on thinking 
its other. This is the supplement of philosophy, or the negative of the binary. A 
tympan marks the limit of a discourse (it is the outer membrane of the ear). To 
tympanize philosophy means to reconsider the meaning of the limit and to blur the 
boundaries between outer and inner, presence and absence. Deconstruction exceeds 
this limit and examines the differance between outer and inner, presence and absence 
that makes philosophy possible, so there is no longer a margin, or a within and 
without  of philosophy, but a text whose supplements are infinitely open to reading. 
The two forms of philosophy that Derrida identifies- hierarchy and envelopment- lead 
to forms of phallocentrism and logocentrism as patriarchy and the ideal or center are 
privileged at the expense of what is supplementary to it. In place of this, Derrida 
writes that philosophy has always thought its other. It has always proceeded through 
iterability or the repetition of the ideal in the sensible. This sensible Other is that 
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which Idealism negated while remaining blind to it. The task of philosophy now is to 
rethink the margin or the limit. Philosophy’s task is to exceed it and show that 
philosophy and its other are not a hierarchy or envelopment but essentially that inner 
and outer, presence and absence are the same. It is the differance between the two 
which enables metaphysics to function.
In “Signature, Event, Context”, Derrida argues that writing forms the basis of 
communication by means of its ability to perpetuate itself through citability and 
iterability. Writing forms a rupture and spacing with the absent origin in order to 
enable it to communicate. Writing functions even in the absence of the sender, and 
thus reveals communication to perpetuate itself even in the absence of its origin. 
Writing is a system of differential marks and differance, in terms of iterability and the 
deferral of meaning through space and time. Writing is precisely what enables 
communication. Writing thus forms the basis for speech which is modelled after it as 
a system of difference in order to communicate- the principle of communication is 
iterability, citability and repeatability of the original mark. In the essay Derrida 
discusses the opposition between speech and writing. Derrida begins by giving a 
deconstruction of writing. Derrida observes that writing, as conceived traditionally, is 
closely linked to communication. Writing is a means of extending the field of 
communication. It does not add to it or alter it but simply transmits meaning in the 
absence of the sender of the message. Writing is thus shown to be a means of 
communication through conveying, across the passage of space and time, the identical 
message but differing and being altered slightly in its mediated form through 
repetition with a difference, or iterability.
Deconstruction then intervenes and transforms by dislodging and displacing a 
traditional hierarchy and pluralizing it to discover a double science or a double 
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writing through iterability, metaphoricity and signature. Derrida’s discovery of 
repetition with a difference demonstrates the fundamental mediation of concepts that 
dislodge and displaces hierarchy, instituting a new writing that signifies plurivocally 
rather referring to a univocal transcendental signified. Hence, meaning becomes 
polysemy and dissemination, which proceeds by metaphor, and thus collapses the 
distinction between philosophy and literature. Everything is writing. There never has 
been anything but writing.54 Philosophy and literature are the same in existing as texts 
to be interpreted rather than as the uncovering of univocal or absolute meaning 
belonging to a transcendental signified or absolute origin. As meaning is an act of 
invention, one has to gamble and take chances with a text, in a climate of radical 
indeterminacy and undecidability. Where there is radical indeterminacy and 
undecidability, the reader’s role becomes infinitely more active in producing 
signifying structures where there had been none, as there is nothing outside the text, 
meaning is invention rather than discovery of pre-determined essences and 
unshakeable truths. Truth is differance, occupying a space between determinacy and 
indeterminacy, because affirming truth as a presence denies possibility and alterity 
while denying truth only reproduces it as a negative and thus remains bound to its 
ontological structure. Truth is thus not reducible to presence or absence. Rather it 
occupies a space between as differance and the quasi-transcendental. Truth is neither 
presence nor absence, philosophy nor non-philosophy, metaphysics nor non-
metaphysics but inhabits a space between, the paradoxical space of the quasi-
transcendental, that determines the thinking of both. This is because it is this prior and 
anterior difference that determines the very possibility of thinking truth and its other, 
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philosophy and non-philosophy, transcendental and empirical. In this thesis we will 
be examining the quasi-transcendental nature of truth, truth that is neither 
transcendental nor empirical but the difference and differance between the two.
Derrida’s style
In Differance, Derrida outlines the key non-concept in his philosophy, which 
delays and defers, spatially and temporally, signification and meaning. It thus puts 
meaning into a certain play. Differance is a non-concept rather than a concept which 
brings the unthought in philosophy to light. Differance also affirms the economy of 
difference within a dialectic rather than privileging a binary structure. In this thesis we 
will examine different ways in which Derrida sheds light on aporias in 
phenomenology, showing that the limit or impossibility of a text is precisely delimited 
or its site of possibility. This will play out in different ways. In our examination of 
Husserl we will show that the distinction between transcendental and empirical fails 
to hold as nothing distinguishes the transcendental and empirical. Similarly, we will 
examine how Heidegger’s non-metaphysics is indistinguishable from metaphysics, 
and how the radical empiricism of Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Blanchot 
translates into a repetition of metaphysics rather than a negation of it and thus 
becomes indistinguishable from metaphysics. Derrida shows that each text is 
inescapably haunted by its double, and hence deconstruction becomes a double 
science and a double-writing, in which the ghost of a text returns to haunt it through 
aporia and the delimitation of limit.
Geoffrey Bennington has remarked on the humour of Derrida. Indeed Derrida, 
through irony and playfulness, invokes laughter through his demonstrations that 
hierarchies are based on a certain structurality, which has always simultaneously
affirmed the center as a non-center. This is because thought has always 
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simultaneously been determined by the unthought and its margin or ghost. Derrida’s 
non-concepts such as trace, differance, iterability and quasi-transcendental are ironic 
displacements of traditional hierarchies to reveal a non-origin to be the origin. Derrida 
affirms differance, or the nothing that separates the transcendental and empirical, as 
the condition of possibility of all thought and structurality of structure. This is because
phenomenological reduction would not be enabled if this difference were ontological 
or substantial. Through irony and playfulness, Derrida displaces, and yet affirms, 
metaphysical structures simultaneously. A central strategy of Derrida’s is the 
revelation of aporia or paradox, demonstrating that the impossibility of a text is 
precisely its possibility. Or that the limit of a text is precisely what allows it to be de-
limited. This joyful affirmation of play and paradox shows that Derrida brings 
humour to philosophy and disturbs concepts through his non-concepts of differance 
and trace. Derrida does this in order to show that traditional hierarchies are based on 
structuralities which affirm the center as a loss of center because the ghost of a text 
always returns to haunt it. Derrida democratizes phenomenology through 
demonstrating that non-philosophy and philosophy are fundamentally the same rather 
than related hierarchically or mutually exclusive. The inside/outside and 
transcendental/empirical distinction is shown to be an illusion, hence Derrida 
democratizes phenomenology by acknowledging the site of exclusion is precisely 
phenomenology’s ground of possibility. Derrida demonstrates that phenomenology 
cannot do without its ghost or unthought. Phenomenology’s other is shown to be 
precisely its condition of possibility, hence the distinction philosophy and non-
philosophy, being and non-being, presence and absence is shown to be an illusion. As 
transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth is neither transcendental nor 
empirical, philosophy nor non-philosophy, but the space between that is quasi-
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transcendental. The interval between the transcendental and the empirical, differance, 
functions as the limit, spacing and trace that produces both transcendental and 
empirical and enables metaphysics to function. As the quasi-transcendental, or the 
difference between the transcendental and empirical, is what allows us to think both, 
transcendental and empirical do not exist outside the dynamic relation of differance 
and iterability. The quasi-transcendental is the limit or spacing that allows us to think 
both the transcendental and empirical, hence empirical is not conceivable without 
transcendental and transcendental is not conceivable without the empirical as each 
term requires the other for the distinction to be upheld. 
Derrida has remarked on his style that:
I do have concerns that may be called aesthetic- I don’t particularly like that word; I 
have a concern about composition, about form, whose origin is not, however, 
exclusively aesthetic. Faced with the singularity of the world event, I have to respond 
to it singularly with my signature, in my own way, not as an aesthetic fetish, but to 
take responsibility. It happens to me and I have to respond, me, with my language, 
my age, my history, my ductus, my way of writing, off making the letters, even if it is 
illegible. Naturally one has to invent, not in the sense of fiction but in that of the 
performative : here is my response to a given situation; if it is a signature, then it too 
has to be an event, in its way, modestly, but it has to have the form of something that 
is not simply constative- it too, like all acts of responsibility, has to pledge itself, to 
give a pledge. This is how I would explain my concern about writing, form, rhethoric, 
politics. To be sure, mine is not only a concern with responsibility in the noble ethico-
metaphysical or ethico-juridical sense, it is also a concern about testimony, about 
testament, about leaving something that has a certain form, that appears. The big 
question is the question of beauty, and I cannot tackle it so fast.55
Derrida thus defines his aesthetic as ethical. It provides a ground for response and is 
performative, formulated to take responsibility for an event and render hospitality and 
justice to the Other and the unthought. It is a signature and a pledge in response to 
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forms of injustice and totalitarianism, bearing witness and giving testimony to what is 
traditionally suppressed within a rigidly enforced power structure. Deconstruction is 
thus about beauty in the sense that it is an aesthetics of complexity where other forms 
of philosophy enforce certain forms of blindness, essentialism, simplification and 
injustice. Deconstruction renders hospitality to the Other and the unthought of 
language and politics. As Derrida mentions elsewhere in the interview, deconstruction 
is a sensitization to the multiple levels of structurality within an event or philosophy, 
it is a performative and demonstration that the dominant force in discourse cannot 
function without its shadow or ghost and thus has to acknowledge it as something 
which is as essential to determining it. In this way it renders justice and hospitality to 
the unthought and Other of language and politics. Deconstruction is thus essentially 
ethical and testimonial, recognizing all constituents within an economy of forces 
rather than privileging the dominant force in traditional consolidation as negative and 
positive, One and Other, transcendental and empirical, are all essential to thinking and 
determining each other. Deconstruction is justice in the sense that it bears witness to 
the whole and all constituents within a structure rather than privileging and blinding 
itself to one element, thus enabling a seeing beyond circumscribed elements to 
acknowledge the fundamental beauty of an organism or structure in its totality and 
wholeness. Derrida’s work is thus a signature in the sense that it bears witness to the 
repetition that is necessary to thinking a structure. Where phenomenology has 
traditionally divided itself into either transcendental and empirical, Derrida 
demonstrates that transcendental and empirical are empty terms on their own and exist 
only in relation to each other as each requires the other as its defining axis and 
relational Other for the distinction to be upheld.
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Deconstruction is thus justice as it enables a seeing beyond traditionally consolidated 
blindspots to acknowledge that transcendental idealism or empirical idealism is 
aporetic and blind to Otherness where true philosophy acknowledges that these exist 
only in dynamic relation to each other. There is no such thing as a pure transcendental 
idealism as Husserl needs to exclude the empirical in order to define his 
transcendental, just as Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Blanchot and Ricoeur 
require the transcendental to exclude it from their radical empiricisms. As Derrida has 
argued, deconstruction is the thinking of futurity and the opening of reading to the 
future of a democracy to come that acknowledges Otherness and alterity. It is an 
ethics of hospitality and open-ness to the Other as well as acknowledging the 
possibility of the self only exists in relation to the Other because the Other is always 
already implicit in the positing of the self. Deconstruction thus does not perform 
anything other than an acknowledgement of conditions that are already implicit in 
reading, discovering that the ghost of a text that inhabits it has always simultaneously 
determined it as its relational Other and condition of possibility for its very 
conceptualization. It is thus a mistake to assume Derrida is merely displacing and 
reversing hierarchy. His concern is to point out theoretical blindness and essentialism 
when one chooses to privilege only one aspect of a discourse, because discourse is 
simultaneously determined by its shadow or ghost. Deconstruction is thus the thinking 
of the simultaneous one and the other because these exist only in and through each 
other through iterability and differance. As Derrida puts it, the relation is not merely 
ethical, but messianic as the other arrives before me, is already pre-existent in me as a 
condition of possibility as alterity is implicit in thinking the One and the ego56, the 
Other precedes me as a condition of possibility for the self, hence texts are not so 
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much deconstructible as an action or process but self-deconstructible as a very 
possibility implicit in the thinking of structure. Alterity and Otherness is the condition 
of possibility for thinking the self, hence opening the text to its Other or ghost in 
deconstruction is merely naming the conditions that allow us to read and encounter 
the text in the first place.
In this thesis, I will be discussing Derrida’s reworking of metaphysics as 
history. Derrida describes history as the history of the metaphysical concept, where 
ontology delineated a strict division of signified and signifier, where the signified 
designated full presence to the signifier, which brings about a certain logocentrism. 
What this thesis has done in place is show through Derrida that the signified is 
nothing outside the signifier and has to be relayed through time, history, and 
differance. This is a democratic move as it opens up possibilities for reading. By 
suggesting that meaning is not ossified and to be located outside the text but within 
the text, Derrida democratizes reading by suggesting reading is an act of invention 
and the possibilities for different readings are endless, where representation would 
hold you to an objective truth. In place this thesis has shown that this history of the 
metaphysical concept as we know it, with transcendental and empirical strictly 
delineated and divided, has come to an end as there never has been anything but 
writing, meaning is located within the text rather than without, and the reader actively 
invents his reading instead of simply discovering an objective transcendental 
signified. The history of the metaphysical concept as we know it has come to an end 
which Derrida designates the end of the book and the beginning of writing, by 
acknowledging there never has been anything but writing we celebrate the play of 
meaning and the infinite possibility that comes about from opening the text to its 
shadow or Other. The history of the metaphysical concept suggested hierarchy, where 
90
the signified precedes the signifier, but by suggesting that all signs are supplements 
and that there never has been anything but writing, Derrida democratizes philosophy 
and opens up the text to infinite possibilities for reading. Reading is no longer 
discovery but invention, and the implications of transcendental-empirical difference 
being an illusion is that everything is already a supplement and hence a rigid 
transcendental signified which holds as primary and originary, which the sign only 
represents, is brought to an end. In place is a celebration of meaning as play and 
infinite possibility, moving beyond circumscribed limits of a text to see beyond its 
blindspots. Derrida also overcomes the history of metaphysics as logocentrism by 
inscribing differance at the heart of phenomenology, showing a non-origin to be an 
origin and demonstrating that signified is nothing outside signifier. Hence a pure 
presence uncontaminated by delay and temporalization or mediation is impossible as 
the transcendental exists only in and through the empirical.
I will now discuss Derrida’s political texts and how these illuminate the 
assumptions of his phenomenology. In Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida explores 
the notion that language is never pure and uncontaminated from without, as all 
language is acquisition and assimilation. Recounting his roots as a Franco-
Magrhebian, his experience of language was one of colonization and assimilation 
rather than anything innately acquired or pre-existent. As Derrida puts it, the language 
called maternal is never purely natural, nor proper, nor inhabitable. Derrida recounts 
his experience of growing up as a Jewish Algerian assimilated by the French, from 
which he derived his first language, a language never properly his own as it was the 
language of the colonizer. Derrida then questions the purity of even the colonizer’s 
language as his method of acquiring the language would have been similar to any of 
the colonizer’s own breed and race – that of conversation, learning and acquisition. 
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The difference between a first language and a second language is thus blurred by 
Derrida as we see that the origin does not properly exist as everything is already 
supplementary, all language is learned, acquired, assimilated from without rather than 
proceeding from any innate ability or inbred knowledge. Extending this idea of 
assimilation and contamination to this thesis, one could properly argue that there is no 
proper transcendental or originary ideal without the empirical. In the same way that 
language is acquisition, assimilation and contamination the transcendental likewise 
has to be mediated by the empirical to come into being. As Derrida argues, all 
language bears the violence of the colonizer as it is imposed from without and learnt 
rather than innate or inbred. The monolingualism of the Other is thus the language of 
the colonizer, imposed from an external source, where Derrida recounts the 
contaminations of Christian and French culture into his upbringing as he grew up and 
was subsequently displaced from his French Nationality more than once. The idea of 
mediation thus comes into play. There is properly no transcendental without the 
empirical as the ideal requires history and the material to come into being. In the same 
way there is no pure, uncontaminated self existing in a vacuum without external 
influences such as the colonizer’s language and culture, the transcendental does not 
exist outside its history and specificity or particularity as the empirical. In the same 
way one’s language is fundamentally mediated from without by conversation, 
education, acquisition and assimilation, the ideal lives only through history, Husserl’s 
transcendental has to be re-activated through History in the Ruckfrage in order to 
come into existence, just as God properly unfolds through difference within the limits 
of everything and nothing, presence and absence. As Derrida argues, the ideal is 
nothing outside the history in which it displays itself, just as the empirical does not 
exist outside its supplementarity to the transcendental.
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In the Work of Mourning, Derrida describes friendship as one that is defined 
by finitude, fidelity and mourning. One mourns a friend because one’s self is also 
constituted by friendship, in mourning the Other we also mourn the self, the self is in 
this sense indebted to and predicated on the Other. Recalling the philosophers that he 
has survived such as Barthes and de Man, Derrida comments on his indebtedness to 
them and indeed how the Other has influenced, moulded, shaped and formed the self. 
As Derrida argues, the law of friendship is one of surviving and mourning. I am a 
friend by virtue of the fact that I can survive the Other, and thus mourn him.
Friendship is thus premised upon finitude as its limit and necessity. In similar ways, 
this thesis has argued that the infinite knows its realization through the finite. In the 
same way the value of an ideal or transcendental notion such as friendship is defined 
by its limits in finitude and mourning, the ideal does not properly exist outside its 
finitude and history. This is what we will describe in the Husserl chapters as the 
Ruckfrage and re-activation, the ideal does not properly exist in a vacuum, but 
through finitude as its limit and condition. In other chapters, we will discuss how a 
pure finitude or materialism does not exist as each definition of the purely finite or 
purely material requires its opposite, the infinite and ideal, to mediate, supplement 
and define it. In the same way the limit of friendship is finitude, the limit of 
phenomenology as we have seen in this thesis is its contingency and history. There is 
no pure transcendental, or pure empirical, these exist only in relation to each other as 
supplements and traces.
In the Politics of Friendship, Derrida defines friendship as an answer for, an 
answer to and an answering before the Other. The condition of possibility for 
friendship is that the Other has to precede the self. Friendship is first a response to the 
Other, then a responsibility for the Other, then a respect for the Other and a basis for 
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moral goodwill. The basis for friendship is thus that the Other provides the foundation 
for the self, the Other has to precede the self and exist as its responsibility and limit. 
While this thesis has not discussed Derrida’s politics explicitly, the commentary in the 
Politics of Friendship is relevant in defining the Other as the limit and horizon for 
defining the self or One. As we have earlier discussed on methodology, the Other is 
implicit in the definition of the One or self as it is its structural necessity and defining 
opposite. In the same way, we have shown that phenomenology’s unthought always 
forms the basis for thought as the ghost of a text always returns to haunt it. Defining 
the transcendental in isolation from the empirical or the empirical in isolation from 
the transcendental does not make sense. Rather, just as the Other has to precede the 
One in friendship, phenomenology is always informed by its shadow. The ideal 
requires the material to define itself against, and vice versa. Transcendental can only 
exist in relation to the empirical as it is its defining opposite that must exist in order 
for the distinction to be upheld and coherent.
Hence a consistency can be seen with this series of analogies drawn between 
Derrida’s later works such as Monolingualism of the Other, The Politics of Friendship 
and the Work of Mourning. The consistent theme that runs throughout is how the 
Other is always the foundation upon which the One is premised and thus exists as its 
limit and defining opposite that it cannot do without. In a similar fashion we will see
throughout this thesis that attempts to divorce the transcendental from the empirical as 
we witness in Husserl or to divorce the empirical from the transcendental in 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Blanchot, Levinas and Ricoeur cannot be coherent as in 
doing so one occludes the Other as the defining moment and relational opposite upon 
which the One must be premised. At the foundation of Derrida’s phenomenology is 
thus a politics and an ethics. It is an open-ness and hospitality to the Other as the 
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necessary founding condition of possibility of the One. Derrida’s democratization of 
phenomenology is thus an opening up of phenomenology to include and embrace this 
Other as its condition of possibility and defining moment.
In this chapter I have examined Derrida’s method as exemplified by several of 
his texts. Derrida demonstrates that discourse is always simultaneously determined by 
its shadow or ghost, because each moment of exclusion and distinction of its 
constituent terms requires the opposing term as a relational Other and defining axis to 
be upheld. Derrida thus demonstrates that transcendental and empirical are empty 
terms on their own as philosophy requires its relation to non-philosophy to define 
itself, transcendental and empirical only exist in relation to each other through 
iterability and differance. One cannot define the transcendental in isolation from the 
empirical and vice versa. Truth is thus neither transcendental nor empirical, but 
located in the space between that is quasi-transcendental. I also examined Derrida’s 
ideas of politics and history, and how these are informed by an opening of philosophy 
to its Other or shadow. In the following chapter I will be reviewing Derrida’s 
reception in the phenomenological field and outline Derrida’s intervention.
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Derrida’s reception in the field of phenomenology:
In this chapter I review Derrida’s reception in the field of phenomenology. 
This section differs from the review I gave earlier of phenomenologists in that it is a 
review of contemporary phenomenologists who have, unlike those covered 
previously, read Derrida, but read him erroneously, as I judge from my understanding 
of Derrida. I seek to address these misconceptions in this chapter. Where 
contemporary phenomenologists describe Derrida’s work as a disruption and 
interruption of phenomenology in critiquing the metaphysics of presence, I proceed to 
argue that characterizations of Derrida as a destructive critic of phenomenology are 
mistaken, and show how Derrida rather accounts for the conditions that make 
phenomenology possible with his notions of differance, iterability and the quasi-
transcendental. Derrida is not to be mistaken for as a nihilist or an empiricist, rather 
he argues that phenomenology has to account for the conditions that make it possible. 
These conditions are differance, iterability, and the quasi-transcendental, that which is 
neither transcendental nor empirical, but the paradoxical space between that 
determines and enables us to think both transcendental and empirical. Derrida thus 
performs meta-phenomenology rather than a destruction of phenomenology as his 
critics claim, and indeed inscribes a phenomenology that is made more powerful, in 
acknowledging the conditions that make it possible.
Phenomenology has not seen its death, despite being now consigned to its 
place as a historical movement in philosophy, encompassing Husserl, Sartre, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology took the form of transcendental 
idealism with Husserl and arguably took a more existentialist turn with Heidegger, 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Contemporary staple textbooks on phenomenology by 
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Dermot Moran (Introduction to Phenomenology57 and Simon Glendinning (In the 
Name of Phenomenology)58 describe Derrida’s intervention with Husserl’s 
phenomenology as a form of destruction or disruption. Simon Glendinnning has 
argued that phenomenology is an essentially unfinished project, which has been 
interrupted and radicalised by Derrida’s intervention.  This thesis will however, argue 
that Derrida’s intervention is not an interruption, but a thinking of the conditions of 
possibility for phenomenology and its production. This Derrida achieves through his 
concepts of iterability and difference. Indeed, these concepts outline a meta-
phenomenology by naming the conditions of possibility for transcendental-empirical 
difference. Dermot Moran has described phenomenology as having a “thoroughly
modernist outlook” in its critical stance of the scientific world view. 
According to Moran, phenomenology formally began with Husserl but was 
subsequently transformed by what he terms “Husserlian heresies” as Sartre, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty broke with Husserl’s method of phenomenological 
reduction. Furthermore, Moran asserts that phenomenology has met a violent death 
and collapsed with Derrida’s critique of presence and the possibility of intentional 
meaning. Contrary to this assertion, this thesis will argue that Derrida’s concepts of 
differance and iterability are meta-phenomenological concepts that outline the 
conditions of possibility for transcendental-empirical difference. Derrida’s 
intervention does not, as Glendinning argues, interrupt phenomenology, or as Moran 
argues, destroy phenomenology. Rather Derrida questions the very conditions of 
possibility for phenomenology and accounts for its mode of production through his 
concepts of iterability and differance. Mohanty59 on the other hand is a leading 
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Husserlian scholar who argues that Derrida has misinterpreted Husserl with his 
readings of iterability and repetition. According to Mohanty, Derrida has construed 
repetition as the nominalistic and endless deferral of ideal meaning. 
This is where I disagree with Mohanty’s interpretation as well, as I do not 
regard Derrida as a nominalist or an empiricist. Derrida argues that ideality has to be 
constituted by repetition, but does not in any way elevate the nominal or empirical 
over the ideal but maintains the dynamic relationship between them as differance. 
Mohanty argues that Husserl’s notion of repetition should rather be interpreted as the 
eidetic grasping of the transcendental. But the question remains as to how this eidetic 
grasping is possible. Can the transcendental be grasped without mediation by the 
empirical? Is the transcendental distinct from the empirical? Mohanty has side-
stepped the question by renaming repetition as eidetic grasping, but has not answered 
the question about the conditions of possibility for this eidetic grasping which 
Derrida’s notion of iterability addresses. While Mohanty is generally kinder to 
Derrida in writing that he does not regard Derrida’s intervention as a destruction of 
phenomenology, indeed he calls Derrida a Husserlian as much as any other 
Husserlian, I do not agree with his assessment of Derrida’s reading of Husserl being 
misleading in its turn to nominalism. I would like to argue contrary to this strain of 
argument against Derrida made by leading phenomenologists such as Mohanty, 
Moran and Sokolowski in my thesis, that Derrida’s intervention is a turn to 
empiricism or nominalism which I do not think it is. Instead I will argue that 
Derrida’s move is a rethinking of the conditions of possibility of ideality through his 
concepts of differance and iterability. Derrida’s intervention is really a continuation of 
phenomenology rather than an interruption of it. He continues phenomenology 
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through extending intentionality to its logical consequences to derive the notions of 
differance and iterability. 
How is thought possible? How is being made to appear to consciousness? 
How does thought present itself to consciousness? Can thought escape mediation in 
its appearance to consciousness? Does not the separation of the transcendental and 
empirical, especially in the act of phenomenological reduction, result in an aporia of 
their non-correlation? Must phenomenology be either transcendental or empirical? Is 
it not the neither and the between (the quasi-transcendental) that enables 
phenomenology by joining it in an economy? In all its configurations prior to Derrida, 
phenomenology has upheld a transcendental-empirical distinction which either 
resulted in a system of transcendental idealism (Husserl) or empirical idealism 
(Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). 
The prevailing reception of Derrida from the phenomenological field is, as 
mentioned earlier, that he has disrupted or destroyed phenomenology in critiquing the 
metaphysics of presence, which leads him to privilege the empirical in place or 
absence and differance. The critics of Derrida from phenomenology such as Mohanty, 
Moran and Sokolowski regard themselves as phenomenological purists. Their 
criticisms however, are based essentially on a misreading of Derrida by classifying 
him as a nominalist and empiricist. They also regard Derrida as a relativist, another 
misconception I wish to contend. Derrida examines the conditions of possibility for 
the Absolute, he does not overthrow or abdicate the absolute. A close reading of 
Introduction to Origin of Geometry for instance, will demonstrate that Derrida 
discusses transcendental genesis which is invented through the retrospective 
differentiating movement of the trace. Derrida examines the conditions for the 
transmission of transcendental knowledge through history, which he calls Ruckfrage
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or re-activation. The transcendental is brought to life through differance and 
iterability, it is the iteration of the noema that ensures its transmission through history, 
the ideal must be repeated with a difference in order to be grasped by consciousness, 
and indeed the ideal exists only in and through consciousness. 
Pure thought is always delay through its transmission through time, enabled by 
the differance of its signification through time. The transcendental is really differance, 
or iterability, enabled in its transmission through history by Ruckfrage or re-
activation. The transcendental is nothing outside its repetition or iteration, which 
retrospectively differentiates and names the transcendental. A true reading of the 
transcendental takes into account not only Korper (ideality constituting sense) but 
Leib (sense constituting ideality), indeed Leib is the condition of possibility for the 
transcendental and ensures its continuation and transmission through history. As 
Derrida argues, without its historical incarnation, transcendental knowledge would not 
be communicated through the passage of time and history to reach its re-activation 
from the past to project itself into the future, and the “to come”. This is the signature 
of the transcendental, in order to be communicated, it has to be perpetuated through 
space and time in an iteration which differs and defers from the original, relayed 
spatially and temporally through differance. By thus being iterated and separated from 
the origin, it is also disseminated into a plurivocality of meanings rather than being 
confined to a transcendental signified or absolute origin.
Derrida’s account thus is an examination of the conditions in which ideality is 
transmitted through the passage of time and history. It is not in any way, a relativism 
or a nominalism. As Derrida argues, historical incarnation sets free the transcendental,
instead of binding it by reducing it to empiricism. It is the condition for its 
transmission through time, through iterability and differance.  Derrida does not reduce 
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phenomenology to empiricism, but does meta-phenomenology by examining the 
conditions of possibility for phenomenology’s production, which is the act of  re-
activation, or iterability.  Derrida also questions the irreducible basis of axioms when 
he mentions Godel’s undecidability theorem in relation to Husserl’s ideal axioms. 
This factor of undecidability adds a factor of contingency to the ideal object.
Axioms acquire their ideal status through sedimentation, but rather than 
reduce history which Husserl regards as adding to the contingency of the ideal object, 
such as adding to their true or false status and hence their undecidability, Derrida 
argues that the historicity of the ideal object and its sedimentations are essential to its 
transmission through differance and iterability. The undecidability of an axiom 
according to Derrida is not something which is reducible but essential in its very 
constitution as its condition for transmission through history. Undecidability is 
intrinsic to an axiom rather than separable from it.Derrida thus historicizes ideality 
through demonstrating that differance and passage through history is its condition of 
possibility.
Damien Byers, in his book Intentionality and Transcendence: Closure and
Openness in Husserl’s Phenomenology60, likewise accuses Derrida of misreading 
Husserl in identifying retention and protention as non-presences which demonstrate 
that ideality is constituted by repetition of the present in the non-present. His method 
of arguing against Derrida is to say that such displacements of past and future are not 
identities and thus essentially not repetitions, thus making non-presence non-complicit 
in the constitution of presence. Byers further argues that the past and future are not
displacements but continuities constituted by the transcendence of the present. It is a 
contradictory argument to say the least. First Byers argues that retention and 
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protention are not identities or repetitions of the present. Then Byers argues that these 
so called displacements are essentially continuities. How does this not contradict his 
claim that the past and future are not identities through repetition? His disputation of 
Derrida’s powerful claim that retention and protention introduce non-presences into 
the constitution of presence simply does not stand upon close examination. Indeed a 
reading of his critique powerfully reinforces the strength of Derrida’s reading of 
Husserl’s own notion of temporality as the introduction of differance into the 
constitution of the transcendental.
Phenomenology and aporia
At the heart of phenomenology lies an aporia. This aporia is the isolation of 
the transcendental from the empirical which are both theatrically produced as distinct 
only through the illusory movement of the differentiating trace or differance, which 
distinguishes nothing. This results in the suppression of the transcendental-empirical 
difference or differance which is really the condition of possibility for metaphysics.  
The transcendental is only produced theatrically through its mediation by the 
empirical rather than excluded from it.  As Derrida argues, all thought is mediation. 
All Gegenwartigung is Vergegenwartingung, Derrida’s philosophy of mediation 
essentially resolves the aporia of the non-correlation between the transcendental or 
empirical, as well as the impossibility of instituting their distinction. It also
acknowledges the essentiality of writing for the embodiment of the ideality in place of 
speech which leads to phonocentrism. It is the written mark, the quasi-transcendental, 
that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, which determines the production of 
both through the distinguishing movement of the trace. The written mark functions as 
if it was transcendental, but without it no distinction between the transcendental or 
empirical would be able to take place, and were the distinction impossible no 
102
transcendental or pure expressive realm would take place either. Hence the 
phenomenological project becomes possible through this paradoxical relation of the 
quasi-transcendental, relating the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous 
identity and difference, identity in non-identity.
As Derrida argues, the Idea is nothing outside the history in which it displays 
itself.  The idea is its signature, differing and deferred from the origin. 
Phenomenology must acknowledge its historicity as a condition of its ideality. 
Through his concept of differance, Derrida explores the contamination and 
inseparability of the transcendental and empirical. The transcendental is really 
differance. It is the retrospective trace distinguishing the transcendental and empirical 
producing them as an after-effect that invents the transcendental, which is always 
delayed and deferred through differance to be communicated. Derrida is interested in 
this differance or trace which is truly the condition of possibility for phenomenology 
rather than solely the transcendental. As Derrida argues, the very possibility of the 
transcendental reduction is enabled by the nothing that separates the transcendental 
and empirical, or differance. 
Derrida’s post-phenomenology thus saves phenomenology by acknowledging 
its very condition of possibility – differance, death and non-presence. This thesis 
starts off from acknowledging the aporia that lies at the heart of phenomenology – the 
non-correlation of the transcendental and the empirical exacerbated by the 
phenomenological reduction, and proceeds to investigate how Derrida’s post-
phenomenology addresses or posits a resolution to this aporia through his notions of 
the quasi-transcendental, iterability and differance which are logical extensions of 
Husserl’s notion of intentionality rather than any radical departure from it. 
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Derrida’s post-phenomenology
David Cerbone61, in Understanding Phenomenology, describes 
phenomenology as an effort to define the essential structures of consciousness, thus 
becoming a transcendental enterprise. But does the transcendental exist in a vacuum? 
Derrida will argue that the transcendental does not exist apart from the empirical, the 
transcendental has to be mediated by the empirical through repetition or iterability 
The transcendental is the empirical. There is no difference between the transcendental 
and empirical subject, because the transcendental subject is the empirical subject, and 
the difference that separates them is precisely this difference that is nothing. In
Positions, Derrida states that the distinction between signified and signifier becomes 
problematical the moment one acknowledges there is no transcendental signified. 
Derrida argues that the concept of the sign (signifier .signified) carries within itself 
the necessity of privileging the phonic substance, leading to the reduction of the 
exteriority of the signifier, of which signifier and signified are two parts of the same 
concept or unity. In other words, the signified does not exist. Neither does the 
signifier as it seems to erase itself, what persists is the infinite trace that is the play of 
differences within writing as differance which is the differal and deferral of meaning 
within the text.
The acknowledgement that the signifier is not exterior - which leads to the 
reduction of writing - leads to the acknowledgement that there never has been 
anything but writing. The transcendental and the empirical are part of the same text, 
essentially the same, nothing separates them. But the infinite trace that is the nothing 
that separates the transcendental and empirical, leads to the signifying of other traces 
and other differances and differences within the system. Hence, translation does not
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mean transportation of signified to signifiers. Rather it means transformation of the 
discursive signs to signify within the same text of the transcendental and the 
empirical, to signify in a different language. 
This plays on the differences between the two languages but appropriates the 
master signifiers and transforms them to signify anew in the new language as sense, 
or the signified, has never been determinate in the first place. The trace is neither 
simply a signifier nor a signified, thus we run into difficulties when we try to conceive 
such a science from within the presently dominant horizon of logocentrism, which 
maintains a strict distinction between the signifier and the signified. To trace back the 
conditions of possibility for logocentrism and presence Derrida directs us to the 
movement of differance, which is the nothing that enables both the transcendental and 
empirical in the movement of its differentiating trace, and thus moves us away from a 
metaphysics of presence as it is not the transcendental but the arche-trace and 
differance which enables the production of metaphysics through iterability.
Derrida however, is not, as Dermot Moran argues, a skeptic, a relativist or an 
empiricist. Derrida posits the iterability as the condition of possibility for ideality 
through the retrospective division into transcendental and empirical through the 
movement of repetition with a difference, or the trace. Derrida thus contends that the 
condition of possibility for ideality is iterability. Derrida’s post-phenomenology does 
not threaten phenomenology, indeed, it is a continuation of it as differance and 
iterability are logical extensions of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. But there exist 
real threats to phenomenology which Derrida’s post-phenomenology does address. 
Simon Glendinning62 has discussed the threat that looms over phenomenology as 
phenomenalism. In positing consciousness as the ground and condition of possibility 
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of thought, indeed phenomenology, especially Husserl’s, does run the risk of 
claiming, like phenomenalism, that everything can be reduced to and is constituted by 
consciousness. Another threat that thus hovers over phenomenology is solipsism. 
Husserl’s Cartesianism and Heidegger’s privileging of human being and solitude as 
authenticity does indeed privilege a transcendental subjectivity that is elevated over 
the Other, which Levinas’ and Derrida’s later reconfigurations of phenomenology will 
address. It is the argument of this thesis that the threats of phenomenalism and 
solipsism in phenomenology are precisely what Derrida addresses in his post-
phenomenology with his positing of the quasi-transcendental and iterability.
Likewise, the scholars Michael Marder and Martin Hagglund have argued in their 
phenomenological accounts of Derrida that Derrida is a realist, a materialist and an 
empiricist. I argue that such characterizations of Derrida are inaccurate as they fail to 
grasp the aporia of Derrida’s thought: the transcendental is not conceivable without 
the empirical and vice versa, through iterability and differance. Derrida is not a 
materialist or an empiricist, rather he is a thinker of the founding conditions of 
possibility for metaphysics in its totality through his concepts of iterability, differance 
and the quasi-transcendental. The trace is not an empirical concept but an a priori 
difference that allows the retrospective division of the transcendental and the 
empirical, hence I would contest Hagglund’s view of Derrida as an arche-materialist 
who posits atheism as the natural conclusion of his philosophy. Derrida is a thinker of 
the iterability and differance that is necessary for sustaining the metaphysical project 
rather than a materialist.
Tom Rockmore, in In Kant’s Wake63, characterizes Derrida as a skeptic who 
makes knowledge impossible as every argument undercuts definite reference and no 
                                               
63 Tom Rockmore. In Kant’s Wake. Malden, Blackwell, 2006.
106
argument can suffice to pick objects out through words. As previously argued with 
Glendinning and Moran, I will argue that such characterizations of Derrida as a 
skeptic and nihilist who violently ends phenomenology are mistaken as Derrida 
merely examines the conditions of possibility for phenomenology and reconfigures it 
to acknowledge these conditions for metaphysical production. Derrida does not, in 
any way, destroy phenomenology. Indeed, Derrida continues phenomenology’s 
legacy through his notions of iterability and differance which are derived from 
Husserl’s concept of intentionality.
Hence this thesis will argue, contrary to Glendinning, Rockmore, Mohanty 
and Moran, that phenomenology does not meet a violent death in Derrida. Derrida’s 
intervention saves phenomenology by addressing the aporias that are intrinsic to it. 
Derrida wishes to address, not Husserl’s transcendental leanings, but the closure of 
metaphysics it produces by suppressing differance in privileging presence by failing 
to acknowledge differance as the source of presence and logocentrism. Yet at the 
heart of phenomenology lies an inescapable death and ineradicable non-self-presence 
that constitutes it and gives rise to metaphysical production. This death is the non-
presence or absence, the nothing which gives rise to both the transcendental and 
empirical in a movement of differentiating traces. It is named differance, the nothing
of spacing between the transcendental and empirical which gives rise to the difference 
and deferral that produces both the transcendental and empirical, through a movement 
of traces. In Introduction to Origin of Geometry, Derrida negotiates a middle ground 
between Platonism and historicism. 
Kant had succumbed to Platonism through his eradication of history from the 
transcendental, while Husserl, through his reduction of factual historicity to arrive at 
the eidetic origin of Geometry, likewise risks negating history which is the exemplar 
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for the ideal and succumbing to Platonism. In place, Derrida argues that the ideal is 
tradition, and the Absolute is passage. Derrida does not succumb to historicism as he 
maintains the existence of the transcendental, which is enabled only through its 
iterability or repeatability. Rather Derrida argues that this transcendental must be 
reactivated through iterability and history. The transcendental must be repeated with a 
difference to form the quasi-transcendental. Derrida argues that historicity and 
differance, the transmission of the ideal through iterability and writing, is a condition 
of possibility for the ideal.
In Introduction to Origin of Geometry for instance, Derrida discusses 
Husserl’s description of the first geometer’s founding act of geometry as an act which 
has taken place “once” and is inaugurated for the “first time”, thus becoming 
institutive and creative. How does phenomenology then transmit and reproduce itself? 
Derrida answers that it is through the iteration of a noema, the act of 
phenomenological reduction is reactivating and noetic by repeating the ideal in the 
empirical. Derrida thus writes of a relation of dependence between the repeated 
phenomena and the reactivated origin- this relation between the transcendental and 
empirical will eventually be coined as differance.  Iterability and history is thus the 
condition of possibility of the ideal. Yet this iteration of origin gives rise to an aporia 
– how is transcendental correlative to the empirical? Are they the same and is there 
any difference between them since they are distinct? 
This is the fundamental paradox of phenomenology, the transcendental is not 
the empirical, they are distinct, and yet the transcendental must be repeated in 
theatrical production through the empirical. The empirical mediates the transcendental 
through the differentiating trace which produces the illusion that transcendental is 
distinct from empirical. The difference which separates the transcendental and 
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empirical is the difference which is nothing, or differance. This thesis will examine 
differance and the quasi-transcendental as Derrida’s argument for addressing the 
aporia of the relationship between the transcendental and empirical.  Against the 
current scholarship that deems Derrida’s intervention as a disruption or a destruction I 
would like to argue that Derrida’s phenomenology is essentially a continuation of 
Husserl’s notion of intentionality through his concepts of iterability and differance, 
indeed Derrida’s reading is nothing but an extension of Husserl’s notion of 
intentionality to its logical conclusion, rather than being any grave disruption of 
Husserl.
Differance
Derrida traces the conditions of possibility for logocentrism by exceeding the 
text in locating the point of exteriority and transcending its totality. This he does by 
coining the term differance, which describes the point of interaction between 
philosophy and empiricism, or philosophy and non-philosophy. In Speech and 
Phenomena, Derrida discusses differance:
We must be referred to an order, then, that resists philosophy’s founding opposition 
between the sensible and the intelligible. The order that resists this opposition, that 
resists it because it sustains it, is designated in a movement of differance (with an a) 
between two differences or between two letters. This differance belongs neither to 
voice nor to writing in the ordinary sense, and it takes place, like the strange space 
that will assembles us here for the course of an hour, between speech and writing and 
beyond the tranquil familiarity that binds us to one and to the other, reassuring us 
sometimes in the illusion that they are two separate things. 64
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Differance is the difference or spacing between the transcendental and empirical that 
enables metaphysics to function, it is the movement that sustains metaphysics in the 
repetition of the transcendental in the empirical, or iterability. It is the movement of 
differance that relates the transcendental to the empirical, and reassures us with the 
illusion that the transcendental and the empirical are two separate things. Differance is 
the difference between the transcendental and empirical which is nothing, for the 
transcendental can only exist through its theatrical production in the empirical as 
repetition with a difference.  Derrida traces the conditions of possibility for
logocentrism by acknowledging the quasi-transcendental, which is the economy of 
both the transcendental and empirical. The quasi-transcendental is neither 
transcendental nor empirical, but is the differance, trace, limit or spacing between the 
transcendental and empirical which enables metaphysics to function. It is the 
difference between transcendental and empirical, or differance, which is the spacing 
or nothing that conditions both the transcendental and empirical in a mode of 
production through iterability or repetition. It is the written mark or quasi-
transcendental, differance, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical which 
enables the possibility of their distinction and the impossibility of their separation as 
transcendental exists only in and through empirical through repetition with a 
difference. Were there no empirical for Husserl, it would not be possible to institute 
his distinction and exclusion of pure expressive signs from it.
Phenomenology and Death
For Derrida, death constitutes life. The very act of hearing-oneself-speak 
presumes a need for signs, and thus solitary mental life needs indicative signs to 
communicate within oneself. Thus absence and the empirical have invaded solitary 
mental life, which cannot be reduced to pure expressive signs or ideality. At the heart 
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of life is death. Death and non-presence is the condition of possibility for life. Death 
constitutes life, it is the impossible possibility that enables life. 
Derrida writes of death that lies at the heart of phenomenology in Speech and 
Phenomena. He argues, for instance, that phenomenology is tormented, if not 
contested from within, by its own descriptions of the movement of temporalization 
and of the constitution of intersubjectivity. At the heart of what ties together these 
decisive moments of description is an irreducible nonpresence as having a 
constituting value, and with it a non-life, a non-presence, or nonself-belonging of the 
living present, an ineradicable non-primordiality.65 This death that lies at the heart of 
phenomenology constituting the present is the difference which is nothing, the 
differance, or Vergegenwartigung and Apprasentation, which bifurcates the a priori 
and aligns it simultaneously with non-presence and absence. This nothing is the trace 
of all repeatable traces which is the constituting value for presence, all productions 
and reproductions of presence arise out of this spacing or interval between the 
transcendental and empirical which Derrida calls differance. It is the repetition of the 
transcendental in the empirical in iterability which arises out of this nothing, or death, 
differance. Differance is the spacing or temporization between the transcendental and 
empirical, which produces the transcendental and empirical through the retrospective 
distinguishing movement of the trace. 
In Of Grammatology Derrida writes of the death of the book and the beginning 
of writing. The death of the book is the death of univocal and absolute meaning, for as 
Derrida argues, there is “nothing outside the text”, with the effacing of the 
transcendental signified. In its place Derrida argues that every signified is already in a 
position of signifier, it is the trace and the movement of traces in a production of 
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differences in writing that produces meaning. It is the iterability between the 
transcendental and empirical and the differance between them which is nothing that 
gives rise to meaning. At the heart of phenomenology thus lies an inescapable death 
which produces it- this death is the non-presence and nothing of differance which 
gives rise to the production of the transcendental and empirical through iterability and 
writing. Death, or differance, is the nothing that conditions and produces life, and the 
phenomenological reduction to suppress differance and arrive at pure presence thus 
lands phenomenology in an aporia by excluding life’s condition of possibility- which 
is death. 
Phenomenology in contemporary context
Today Phenomenology risks being eclipsed by later developments in 
philosophy, such as the burgeoning of analytic philosophy and analytic accounts of 
metaphysics and epistemology or philosophy of mind and philosophy of social 
sciences. Moran has also argued that phenomenology has been superceded by 
deconstruction and post-structuralism, another point which I disagree with. Derrida’s 
intervention was a reconfiguration of, not a destruction of phenomenology. It is the 
argument of this thesis that Derrida’s intervention is a step towards reconfiguring 
phenomenology to make it of contemporary relevance by bringing it to acknowledge 
its historicity as a condition of possibility for its ideality. There is no ideality without 
repeatable, repeated marks.
Ideality is constituted by repeatability and history which is the equivalent of 
difference. Derrida puts repeatability and difference together together to get 
differance. Iterability is the condition of possibility of history and metaphysics as the 
ideal needs to be exemplified in order to come into being. As Derrida argues in the 
Introduction to Origin of Geometry, the historicity of geometry, the pure possibility of 
112
truth’s appearance, is not a Platonic entity that exists outside of history. It is 
dependent on the fact of empirical history, of which it is the essence, for its 
appearance, and like any other phenomenological sense, its being is what it gives 
itself to be in history. As Derrida puts it, “The Absolute is passage”. The 
transcendental is mediated through empirical history to come into being; there is no 
ideality without historicity. Science or empiricism is thus not excluded in post-
phenomenology but made the condition of possibility for the representation of the 
ideal. 
Dermot Moran has characterized phenomenology as “a way of doing 
philosophy” marked by having a “thoroughly modernist outlook”66. Moran argues that 
the modernist outlook of phenomenology is inseparable from its attempt to develop a 
“critique of the effect of the natural scientific outlook on human being in the world.”67
Derrida’s account bridges metaphysical idealism and naturalist science, positing the 
relation between them as iterability or the empirical representation of the 
transcendental. Phenomenology thus moves away from being merely an anti-scientific 
or modernist philosophy to a philosophy which examines the conditions of possibility 
for ideality or traditional metaphysics- iterability and repetition in Derrida’s post-
phenomenology. 
What Derrida’s reconfiguration of phenomenology saves phenomenology
from is phenomenalism and solipsism. Specifically this post-phenomenology is a 
reconfiguration of Husserl’s phenomenology to save it from all the above problems by 
enabling phenomenology to acknowledge its historicity. Husserl, through his 
repudiation of history and naturalism, had in fact landed phenomenology in an aporia 
by negating the act of repetition that constitutes the ideal. Sartre, Heidegger and 
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Merleau-Ponty had returned phenomenology to the empirical or the things 
themselves. Sartre did this through intentionality that repudiated that the 
transcendental ego exists over and above consciousness.Heidegger did this through 
his concept of being-in-the-world or a return to ontology over metaphysics.Merleau-
Ponty did this through his suggestion of the intertwining of mind and body or the 
transcendental and empirical. Yet in doing so phenomenology was thus reconfigured 
by them into empirical idealism, which Derrida’s radicalisation of phenomenology 
overcomes. He overcomes this by acknowledging the economy of both the 
transcendental and empirical.  Phenomenology was an investigation into the 
constitution of human consciousness, the ego and perception, and the conditions that 
made thought possible. As a philosophical discipline, it exercised a profound 
influence on both Levinas and Derrida, who took on its presuppositions to rework 
them anew in their thought by expanding phenomenology to include what it had 
previously excluded- the “Other” and iterability. This thesis examines 
phenomenology and its reconfiguration as post-phenomenology, specifically in 
selecting representatives from two sides of the camp, Husserl and Derrida. It will be 
asked if the reconfiguration of phenomenology as post-phenomenology was necessary 
to resolve certain underlying contradictions and aporias contained in its very 
premises. 
The Transcendental
Traditionally conceived, the transcendental is that which conditions 
knowledge and perception in phenomenology by giving it the properties of space and 
time. Tradition has posited the transcendental as the condition of possibility of the 
empirical, from Plato’s Forms to Aristotle’s morphe and Kant’s synthetic a priori. The
Transcendental in philosophy is that which goes beyond (transcends) empiricism and 
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denotes the sphere of metaphysics or the ideal which transcends the empirical. The 
word transcendental means “going beyond”, based on its Latin root, transcendere, to 
climb or go beyond, from trans and scando. In Husserl’s thought, the transcendental 
is the ground of the empirical, and the transcendental ego which consciousness must 
be reduced to is the absolute that grounds consciousness and conditions our 
knowledge and perception of objects by uniting them in continuous unities of space 
and time. The transcendental is what is experienced in order to accertain the a priori
fundamental principles or structuring processes of all knowledge. A quasi-
transcendental functions as the interval between the transcendental and empirical that
enables the retrospective production of both through the differentiating movement of 
the trace. This repetition with a difference or iterability that constitutes the quasi-
transcendental is the condition of possibility for metaphysics and ideality. 
In contrast to the transcendental, empiricism is a theory of knowledge which 
asserts that knowledge arises from experience. Empiricism emphasizes the role of 
experience and evidence especially sensory perception, in the formation of ideas, 
while debating the notion of innate ideas. All knowledge of real existence must be 
based on the senses or self-consciousness. Empiricism asserts that no claims to real 
existence can be justified independently of experience, or a priori. Empiricism is thus 
scepticism towards idealism or the transcendental and a view that all justification of 
beliefs about real existene is dependent on experience, or empirical.
Positing the transcendental as the condition of possibility of the empirical has 
led to a logocentrism, or the privileging of presence. This fails to acknowledge 
differance and a priori difference as its source. The condition of possibility for 
metaphysics, as argued by this thesis, is not the transcendental but the quasi-
transcendental. The quasi-transcendental in Derrida’s thought functions as the 
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condition of possibility of knowledge through iterability or the exemplification of the 
transcendental in the empirical through the differentiating movement of the trace that 
produces the illusion that the transcendental and empirical are distinct. This is the 
signature of the transcendental, differing from the origin and thus enabling its 
communication. This thesis questions if the reconfiguration of philosophy by the 
positing of the quasi-transcendental solves the problem of the contradiction brought 
about by dichotomizing and reifying the transcendental and empirical. This 
contradiction is the aporia of non-correlation and distinctness, which Husserl indeed, 
repeatedly institutes through his act of phenomenological reduction. The 
phenomenological reduction suppresses the movement of differance and iterability 
which are the true conditions for metaphysics and ideality. This thesis questions if the 
transcendental empirical distinction upheld by phenomenology or its conflation 
upheld by the quasi-transcendental in post-phenomenology is a more sound 
description of metaphysics, its mode of production and its conditions of possibility.
Intentionality and iterability
In Ideas 1, Husserl proclaims that the concept of intentionality “is a concept 
which at the threshold of phenomenology is quite dispensible as its starting point and 
basis”. 68 In the simplest of terms, intentionality signifies that consciousness is 
consciousness of something. This integrates the transcendental and empirical in a hyle 
morphe relationship. Consciousness contains sensory contents or hyle, such as the 
data of colour, touch, sound and the like which can only become part of intentional 
structures or forms (morphe) through animating synthesis. As Husserl expresses it, the 
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material or hyle “furnishes a woof that can enter into the intentional tissue, material 
that can enter into intentional formations”69
Husserl, in his efforts to unravel the complicated workings of consciousness, 
seems continually only to entangle himself in greater and even knottier problems. For 
instance, the act of reduction and the suspension of the natural through the 
transcendental epoche seems to undo entirely the hyle-morphe relationship that 
Husserl indicates and the act of reduction hence lands phenomenology in an aporia by 
negating the movement of iterability and difference. This is where Derrida’s notion of 
iterability appeals to us as far more convincing, it is the repetition that retrospectively 
divides and differentiates transcendental and empirical in the reproductive movement 
of differance that makes metaphysics and philosophy possible.The reduction simply 
distorts the transcendental empirical hyle-morphe relationship in suggesting these can 
be separated. Intentionality is the logical precursor of differance, which posits the 
dialectical economy of both transcendental and empirical in a relation. This thus 
includes both consciousness and intended object in a dynamic relation of repetition 
with a difference. 
Critics of Derrida
Contemporary phenomenologists such as Dermot Moran and Robert 
Sokolowski mistakenly characterize Derrida’s reconfiguration of phenomenology as 
an attack on idealism and a privileging in its place of absence, differance, play, and 
the empirical. Moran characterizes Derrida as a relativist and a skeptic whose 
privileging of differance and deferral leads to nihilism in which meanings cannot be 
determined or are endlessly deferred in textual indeterminacy. Such readings of 
Derrida are essentially mistaken. Derrida’s deconstruction does not overthrow the 
                                               
69 Ibid.,§86,  233
117
ideal to privilege the empirical and lead to a destructive nihilism as they assert. It is an 
examination of the conditions of possibility for metaphysics.This is through 
differance which enables transcendental genesis, as well as the principle of iterability, 
or the repetition with a difference which retrospectively differentiates transcendental 
and empirical through the trace. Iterability enables metaphysical production.  
Derrida traces the conditions of possibility for transcendental genesis to the 
meta-concepts of differance and trace, the spacing or interval and temporization 
between the transcendental and empirical which enables their production. Derrida also 
does not repudiate idealism to replace it with empiricism or a play of meanings, but 
posits a priori difference, and iterability, or repetition with a difference of the origin.A 
priori difference is only produced in retrospect through the differentiating trace that 
produces the transcendental and empirical. These a priori conditions of differance and 
trace constitute a meta-phenomenology in accounting for transcendental genesis. 
Derrida’s philosophy does not privilege absence or the empirical. Rather, it posits the 
quasi-transcendental as the supplement that enables the transcendental. It is the 
differance between the transcendental and empirical, or the spacing and repetition 
with a difference between them that makes philosophy possible. This is the play 
between presence and absence that makes philosophy possible, thus what Derrida 
characterizes is this fundamental relationship of differance which makes philosophy 
possible. Derrida does not overturn the transcendental in favour or the empirical. 
Derrida’s philosophy is not empiricism but a philosophy of mediation, a positing of 
the quasi-transcendental as that which enables philosophy. This is the accounting for 
the meta-concepts that enable phenomenology as differance and the trace. 
Dermot Moran is also mistaken in characterizing differance as merely the 
endless deferral of meaning leading to a nothingness or nihilism. Differance is an 
118
acknowledgement of the economy of the repetition of transcendental and the 
empirical in the reproductive movement of iterability rather than a lapse into 
empirical substitution or the elevating of the sign over the signified. It is an 
acknowledgement that the condition of possibility of signification is repetition, or 
representation. (Vergegenwartingung) I also contest Moran’s view that Derrida 
privileges the singular over the universal. Derrida argues that the universal must be 
expressed through the singular. It is not his project to repudiate universals or idealism 
but to examine the conditions of possibility in which metaphysics produces itself, 
which is repetition and representation, or iterability. 
In Speech and Phenomena for instance, the expressive represents pure ideality, 
a stratum of sense separated from empirical data, it is a form of transcendental 
signified and a metaphysics of presence. Derrida questions the strict distinction 
between the expressive and the indicative that Husserl makes. For Derrida this rigid 
dichotomization leads to a form of phonocentrism and logocentrism. Derrida 
questions the strict distinction between the transcendental and the empirical and 
argues for an interweaving between the two. This interweaving he calls differance, or 
the repetition of Vorstellung(ideality) in empirical life, which he calls 
Vergegenwartingung, reproductive repetition.Vergegenwartigung involves the 
objectification of something as being itself absent (past, merely imaginary) whereas 
repetition and recognition of an expression does not. The sign becomes made possible 
by its repeatability, or iterability, and in this repetition that Derrida locates the 
movement of trace, differance, or supplementarity. Derrida argues that the sign’s 
possibility of repetition conditions presence, thus non-presence constitutes presence 
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rather than the reverse. In this sense ideality is bifurcated into two. As Derrida puts 
forth, the presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse. 70
Derrida questions the possibility of making a rigid distinction between the 
expressive and the indicative and isolating the expressive in order to privilege it as a 
site of presence. In questioning the reduction of indication, Derrida wishes to question
the possibility of the existence of exclusive expressive signs. He argues that 
expression and indication is always interwoven and mutually implicated. This is 
through the relation of iterability or quasi-transcendental.  
What Moran and Sokolowski miss entirely in their interpretations of Derrida is 
his positing of the quasi-transcendental in order to save phenomenology from an 
aporia by nullifying the reproductive movement of iterability through the act of 
phenomenological reduction. They simply assume that Derrida dismisses the 
transcendental and mounts an attack on idealism. While Moran is right in noting that 
Derrida posits the contamination of the transcendental and empirical, he is wrong to 
interpret this as amounting to a valorization of the empirical or the signifier over the 
signified. Derrida’s suggestion that there is nothing outside the text does not, as 
Moran suggests, lead to a nihilism. Rather it is a suggestion that the transcendental 
must be contained or embodied by the text rather than posited as exterior and separate 
from it. Moran’s charge that Derrida’s repudiation of logocentrism leads to a rejection 
of the law of non-contradiction also misses the point of Derrida’s account of 
metaphysics entirely, Derrida’s argument precisely captures the aporia, and hence the 
contradiction, that metaphysics lands itself in by negating the constituting movement 
of iterability and differance in the phenomenological reduction. It thus locates this 
contradiction and resolves it through the positing of the quasi-transcendental, or the 
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repetition of the transcendental in the empirical, or the mediation of the transcendental 
in the empirical. 
Also, Derrida does not repudiate logocentrism. He merely examines the 
conditions of possibility for logocentrism- differance and the trace. Moran is also 
mistaken in charging Derrida with linguistic idealism with his statement that there is 
nothing outside the text. Derrida is not arguing that there is nothing outside language,
but rather that language is instrumental for meaning and its condition of possibility for 
coming to fruition. Derrida’s argument is for mediation of the transcendental through 
the empirical rather than an exchanging of idealism for context or the empirical. It is 
the argument of this thesis that Derrida, far from being a destructive critic of 
phenomenology as Moran and Sokolowski argue, is in fact examining the mode in 
which phenomenology is made possible.This is through his notion of repetition and 
the principle of iterability which constitutes the ideal. 
This makes for a more complete and sensible reading of metaphysics in place 
of one that lands phenomenology in an aporia through the exclusion of differance or 
the quasi-transcendental that occurs through the reduction. The phenomenological 
reduction is only enabled by the nothing, or differance, which distinguishes the 
transcendental and empirical. Hence, metaphysics should be brought to acknowledge 
this a priori condition of possibility that enables transcendental genesis and the very 
possibility of mediation of the transcendental and empirical through iterability. 
Phenomenology becomes enabled by differance as its condition of possibility as the 
very act of phenomenological reduction presupposes this a priori difference between 
transcendental and empirical which translates as nothing.
In this chapter I have examined Derrida’s reception in the phenomenological 
field. I examined common miscontruals of Derrida as an empiricist and nihilist, and 
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allegations that his post-phenomenology is a destruction of phenomenology. Contrary 
to these charges, I have argued that Derrida’s post-phenomenology is a meta-
phenomenology in its account for the conditions of possibility for transcendental-
empirical distinction through his notions of differance and trace, as well as the quasi-
transcendental. The quasi-transcendental is the interval between the transcendental 
and empirical which enables the thinking of both. Iterability and repetition name the 
conditions of possibility of ideality rather than being any simple destructive negation 
of it. The transcendental is only enabled by its signature, or difference from the origin 
in order to be communicated through space and time. It is the written mark, the quasi-
transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, which makes 
possible the distinction between the transcendental and empirical at the same time it 
makes impossible a sphere of purely expressive signs without the distinction. The 
written mark functions as if it was transcendental, but without it no distinction 
between the transcendental or empirical would be able to take place, and were the 
distinction impossible no transcendental or pure expressive realm would take place 
either. Hence the phenomenological project becomes possible through this 
paradoxical relation of the quasi-transcendental, relating the transcendental and 
empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity in non-identity. It is thus 
made more powerful through an acknowledgement of the quasi-transcendental as its 
condition of possibility. In the next chapter I will further outline Derrida’s meta-
phenomenology as an account of the conditions of phenomenology rather than being a 
simple destruction of it.
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Husserl’s quest for eidetic certainty
Husserl’s project
In this chapter I will examine Husserl’s attempt to establish a ground for 
science with the so called transcendental reduction. This will entail both an 
identification of the problems that Husserl was attempting to solve as well as a careful 
analysis of Husserl’s account of his methodology. I will then examine how Derrida’s 
reading, which affirms the phenomenological project in many of its essential aspects, 
begins to signal a subtle yet ultimately radical disagreement. This disagreement will 
have lasting implications for our understanding of the possibilities designated by the 
transcendental method in Husserl’s thinking.
Husserl, in attempting to bracket the natural world through his transcendental 
reduction, was seeking an absolute foundation in which to ground science. This a 
priori grounding would establish science in a solid and unshakeable foundation that 
subsequently resolved all the crises of foundations in the European sciences. Husserl 
seeks to overcome psychologism and relativism through establishing an a priori and 
absolute foundation for science. As Husserl puts it on establishing an a priori 
foundation for science:
This implies that in and through the establishment of the a priori the subjective 
method of this establishing is itself made transparent, and that for the a priori 
disciplines which are founded within phenomenology (for example, as mathematical 
sciences) there can be no “paradoxes” and no “crises of foundations”. The 
consequence that arises (from all this) with reference to the a priori sciences that have 
come into being historically and in transcendental naivete is that only a radical, 
phenomenological grounding can transform them into true, methodical, fully 
justifying sciences.71
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Husserl thus seeks a science that grounds itself radically as an a priori science, its 
justification and method would lie in its absolute ideal foundation which would 
resolve problems that involved crises of foundations and logical paradox. This also 
included problems of subjectivism- in positing the a priori as the unshakeable ground 
of phenomenology Husserl sought a method in which to objectify the sciences and 
find a radical foundation upon which the unquestionable certainty and objectivity of 
the sciences would be founded through the transcendental reduction. As Husserl puts 
it on the necessity of the transcendental reduction:
Phenomenological psychology in this manner undoubtedly must be established 
as an “eidetic phenomenology”; it is then exclusively directed toward the invariant 
essential forms. For instance the phenomenology of perception of bodies will not be 
(simply) a report on the factually occurring perceptions or those to be expected; rather 
it will be the presentation of invariant structural systems without which perception of 
a body and synthetically concordant multiplicity of perceptions of one and the same 
body as such would be unthinkable. If the phenomenological reduction contrived a 
means of access to the phenomenon of real and also potential inner experience, the 
method founded in it of “eidetic reduction” provides the means of access to the 
invariant essential structures of the total sphere of pure mental process.72
Transcendental reduction is a method at which one arrives at apodictic certainty – at 
the essences which form the a priori conditions upon which empirical phenomenology 
is premised.  Phenomenology is eidetic phenomenology – it seeks to arrive at the 
genetic foundations of thought, as Husserl puts it- moves phenomenology from static 
to genetic – in arriving at the pure, invariant, essential forms which synthesize 
perceptions into coherent unities and without which perception would be impossible.  
Husserl sought, through the eidetic reduction, to arrive at the essential structures of 
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the pure mental process; in this sense the transcendental reduction is a purifying 
process of bracketing everything contingent, empirical and relative to arrive at the 
absolute and a priori foundations that structure mental processes. 
This chapter will seek to examine the conditions of possibility for establishing 
Husserl’s absolute ground of certainty in its a priori formulation by moving from 
establishing the need for the transcendental reduction, which we have just seen to be 
the consequence of Husserl’s quest to ground science with an absolute and 
unshakeable foundation. Then I will examine Derrida’s account of the conditions for 
arriving at apodictic certainty through its foundational condition of possibility – the 
trace and differance.   
Derrida’s reading of the Absolute
In Derrida’s reading, the Absolute is constituted by repetition and 
representation and not presentation, which has never existed in the first place. The 
absolute has to be re-activated through time and history by the iteration of the noema 
and the repetition of presence in absence, being in non-being. This bifurcates the a 
priori. This absolute is always deferred and delayed, spatially and temporally, 
communicated to us through the passage of differance. The Absolute is communicated 
by its signature or trace. For instance Derrida states in Introduction to Origin of 
Geometry that:
Here, on the contrary, the here and now of the “first time” is institutive and creative. 
Is this experience, unique of its kind, not a singular fact – one for which we should 
not be able to substitute another fact as an example in order to decipher its essence?
Is this to say that this inseparability of fact and sense in the oneness of an instituting 
act precludes access for phenomenology to all history and to the pure eidos of a 
forever submerged origin?
Not at all. The indissociability itself has a rigorously determinable phenomenological 
sense. The imaginary variation of static phenomenology simply supposed a type of 
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reduction whose style will have to be renewed in a historical phenomenology. The 
eidetic aspect of this reduction was the iteration of a noema: since the eidos is 
constituted and objective, the series of acts which intended it could not but 
indefinitely restore the ideal identity of sense which was not obscured by any 
historical opacity, and it would only be a question of clarifying, isolating, and 
determining its evidence, invariance, and objective independence. The historical 
reduction, which also operated by variation, will be reactivating and noetic. Instead of 
repeating the constituted sense of an ideal object, one will have to reawaken the 
dependence of sense with respect to an inaugural and institutive act concealed under 
secondary passivities and infinite sedimentations – a primordial act which created the 
object whose eidos is determined by the iterative reduction. Here again we are going 
to see that there is no simple response to the question of the priority of one reduction 
over another. 73
Derrida shows that the relation between the eidetic reduction and the absolute origin 
is one of repetition – the reduction is the iteration of the noema. It re-awakens the 
dependence of sense with respect to the institutive and creative act of the absolute 
origin which, far from being submerged and lost, is re-activated through the reduction 
through repetition with a difference in the present. This de-sediments the concealed 
origin of the past and re-activates it in the present and future. The Absolute origin of 
the past which was instituted creatively “for the first time” by the first geometers is 
thus re-activated through the reduction through the iteration of the noema, or the 
repetition of the Absolute with a difference in the present. This origin is produced 
only retrospectively through the act of repetition, signalling to a presence that never 
existed. Repetition produces the subsequent division into transcendental and empirical 
retrospectively signalling to a presence that must have existed but was never there 
through the differentiating movement of the trace. The Absolute, or its myth, is thus 
constituted by this re-activating iteration of the noema, or repetition with a difference 
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in the present and future through the reduction. This signature of the Absolute 
dislodges it from the origin, and institutes a new writing and a dissemination of 
plurivocal meaning. Further Derrida states that:
The impossibility of resting in the simple maintenance (nowness) of a Living Present, 
the sole and absolutely absolute origin of the De Facto and the De Jure, of Being and 
Sense, but always other in its self-identity: the inability to live enclosed in the 
innocent undividedness (indivision) of the primordial Absolute, because the Absolute 
is present only in being deferred-delayed (differant) without respite, this impotence 
and this impossibility are given in a primordial and pure consciousness of Difference. 
Such a consciousness, with its strange style of unity, must be restored to its own light. 
Without such a consciousness, without its own proper dehiscence, nothing would 
appear.
The primordial Difference of the absolute Origin, which can and indefinitely must 
both retain and announce its pure concrete form with a priori security, i.e. the beyond 
or the this-side which gives sense to all empirical genius and factual profusion, that is 
perhaps what has always been said under the concept of “transcendental” through the 
enigmatic history of its displacements. Difference would be transcendental. The pure 
and interminable disquietude of thought striving to ‘reduce’ Difference by going 
beyond factual infinity toward the disquietude would be transcendental. And 
Thought’s pure certainty would be transcendental, since it can look forward to the 
already announced Telos only by advancing (or being in advance of) the Origin that 
indefinitely reserves itself. Such a certainty never had to learn that Thought would 
always be to come.
The strange procession of a “Ruckfrage” is the movement sketched in The Origin of 
Geometry, whereby this piece of writing also holds, as Husserl says, an “exemplary 
significance.” 74
Derrida discusses the conditions of possibility of the Absolute – it is always relayed 
spatially and temporally through the passage of differance, deferred and delayed in 
order to be communicated. As Derrida puts it earlier, the Absolute is passage – the 
Absolute is re-activated through the iteration of the noema, of what Derrida calls the 
                                               
74 Ibid., 153.
127
movement and the procession of the “Ruckfrage.” It is the possibility of the iteration 
of the noema, and the re-activation of the Absolute origin that ensures it transmission 
through time and history from past to future, as Derrida puts it “Thought would 
always be to come”. The Absolute is thus never present to itself or undivided in the 
Living Present, it is always delay. Hence the Living Present is always co-existent with 
the past and the future, or the not-now. Presence is thus aligned with non-presence in 
the forms of past and future in order to be perpetuated. The Absolute is constituted 
through its repetition and deferral through space and time in order to be 
communicated. As Derrida puts it, pure thought is always delay. The Absolute origin, 
or its myth, thus has to be re-activated through its iteration and conveyed through the 
passage of differance in order to perpetuate itself through space and time. Repetition 
produces the Absolute origin retrospectively through division into the transcendental 
and empirical signalling to a presence which was never there. The Absolute, or the 
transcendental, is thus really differance, or delay and deferral in its passage through 
time and history to be perpetuated from past to future. The Absolute always differs 
from itself in its repetition with a difference or differance, without this difference or 
deferral through space and time, nothing would appear to consciousness. The 
Absolute only exists as its signature, or difference from origin.
Derrida’s “Disagreement” with Husserl
Derrida’s disagreement with Husserl takes the form of a non-synonymous 
substitution. The non-synonymous substitutions for Derrida in the Differance essay 
are terms such as pharmakon, supplement, arche-writing, trace, protowriting, reserve, 
things which mean different things in different contexts but perform the same function 
in Derrida's work of naming the aporia that takes place in different contexts where 
there is a inescapable haunting of presence by non-presence and the greater structure 
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that the terms belong to. In Derrida’s work, these aporias or displacements are 
produced as a “chain” of “non-synonymous substitutions” in which difference defers 
and differentiates itself differently in accordance with the (contextual situation in 
which its movement is solicited: in reading Plato, for instance, Derrida finds the trace 
of difference inscribed in the thought of writing as pharmakon (meaning both 
“poison” and “cure”); in Rousseau, it appears as “the supplement”(meaning both “the 
missing piece and the extra piece” ); in Mallarme, as “the hymen” (indicating both
“inside and outside”, “virginity and consummation”; and even when he explicates 
differance under its “own” name, this explication is carried out only through its 
dissimulation into other names (“reserve”,”trace”, “archi-trace”, and “archi-writing” 
etc), each of which may stand in for this movement in a given context, but none of 
which- including ‘differance’ itself- may claim authority over the open system in 
which it plays and through which its effects are produced and dispersed. 75
Derrida’s reading affirms that it is differance and repetition that constitutes the 
Absolute rather than the transcendental. Such a reading accounts for the perpetuation 
of the Absolute through time and history, as the Absolute has to be re-activated 
through its iteration in the present and future in order to sustain itself through space 
and time. This delay and deferral through space and time is the passage of differance 
which the Absolute, or its myth, has to pass through in order to be communicated 
from its institution in the past to the present and future. This absolute origin is only 
produced retrospectively through the differentiating movement of difference and the
trace. Derrida’s reading develops and affirms in Hegelian terms rather than being a 
contradiction or disagreement. Contradiction and disagreement, on Hegelian terms, 
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should be replaced with phrases like process and evolution or development. Reading 
from Hegel:
The more the current opinion views the opposition between true and false as rigid, the 
more it expects that every given philosophical system should be either endorsed or 
contradicted, and takes every explanation of such a system to be only the one or the 
other. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive 
development of truth, it only sees contradiction in that diversity. The bud disappears 
in the eruption of the flower, so one could say that the flower contradicts the bud. In a 
similar way, the fruit declares the flower to be the plant’s false existence, and steps 
forward in its place as the plant’s truth. These forms are not only distinct; they reject 
one another as mutually exclusive. At the same time, their fluid nature makes them 
into moments of an organic unity, in which they not only do not struggle with each 
other, but one is as necessary as the other; and only this equal necessity constitutes 
the life of the whole. 76
The widely held view of philosophy holds that two contradictory claims, or 
philosophical doctrines, are mutually exclusive. Only one of them can be true, while 
the other is a falsehood. Hegel proposes a different view according to which 
conflicting philosophical doctrines are all dynamic constituents or “moments” of 
Truth, every moment emphasizes a single, partial aspect of the whole truth. Truth is
thus organic and evolutionary. Each “moment” of truth is a progressive development 
towards the whole Truth or Absolute. Each ‘moment’ of truth thus represents a 
constituent truth on the path to the growth and development of the Absolute.  
Contradiction and disagreement as the relationship between philosophers 
needs to be reformulated as development towards the synthesis of progressive truth 
because it is a more accurate description of what actually takes place when one 
philosopher ‘disagrees’ with another, philosophers essentially do not disprove the 
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theory or systems of each other as the formal qualities of the expression of the 
Absolute is sustained. The Absolute only takes on different forms as each philosopher 
evolves the relationship between the transcendental and empirical into a different 
shape, but essentially these are repetitions of the same fundamental axioms and truths.
Does the existing formulation of disagreement accurately capture what is at 
stake when a so called disagreement arises between philosophers? As Hegel has it, 
disagreement translates into only half the story, as the formal qualities of the 
alternative philosophies developed, such as transcendental empirical difference 
remains the same rather than diverge. Rather each philosopher develops and 
progressively evolves the notion of the relationship between the transcendental and 
empirical by giving these a new shape and form and evolving it into new systems
which essentially share the same principle of the Absolute. Is there truly a 
disagreement between philosophers when the formal qualities of their formulation 
remain the same, in the form of transcendental empirical difference? The differences, 
or disagreements between philosophers, are on the level of form and appearance 
rather than substance. The grounding principle of the Absolute remains the same. No 
difference exists between the philosophers, as they are a repetition of the principle of 
the Absolute. No disagreement or contradiction thus arises between the philosophers.
Hence does Derrida’s reformulation of transcendental-empirical difference in 
his notions of differance and trace contradict or develop the preceding philosophers?
In many senses, Derrida affirms and develops philosophy by discovering that the 
fundamental relationship between the transcendental and empirical is one of repetition 
with a difference. It translates as a priori difference which produces subsequently the 
illusory distinction of the transcendental and empirical in theatrical production 
through the differentiating movement of differance and the trace. Derrida also 
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discovers that the difference that separates the transcendental and empirical is a 
difference which translates as nothing. This formulation of the transcendental and 
empirical does not contradict or disagree with previous arguments of the philosophers,
but develops and affirms it by discovering its conditions of possibility – differance 
and trace are the conditions of possibility for the formulation of the transcendental 
and empirical. These transcendental and empirical are not separate and reified entities 
ontologically but repetitions with a difference, or traces. The difference which is 
nothing is presupposed by phenomenology from the beginning in its being the 
condition of possibility for the phenomenological reduction. Derrida discovers that 
the condition of possibility for a priori difference is that it is a difference which 
translates nothing because it distinguishes nothing and separates nothing. 
The transcendental and empirical differ only in name and are produced 
theatrically as distinct through the movement of differance and the trace. The 
transcendental and empirical, along with the illusion that they are distinct, arises out 
of the movement of iterability, which re-activates the noema and perpetuates it 
through time and history. Derrida’s arguments are a development towards the 
Absolute by discovering the a priori conditions of possibility for the transcendental 
empirical distinction as repetition with a difference and the a priori difference, or 
differance, as a difference which translates as nothing. The Absolute is communicated 
through time and history as its signature, or difference from origin. Hence does 
Derrida contradict or affirm and develop philosophy? I incline towards the latter view 
as Derrida examines the conditions of possibility for the production of the Absolute, 
which is formed retrospectively through the act of repetition which signals to an 
origin which must have been but was never there, through the movement of iterability 
and difference.
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Derrida’s non-synonymous substitution for Husserl’s thought does not 
contradict but develop his phenomenology by examining the very conditions of 
possibility for Husserl’s transcendental idealism, positing these as differance and 
iterability. Through his non-synonymous substitution of differance, Derrida discovers 
that a priori difference, or the difference that translates into a nothing that separates 
the transcendental and empirical, is the condition of possibility for phenomenology. 
Paradoxically thus, Derrida’s disagreement with Husserl does not destroy but affirm 
and is a meta-phenomenological examination of the conditions of possibility for 
Husserl’s project. Husserl posits the conditions of possibility for epistemic knowledge 
as the a priori, or the transcendental and the noema which constitutes the real by 
structuring perception into coherent unities. For example the transcendental gives
discrete impressions the properties of space and time. Yet this account of 
transcendental constitution says nothing about the method in which metaphysics is 
perpetuated and sustains itself through the passage of time and history. What is the 
very condition of possibility for transcendental constitution?
Derrida traces the genesis of the transcendental to the trace, or the nothing 
that separates the transcendental and empirical, out of which further differentiating 
traces arise. The trace, or differance, the nothing between the transcendental and 
empirical, out of which the differentiation which produces presence and absence, 
being and nothing arises, is the a priori difference and condition which sustains 
metaphysics rather than solely the transcendental. A transcendental account of 
constitution says nothing about genesis and metaphysical production and 
perpetuation. How does the Absolute get transmitted through history? The 
transcendental noema has to be iterated and conveyed through differance in order to 
be communicated. This is the signature through which the Absolute is communicated.  
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A priori difference, or differance, is the condition of possibility for transcendental 
genesis and metaphysical production.  The transcendental is produced theatrically as 
separate from the empirical through the distinguishing movement of differance and 
the trace. Yet this a priori difference, or differance, is a difference that is nothing and 
distinguishes nothing as transcendental and empirical are but historical names derived 
from metaphysics. The transcendental and empirical are the illusory distinctions and 
theatrical productions of metaphysics, only differing in name as repetitions with a 
difference. Yet each repetition differs and separates itself from the original mark, 
produced as the trace.
Derrida questions the idea that the isolation of the transcendental through the 
act of phenomenological reduction results in accounting for the conditions of 
possibility for knowledge as the absolute a priori. This reduction negates the 
movement of iterability, or repetition with a difference from the original mark, which 
is the mode of production for metaphysics. The transcendental is distinguished from 
the empirical only as an illusion through the reproductive movement of the trace.
Hence, the reduction nullifies this movement of repetition and difference, or 
differance, which is the condition of possibility for metaphysics. The 
phenomenological reduction negates the a priori difference, or differance, which is 
necessary to account for how metaphysics sustains itself. The transcendental is only 
produced separately from the empirical through the illusion of a distinction that 
occurs through the movement of differance, hence expression without indication, 
signified without signifier, ideal without real becomes an incoherent postulate. 
Derrida does not dispute the necessity of the phenomenological reduction to arrive at 
the true conditions of knowledge, but argues that it reverses or annuls the movement 
of iterability. Iterability is the repetition which constitutes ideality and enables it to 
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come into being. It is iterability and repetition that constitutes ideality rather than the 
transcendental as the ideal has to differ from itself through repetition to come into 
being.  As argued by Derrida, the reduction is a re-activation of the noema, rather than 
its negation. The reduction is a theatrical production and illusion that produces the 
transcendental as separate from the empirical, hence positing the transcendental 
without the empirical as its mediation becomes an incoherent postulate. The problem 
with a transcendental account of constitution is that it does not account for genesis 
and metaphysical production and perpetuation. Derrida’s meta-phenomenology, with 
his account of differance and iterability as the conditions of possibility for 
phenomenology, gives such an account. Iterability is the principle by which the 
reduction is negated and enabled - it is precisely what makes the transcendental,
empirical and the division between them deconstructible as it is what allows its own 
negation and performs its own repetition. It is the very principle of iterability in its 
reversibility of the reduction and its simultaneous enabling of it that makes the 
transcendental and empirical deconstructible.
This brings us to an area of contention that Derrida has with Husserl. Husserl 
insists on the rigid distinction between the transcendental and the empirical in order to 
institute his transcendental idealism as the condition of possibility for knowledge. Yet 
according to Derrida, this distinction is incoherent as the transcendental is produced in 
an illusion as separate from the empirical only through the differentiating movement 
of the trace, and through the movement of iterability. The transcendental is nothing 
outside its theatrical production through the empirical in which it displays itself.
Hence, while Husserl posits the distinction between transcendental and empirical as 
ontological and substantive, Derrida will show that the phenomenological reduction 
would not be able to take place if this were so. Rather, Derrida demonstrates that the 
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difference between the transcendental and empirical is a difference which translates as 
nothing. It is a difference which is paradoxically a sameness because it separates 
nothing and distinguishes nothing. It is precisely differance which translates as 
nothing separating the transcendental and empirical which enables the 
phenomenological reduction, were the difference ontological or substantial the 
phenomenological reduction would not be able to take place. Derrida thus examines 
the fundamental aporia of Husserl’s metaphysics – the fundamental and rigid 
distinction which Husserl posits as ontological and substantive would not allow the 
phenomenological reduction to take place if it truly held. Derrida’s account of the 
difference which translates as nothing and distinguishes nothing, and is paradoxically 
not a difference but a sameness, accounts for the very conditions of possibility of the 
phenomenological reduction and transcendental genesis.
Differance and Iterability
Traditionally the transcendental has been posited as the sole source and origin 
of the empirical. Yet this says nothing about the dynamic constitution between the 
transcendental and empirical which enables their relationship. It does not account for 
the movement of the a priori difference across these metaphysical categories, or the 
trace, which enables transcendental-empirical constitution. Derrida traces back the 
condition of possibility for the transcendental-empirical relation to differance, or the a 
priori difference and nothing, spacing, or interval which separates the transcendental 
and empirical. The a priori difference contains an aporia: it is paradoxically a 
difference which is a sameness because it separates nothing. This difference which 
translates as a nothing enables the mediation of the transcendental in the empirical 
and the phenomenological reduction, were this difference ontological or substantial 
the phenomenological reduction would not be able to take place and the 
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transcendental would not be able to be mediated in the empirical. Husserl’s distinction 
between the transcendental and empirical as a substantive and ontological division 
thus becomes an incoherent distinction because of the above reasons.  As Derrida 
argues, transcendental-empirical difference, or differance, is more functional than 
substantial. 
This trace of repeatable traces produces both the transcendental and empirical 
in the reproductive movement of iterability, or its signature and difference from 
origin. The a priori difference between the transcendental and empirical which 
translates as nothing, or differance, sustains metaphysics through maintaining their 
dynamic constitution as iterability. Differance translates as the reproduction of this 
nothing, or a priori difference that separates the transcendental and empirical. 
Differance enables metaphysical production and bifurcates the a priori between 
presence and non-presence. In place of the transcendental as sole constitutor of the 
empirical thus, Derrida argues that a priori difference, or differance, sustains 
metaphysical production. Objective knowledge or science is thus able to conceive the 
life-world through mediation of the transcendental in the empirical, or differance and 
iterability, rather than through the sole sustenance of the transcendental. Rather the 
relation of repetition between the transcendental and empirical, or iterability, sustains 
metaphysics, and allows metaphysical production to take place. The transcendental 
comes into life in the world only through an illusionary distinction through the 
movement of the trace, as a difference from itself as the original mark. This was 
previously discussed as the re-activation of the noema through its iteration. 
Derrida describes the difference between the transcendental and empirical as a 
difference which is nothing:
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For the domain of pure psychological experience incorporates the total domain of 
what Husserl calls transcendental experience. Yet despite this perfect incorporation, a 
radical difference remains, one having nothing in common with any other difference, 
a difference in fact distinguishing nothing, a difference separating no state, no 
experience, no determined signification- but a difference which, without altering 
anything, changes all the signs, and in which aloe the possibility of a transcendental 
question is contained. That is to say, freedom itself. A fundamental difference, thus, 
without which no other difference in the world would either make sense or have the 
chance to appear as such. Without the possibility and the recognition of such a 
duplication (Verdoppelung), whose rigour tolerates no duplicity, without this invisible 
distance held out between the two acts of the epoche, transcendental phenomenology 
would be destroyed in its root.77
Above we see Derrida’s accounting for a priori difference, differance. Derrida posits 
differance as the primordial difference between the transcendental and the empirical 
which is nothing. It translates into the fundamental spacing, delay or deferral of 
meaning which becomes the trace of repeatable traces giving rise to the differentiating 
movement of presence and absence, transcendental and empirical, philosophy and 
non-philosophy. It does this through the movement of differance and iterability. This 
difference distinguishes nothing, separates nothing, but translates into the primordial 
trace or difference out of which all subsequent traces and differentiations producing 
transcendental and empirical arise. As Derrida argues, this a priori difference, or trace, 
is the condition of possibility of both the transcendental and empirical as it translates 
into the reproductive movement or duplication (Verdoppelung) of this trace or nothing 
distinguishing the transcendental and empirical which gives rise to metaphysical 
production through the movement of iterability, or the repetition of the transcendental 
in the empirical with a difference. The condition of possibility for phenomenology 
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hence becomes this perpetuating trace or a priori difference which is nothing, a 
difference from the original mark as repetition of the same. This nothing which 
distinguishes the transcendental and empirical becomes what enables the 
phenomenological reduction: 
This nothing that distinguishes the parallels, this nothing without which precisely no 
explication, that is, no language, could be freely developed in the service of truth 
without being deformed by some real contact, this nothing without which no 
transcendental (that is, philosophical) question could be opened, this nothing arises, 
so to speak, when the totality of the world is neutralized in its existence and is 
reduced to its phenomenal being. This operation is that of the transcendental 
reduction; it may in no case be that of the psychophenomenological reduction78.
The nothing which distinguishes the transcendental and the empirical translates into 
the trace, or differance, which becomes their a priori condition of philosophy that 
arises out of the transcendental reduction. It is the possibility that the transcendental 
can be reduced to the empirical or phenomenal, or the nothing that separates them, 
which enables the reproductive movement of both the transcendental and empirical in 
metaphysical production through iterability. The transcendental does not exist outside 
its illusory reproduction through the empirical. A priori difference which translates as 
the nothing separating the transcendental and empirical enables the phenomenological 
reduction. Iterability translates as the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical 
as a difference from the original mark which is, as Derrida argues, paradoxically a 
difference which is nothing, and separates nothing.
Differance translates as a priori difference, or transcendental difference, yet its 
distinction contains an aporia because it is a difference which translates as nothing or 
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separates nothing. This is because the transcendental does not exist outside the 
empirical, the ideal does not exist outside history and the real. The transcendental ego 
does not exist outside the empirical ego, just as the transcendental is nothing outside 
the history and sedimentations in which it displays itself. Differance, as Derrida 
states, is a sameness which is not identical. This is the aporia of metaphysics – the 
difference between the transcendental and empirical translates paradoxically into a 
sameness, because the transcendental is the empirical. The transcendental cannot exist 
outside of the empirical as iterability or repetition with a difference from the original 
mark, what we discussed in the earlier chapter as re-activation of the noema through 
iteration. 
Husserl’s logocentrism
Husserl maintains a rigid distinction between the transcendental and empirical 
in the text that consolidated his phenomenology as a transcendental idealism, namely, 
Ideas I. For instance, in his beginning chapter he institutes the separation of fact and 
essence, the real and the irreal, and maintains the principle of principles in his 
phenomenology, that every intuition is a source of authority for knowledge, that 
whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form is simply to be accepted as it 
gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.79
In other words, Husserl privileges intuition or the ideal given-ness of an object as its 
reality. (This move is seen by Derrida to privilege presence as what is given is 
presented entirely to itself, hence this makes the ideal absolute). Derrida discusses 
logocentrism in Speech and Phenomena:
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In this sense, within the metaphysics of presence, within philosophy as knowledge of 
the presence of the object, as the being-before-oneself of knowledge in 
consciousness, we believe, quite simply and literally, in absolute knowledge as the 
closure if not the end of history. And we believe that such a closure has taken place. 
The history of being as presence, as self-presence in absolute knowledge, as 
consciousness of self in the infinity or parousia – this history is closed. The history of 
presence is closed, for “history” has never meant anything but the presentation 
(Gegenwartigung) of Being, the production and collection of beings in presence, as 
knowledge and mastery. Since absolute self-presence in consciousness is the infinite 
vocation of full presence, the achievement of absolute knowledge is the end of the 
infinite, which could only be the unity of the concept, logos, and consciousness in a 
voice without differance. The history of metaphysics therefore can be expressed as 
the unfolding of the structure or schema of an absolute will-to-hear-oneself speak. 
This history is closed when this infinite absolute appears to itself as its own death. A 
voice without differance, a voice without writing, is at once absolutely alive and 
absolutely dead.80  
In the above passage Derrida discusses the conditions of possibility of logocentrism 
with the discovery of differance. Logocentrism privileges presence as the objective 
presentation of intuition given entirely to itself, which Husserl privileges in solitary 
mental life as expressive signs over indication. Intuition as absolute, present, objective 
and given to itself (being as presence- the presentation (Gegenwartigung) of being), 
amounts to what Derrida posits as Husserl’s logocentrism. The closure of metaphysics 
and the end of history : metaphysics as an absolute idealism which fails to 
acknowledge the differance, or the difference between transcendental and empirical, 
which constitutes metaphysics : becomes what Derrida wishes to save 
phenomenology from with his post-phenomenology and quasi-transcendental. Derrida 
shows that the trace and death lie at the heart of presence and embody its condition of 
possibility. Differance translates into the contamination of the transcendental and 
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empirical, or the interaction between them in the reproductive movement of 
iterability.
Differance maintains the illusion that the transcendental and empirical are 
separate when it is paradoxically a difference that is nothing, that separates nothing.
This is because the transcendental translates into the empirical.  Metaphysics becomes 
the will-to-hear-oneself speak: as intuition given entirely to itself in expression or 
solitary mental life in full presence. Such a privileging of presence fails to 
acknowledge differance as its source : or an acknowledgement of the economy and 
repetition of the transcendental in the empirical which constitutes metaphysics. 
Derrida wishes to argue for a metaphysics that acknowledges differance as its 
grounds of possibility and source, or the economy and repetition of the transcendental 
in the empirical which enables metaphysics. Derrida argues for a metaphysics that 
acknowledges the quasi-transcendental, which is the spacing between the 
transcendental and the empirical that enables metaphysics in the movement of 
differance or iterability. In this way Derrida wishes to save metaphysics from its 
absolute closure and death- by bringing it to acknowledge what it had repressed-
differance and the quasi-transcendental, as its condition of possibility. Derrida 
pronounces not so much the end of logocentrism as what makes it possible- differance 
and iterability which produces metaphysics through the fundamental relation of 
repetition with a difference. The transcendental distinction from the empirical is an 
illusion, differing from itself through repetition with a difference, which in effect 
distinguishes nothing and separates nothing.
The hierarchizing of essence and fact takes place when Husserl suggests that 
essence is prior to and the necessary condition for fact. This runs the risk of a solely 
exclusive transcendental idealism in relegating the empirical to be secondary to 
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essence and the ideal. Is it not counter-intuitive to suggest that the mind’s essential 
intuitions are the source of our perceptions rather than their empirical counterpart? It 
is this counter-intuitive claim that is countered in Derrida’s notion of iterability. This 
privileging of presence in philosophy will be shown by Derrida to be a phenomenon 
that excludes differance and is thus logocentric. The separation of the transcendental 
and empirical that takes place in Husserl’s noesis and noema distinction further 
privileges the noematic (the ideal content) of the empirical phenomenon. Instead,
Derrida will show that this distinction between the transcendental and the empirical 
collapses when he discusses the principle of iterability, or the repetition of the 
transcendental in the empirical. Husserl further posits the noema or immanent 
perception as absolute and transcendent perception as merely contingent and relative, 
which consolidates his logocentrism. Through this Husserl elevates the noema or 
transcendental to the absolute condition of possibility for the empirical and thus 
elevates and places it prior to the empirical. Instead this thesis will show that it is the 
phenomenon of repetition, or iterability that necessitates the empirical embodiment of 
the ideal and thus allows it to come into being. This problem likewise applies to 
Husserl’s distinction of expression and indication that Husserl upholds in the Logical 
Investigations, and again, immanent and transcendent perception in Ideas I. Husserl’s 
privileging of essence in his phenomenological reduction to arrive at pure intuition is 
in this sense, problematic, because the empirical is what allows the ideal to come into 
being, and reduction hence excludes the very condition of possibility of the ideal. In 
the Logical Investigations, Husserl further privileges presence and intuition by 
mounting an attack on psychologism and its consequence, empiricism. Husserl’s 
attack on empiricism and rigid delineation and privileging of presence, intuition, 
expression and the noematic is logocentric. The notion of the phenomenological 
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residuum which is the remains of pure consciousness that results from bracketing 
likewise is a privileging of the ideal (with the empirical bracketed out). This thesis 
will question if there can indeed be such a thing as a phenomenological residuum and 
if the transcendental and empirical are not in fact, the very same thing. Husserl posits 
his idealism as a necessary condition of possibility for knowledge. For instance, he 
posits that it is pure eidetic intuition which consciousness must be reduced to in order 
to arrive at the ultimate conditions of possibility for knowledge. In Thing and Space
for instance, these are the a priori intuitions which unite discrete phenomena and give 
them the properties of space and time. We will ask if the ideal is indeed the condition 
of possibility of the real and if it is not in fact, absence and differance which 
conditions the ideal and allows it to come into being.
Thing and Space
Husserl sets down the conditions of possibility of perception in Thing and 
Space by formulating these in terms of pre-empirical constitutive functions of space 
and time. Objects are constituted and given in terms of these ideal structures which 
are apprehended and apperceived, which the mind imposes and processes manifold 
perceptions, or pure empirical datum, to form continuous unities. This sets down the 
ideal as the condition of possibility for the empirical, as Husserl argues, objects are 
intended, and intentionality constitutes the empirical in terms of the ideal. The 
problem with such a formulation is that it sets a rigid dichotomy and sets apart the 
ideal and the empirical, resulting in an aporia of non-correlation and distinctness 
between the transcendental and the empirical. The phenomenological reduction which 
Husserl repeatedly institutes in order to arrive at the conditions of knowledge, namely 
space and time, also results in an aporia by nullifying the phenomenon of differance 
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and iterability. Difference and iterability, according to Derrida, translate as the 
condition of possibility of the ideal. 
As discussed earlier, iterability becomes a more reasonable account of the way 
in which metaphysics functions and more consistent with the doctrine of intentionality 
than the reduction or the transcendental epoche. Differance constitutes ideality 
through repetition, or iterability, and ideality is only made possible by its iterability or 
repeatability. Intentionality implies that the ideal and empirical are mutually 
implicated and the reduction that is performed in order to arrive at pre-empirical 
forms of space and time thus negates the phenomenon of iterability which translates 
into the condition of possibility of the ideal.
Husserl further distinguishes real and reell, or transcendent and immanent 
perception. Husserl posits immanent perception as absolute and the condition of 
possibility of transcendent perception. This leads to a logocentrism which forgets its 
origin as difference. Also as discussed earlier, it is counter-intuitive that immanent 
perception is the sole constitutor of transcendent perception rather than the trace. The 
trace is the a priori difference which is the very condition of possibility for 
transcendental genesis. Perception, as argued by Derrida, finds its condition of 
possibility in the trace, or differance, and the repetition of the transcendental in the 
empirical. Immanent perception iterates transcendent perception and hence would be
its mediation, rather than solely determined by transcendent and pre-empirical 
intuition. The transcendental is produced as separate and distinct from the empirical 
only through the illusory movement of difference. It is iterability that produces the 
illusion of the transcendental and empirical as separate through the distinguishing 
movement of the trace, or the production of its difference from the original mark that 
sustains metaphysics. 
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The reduction repeatedly performed by Husserl to arrive at the pure conditions 
of knowledge, the immanent or pre-empirical that unites discrete phenomena, 
manifold perception, or dead matter into continuous unities of objects.This lands 
phenomenology in an aporia by nullifying the movement of differance and iterability 
which are the true conditions of possibility for ideality. The reduction paradoxically is 
a repetition and iteration of the noema rather than the isolation of the transcendental 
through negating the empirical. The reduction can only be performed through this 
repetition or iteration of the noema, and thus to define transcendental without 
empirical lands phenomenology in an aporia.  The transcendental is only produced as 
separate from the empirical as an illusion, through the retrospective movement of the 
trace. Hence, the phenomenological reduction in effect nullifies phenomenology’s 
conditions of possibility by negating the movement of iterability. This aporia becomes 
resolved by Derrida’s account of the quasi-transcendental, which posits the relation of 
iterability or repetition with a difference which produces the illusion that 
transcendental and empirical are distinct when they are the same.
As Derrida has argued in Of Grammatology, every signified is already in the 
position of signifier, and the signified only exists through its mediation as the signifier 
to come into being, Husserl’s rigid distinction between transcendent and immanent 
perception will thus be shown to be in this sense, problematic. This problematization 
however will not be taken for granted. It will be asked if this problematization is 
necessary to arrive at the conditions of possibility for knowledge and if the account of 
the transcendental in phenomenology or the quasi-transcendental in post-
phenomenology provides a more convincing account of a theory of knowledge. It will 
be asked if Derrida’s positing of the quasi-transcendental saves phenomenology by 
positing the dynamic relation between them as differance and repetition, as the ideal 
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has to differ from itself as the original mark through repetition with a difference to be 
instantiated. This enables phenomenology to move from static to genetic by naming 
the conditions of possibility for transcendental genesis. These are differance and the 
trace. The transcendental is only formed retrospectively through repetition, as its 
iteration to be communicated through space and time, which ensures its transmission 
through history. The transcendental, or its myth, is always deferred and delayed 
through its communication to us with the passage of differance, this ensures that 
thought will always be ‘to come’ as the transcendental becomes re-activated from its 
absolute origin in the past through its repetitions in the present and future.
Idea of Phenomenology
The Idea of Phenomenology marks Husserl’s first turn towards transcendental 
idealism. It is here that Husserl introduces his eidetic reduction to arrive at the 
absolute self-given-ness of the immanent perception. This again, privileges presence 
and intuition at the expense of differance and the empirical. Husserl institutes the 
phenomenological reduction in order to arrive at the transcendental ego or absolute 
given-ness of immanent perception. Through this act of reduction Husserl hopes to 
suspend the natural and the empirical which he believes to be contingent and relative 
to absolute consciousness in immanent perception and which can be isolated through 
the transcendental reduction. As argued earlier, this move leads to logocentrism as it 
privileges intuition and presence.
Ideas I
Husserl sets out his transcendental project of phenomenology in Ideas I. By 
distinguishing between fact and essence, the real and the irreal, noesis and noema, 
transcendent and immanent, and raising the essential to absolute. For instance he 
argues that immanent perception is absolute and transcendent perception is merely 
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contingent and relative. Husserl consolidates his logocentrism in privileging presence. 
Husserl also defines his phenomenological reduction in detail here, arguing that the 
reduction must be performed in order to arrive at the noematic constitution of 
knowledge. It is a noematization of the real in order to arrive at the pure conditions of 
knowledge as the irreal essence that determines the real. As argued in the previous 
paragraph, this principle is dubitable when juxtaposed with the principle of iterability. 
Reduction fundamentally forgets the principle of repetition that enables metaphysics 
to function, resulting in a metaphysics that privileges presence. This excludes
differance and becomes phenomenalistic and solipsistic. Husserl’s denigration of the 
empirical, or the natural world view taken by the sciences, forgets that the real 
embodies the ideal as its condition of possibility. This results in a metaphysics that
excludes differance. It will be argued in this thesis that iterability must be taken into 
account when Husserl defines constitution and rather than conveniently forget the 
origins of the ideal that comes from the supplement or the trace which is the 
differance between presence and absence that enables metaphysics to function. One 
should acknowledge the economy of the transcendental and the empirical, or the 
quasi-transcendental. The quasi-transcendental grounds metaphysics, constitutes it, as 
it were, and allows it to function. The supplement or the quasi-transcendental is what 
enables the transcendental to come into being. There is no transcendental outside and 
without the empirical. Hence, metaphysics must acknowledge what it had repressed in 
order for a more holistic and just reading of metaphysics to occur. There is no 
metaphysics without iterability. Hence a logocentrism like Husserl’s which only 
privileges presence and negates the movement of iterability by his act of 
phenomenological reduction can only result in a metaphysics that suppresses 
differance as its condition of possibility. No distinction between expression and 
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indication would be able to take place without the quasi-transcendental, or 
transcendental-empirical difference. Hence the transcendental requires the empirical 
in order to be distinguished from it to perform Husserl’s act of phenomenological 
reduction and exclusion, thus metaphysics cannot function without the quasi-
transcendental, the neither transcendental nor empirical, which upholds the possibility 
of the distinction and the impossibility of their separation.
Cartesian Meditations
In this text Husserl sets out Descartes’ notion of reflection as the ideal for his 
philosophy. The Cartesian ideal is the transcendental ego which is isolated in the act 
of reflection, and Husserl further consolidates this isolation of the transcendental ego 
through his act of phenomenological reduction. This leads to solipsism and a 
privileging presence and intuition in the form of the transcendental ego which exists 
as a phantom without embodiment. Again, we find ourselves trapped in 
phenomenalism and solipsism. This awkwardly posits the transcendental without the 
empirical. As stated in the paragraphs above, this act of reduction cannot take place 
without landing metaphysics in an aporia. How does the transcendental ego exist 
without the empirical ego? This act of reduction, as stated above, negates the 
movement of iterability and differance. The attempts to arrive at apodictic certainty 
result in a privileging presence and intuition without the empirical. The very notion of 
the apodictic is itself a privileging of intuition as absolute. As we have seen above, 
this leads to problems: there is no transcendental ego without the empirical ego. They 
are the same, as the transcendental ego exists only in and through the empirical ego. 
The Cartesian ghost left without a machine is thus ultimately, a prisonhouse of 
metaphysical idealism that finds itself in an absurd state of unembodiment, and as we 
149
have seen with the principle of iterability, this phantom transcendental ego simply 
does not exist without the empirical ego which allows it to come into being.
Derrida’s meta-phenomenology
Derrida’s account of Husserl’s phenomenology is thus in no sense a 
repudiation of it but a meta-examination of its conditions of possibility. Derrida 
examines the contradictions and incoherencies in Husserl’s phenomenology, such as 
the paradox or aporia that the phenomenological reduction gives rise to by negating 
the movement of differance and iterability. These are the conditions of possibility for 
metaphysical production and sustenance. Derrida writes of death that lies at the heart 
of phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena. This death that lies at the heart of 
phenomenology constituting the present is the difference which is nothing, the 
differance, or Vergegenwartigung and Apprasentation. This bifurcates the a priori and 
aligns it simultaneously with non-presence and absence. It is the repetition of the 
transcendental in the empirical in iterability which arises out of this nothing, or death, 
differance, the spacing or temporization between the transcendental and empirical, 
which produces metaphysics and sustains it through repetition with a difference. 
Death thus lies at the heart of life and the Living Present and constitutes it, 
produces it through the differentiating trace out of which presence and absence, being 
and non-being arise. This is the aporia of phenomenology : death constitutes life. 
Derrida also examines the aporia that the transcendental-empirical distinction simply 
does not allow the phenomenological reduction to take place, and resolves these 
contradictions in Husserl’s phenomenology through his positing of the quasi-
transcendental, or the economy and repetition of the transcendental in the empirical. 
Critics of Derrida have been mistaken in classifying Derrida as an empiricist and a 
nihilist. Differance and trace are not empirical concepts. Differance and trace are an a 
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priori difference out of which subsequent differentiations and determinations of the 
illusion of transcendental empirical difference arise. Derrida’s post-phenomenology 
addresses the fundamental problems of phenomenalism and solipsism that a sole 
transcendental account of genesis leads phenomenology to.
Hence Derrida’s post-phenomenology and his concepts of difference and trace 
are an accounting for the very conditions of possibility for transcendental genesis. In 
this sense it does not in any way, as critics have suggested, dispute the existence of 
the transcendental or negate it but examines the very source and origin of this 
transcendental or a priori condition of possibility for knowledge. The transcendental is 
nothing outside the empirical and vice versa. Derrida’s post-phenomenology is an 
account of the mediation that is necessary for transcendental genesis to take place. 
This account of transcendental genesis through the concepts of differance and trace 
resolves the fundamental aporias that haunt Husserl’s phenomenology through his 
separation of the transcendental and the empirical which is inconsistent with his 
account of the phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction itself is 
haunted by the aporia that the transcendental becomes separated and excluded from 
the empirical when Derrida’s notion of iterability shows that the transcendental does 
not exist outside the empirical. It has to be mediated by it. The fundamental 
relationship between the transcendental and empirical is one of repetition with a 
difference rather than exclusion and separation. Derrida’s post-phenomenology thus 
accounts for transcendental genesis and resolves the aporias that are latent in 
Husserl’s phenomenology.  In this sense it is a more convincing account of Husserl’s 
phenomenology than traditional commentaries or analytic commentaries have given.
Central to Derrida’s post-phenomenology is his positing of the quasi-
transcendental, or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical in an economy. 
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Where Husserl had posited the transcendental as sole origin of the empirical, Derrida 
posits the quasi-transcendental in order to demonstrate that it is the economy of the 
transcendental in the empirical that constitutes metaphysics. Husserl’s account of 
transcendental constitution privileges presence and leads to logocentrism. Derrida 
does not dispute this privileging of presence and logocentrism but traces the very 
conditions of possibility for the setting up of intuitive presence and logocentrism 
through his concepts of differance and iterability. It is the a priori difference, or 
differance, between the transcendental and empirical which enables metaphysical 
production through the production of the trace which differentiates the transcendental 
and empirical. This difference is illusory as the transcendental is the empirical. 
This trace gives rise to further differentiations between transcendental and 
empirical. Iterability ensures that metaphysics is sustained and perpetuated through 
repetition with a difference of the transcendental in the empirical. This is the 
differentiating trace that produces the transcendental in the empirical as a difference 
from the original mark. The problem with Husserl’s account of transcendental 
constitution is that it does not account for all the above, namely how metaphysics 
produces, perpetuates and sustains itself through the economy of repetition with a 
differance, or iterability. Husserl’s account of phenomenology does not explain how 
the transcendental is perpetuated through time. This is explained in Derrida’s account 
of the repetition of the Absolute in the present and future and how it is conveyed 
through time and history with the passage of differance. Derrida’s account of 
phenomenology thus explains the dynamic constitution between the transcendental 
and empirical. It also accounts for transcendental genesis through his positing of the 
quasi-transcendental and differance. 
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Husserl’s transcendental idealism arises in no small part from, his Christianity. 
Yet Derrida will demonstrate that the impossibility of God is His possibility, God is 
written in history and differance, unfolding within the limits between presence and 
absence, transcendental and empirical, everything and nothing. Derrida does not 
negate Husserl’s theology. He traces its conditions of possibility for its perpetuation –
differance and iterability. The transcendental is perpetuated through its repetition as 
the empirical to come into being. The transcendental is nothing outside the empirical 
or its unfolding in empirical history which mediates the transcendental. Differance 
and iterability thus name the very conditions of possibility for transcendental genesis.  
The Absolute is always delayed and deferred, conveyed and communicated to us 
through the passage of differance. Without this delay and deferral through the passage 
of differance that takes place through the iteration of the noema, nothing would 
appear to consciousness. This is because the transcendental has to be transmitted 
through time and history to be communicated through its sedimentations to us in the 
present.
This thesis also questions the fundamental relationship between irreal essence 
(the transcendental) and how it is posited as the condition of possibility for the 
empirical, how the relationship between the two is constituted, which is actually 
suggested by Derrida’s quasi-transcendental, or the economy and repetition of the 
transcendental and empirical. Why should it be the case that the irreal essence 
determines the real rather than the act of repetition, or iterability, which explains the 
dynamic constitution between the transcendental and empirical and thus moves from 
static to genetic phenomenology? The problem with positing the transcendental as 
source and origin of the empirical is that it does not account for how the Absolute is 
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communicated to us in the present and future. The Absolute has to be re-awakened as 
sense through iterability in order for such a communication to take place. 
In this section I will examine criticisms of iterability and the idea that the 
general displaces the particular in Derrida’s deconstruction. Derrida is affirming of 
the particular rather than one who displaces the particular in favour of the general. 
One need only look at his law of iterability to realize this. The law of iterability 
dictates that it is the movement of repetition that sustains the transcendental and 
empirical. Hence this law of iterability is fundamentally a law of mediation. The 
transcendental is realized in and through the empirical, hence the general requires the 
particular in order to be realized, just as the ideal requires history in order to be 
realized. Throughout this thesis, I will maintain that it is this law of iterability that 
sustains the metaphysical project. While one might argue that his collapse of 
difference into non-distinction is ultimately nihilistic, this would miss Derrida’s point 
that each term requires its opposite for the distinction to be upheld, his collapse of 
difference into sameness is thus not an attack on identity, but a maintaining that all 
parts are necessary to thinking the whole. Philosophy is both transcendental and 
empirical rather than consisting of solely a pure idealism or a pure empiricism.
The law of identity is thus not under erasure in Derrida but maintained as an 
essential part of a system. In Derrida’s thought, his suggestion that distinctions 
translate into non-distinctions is part of a move to inscribe the transcendental and 
empirical in relation to each other in the broader field of the history of metaphysics, 
where these are oppositional terms which can only mean something in relation to each 
other but also belong to the same ontological and metaphysical structure. 
Transcendental and empirical are historical names derived from metaphysics, and the 
difference between them is an illusion because without the capacity of reducing the 
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transcendental to the empirical, the phenomenological reduction would not be able to 
take place if these were ontologically distinct and separate. The difference between 
the transcendental and the empirical is thus paradoxically both a difference and a 
sameness rather than a pure homogenous unity that chargers of nihilism would 
suggest. The transcendental simultaneously is and is not the empirical, hence the 
relationship is a paradoxical simultaneous similarity and difference rather than a pure 
sameness. Difference is maintained, but it is a distinction that is simultaneously a non-
distinction because these terms are not separable and mean nothing outside 
relationality to each other.
To the charge that Derrida suppresses difference in philosophy thus, this is 
essentially a partial view of Derrida. Indeed, Derrida does seem to put difference 
under erasure by suggesting that transcendental and empirical are ultimately 
repetitions of the same through the law of iterability. But his move is not to erase 
identity but broaden its sphere of inclusion in suggesting that discourse cannot 
function without its shadow or ghost. To argue that the transcendental and empirical 
are the same is not to reduce philosophy to an ahistorical mass or homogenous 
uniformity in which there is essentially no identity. This is not Derrida’s agenda. 
Rather, his moves to suggest these are ultimately the same is a move to democratize 
phenomenology and abolish hierarchy, where philosophy has historically privileged 
either transcendental or empirical in its accounts of philosophy. A suggestion that 
transcendental and empirical are the same is not a move to erase identity, but to 
suggest essentially that these terms are equal in the eyes of philosophy because they 
are each necessary constituents of the whole and necessary opposites that are required 
to thinking each other. The integrity of each term, transcendental, and empirical, is 
maintained when one suggests they are the same. The suggestion that these are the 
155
same is not to destroy identity but rather suggest they belong to the broader sphere of 
metaphysics where each term only means something  in relation to its opposite. An 
affirmation of the centre in metaphysics with idealism confirms its presence, just as a 
deviation from the centre simultaneously confirms the presence of the centre, it 
follows that both philosophy and non-philosophy, transcendental and empirical, share 
the same ontological structure and vocabulary of metaphysics. It is this relationality to 
the larger sub-strata of metaphysics that Derrida is affirming by pronouncing that the 
transcendental and empirical are the same, instead of making any move to erase 
identity or suppress specificity. The specific does not come under erasure in Derrida. 
Rather it is put into a relation of aporia, the specific and the particular is the means 
and medium through which the general is realized, Derrida’s philosophy is not a 
hegemonic totalitarianism but an affirmation of paradox and aporia, the 
transcendental both is and is not the empirical. Without this paradoxical similarity and 
difference, philosophy would not be able to realize itself as the transcendental has to 
be realized in and through the empirical while at the same time being distinct from it 
as I have maintained that Derrida is not a materialist or an empiricist but a thinker of 
paradox, aporia and the necessity of both terms to thinking each other. Rather than 
suppress identity thus, what Derrida’s phenomenology performs is a doubling. 
Derrida is a thinker of the necessity of oppositionality and difference to 
conceptualizing philosophy rather than any materialist or destructive nihilist. Derrida 
thinks paradox, aporia, and oppositionality rather than relegating each term to 
essential meaninglessness because these cannot be distinguished. Derrida maintains 
difference but suggests it is simultaneously a non-difference, so Derrida is a thinker of 
simultaneous similarity and difference rather than pure sameness. The relation is one 
of paradox rather than conflation, hence charges that Derrida is nihilistic essentially
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misses the point that Derrida does not dissolve identity but doubles it and multiplies 
it, maintaining the integrity of both terms as essential to thinking each other. Derrida 
does not dissolve identity but maintain identity is relational, transcendental and 
empirical are traces and supplements that only have meaning in relation to one 
another, hence privileging idealism or empiricism is a partial view of philosophy. 
Derrida is thus a thinker of parts in relation to the broader whole that is metaphysics 
rather than a suppressor of difference, because transcendental and empirical are 
relative, rather than absolute terms. Suggesting that transcendental or empirical are 
the same does not dissolve their identity, but relates them to the broader field of 
metaphysics where they share the same ontological structure.
This section argues that the singular is not effaced by Derrida but 
demonstrated to be relational to a larger structure of which the singular identity is a 
part. When one says the difference translates into similarities, this is not a move to 
consign identity to oblivion. Rather it is a move to relate identity to a larger whole 
that provides the same structure for both opposites. Hence when I argue that the 
transcendental is similar to the empirical, what I really mean to say is they share the 
same metaphysical superstructure which relates both transcendental and empirical 
through the condition of a priori difference. Identity then becomes contingent and 
relative rather than absolute, the difference and identity between terms is maintained 
but what happens is that they are related to a broader metaphysical and ontological 
superstructure. This is what Derrida means when he says that Christianity cannot do 
without its opposite, atheism, as it means something only in relation to its negation 
and reversal. Affirmations of Christianity and deviations of Christianity share the 
same foundation- a transcendental God which people either affirm or disbelieve. By 
stating thus that these opposites are similar, Derrida is not reducing their identity to a 
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meaningless nothing. Rather Derrida is saying that such identity has to be related to 
its opposite in order to be coherent, as Christianity can only be defined in relation to 
what it negates, which is the demonic and disbelief. Hence to say that Christianity 
shares something in common with atheism is not to efface its singularity, but to 
demonstrate its relative meaning that comes about only through the exclusion of its 
opposite, just as the transcendental has to exclude the empirical in order to come into 
being. Far from rendering identities meaningless and annihilated then, what 
deconstruction does is posit identities as fluid, relative, and only possessing meaning 
in relation to a larger whole, which is the structurality of metaphysics which has 
inscribed itself in our language from Plato to Nietzsche. Derrida is then far from being 
a nihilist who renders all entities abstract and meaningless, but a dynamic thinker of 
relativity, contingency, and the foundational transcendental-empirical difference 
which necessitates identity. The critique of iterability as a transcendental method is 
thus not balanced as deconstruction is about seeing the necessity of oppositionality to 
define philosophy rather than merely the return of an idealist framework. Indeed, 
Derrida may be described as a neo-transcendentalist. But his discovery was the 
necessity of seeing paradox and oppositionality as the founding conditions of 
philosophy rather than a naive return to idealism. His philosophy is about the 
founding conditions for idealism and empiricism, rather than being just a naive return 
to idealism.
Derrida’s reconfiguration of phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida puts to question Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction of the transcendental ego and his distinction of the 
transcendental ego from the empirical ego. Husserl does this phenomenological 
reduction by distinguishing two forms of signs.These are the expressive- or bedeuten, 
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which is another word for sense, or the signified, fully constitutive of meaning, and 
the indicative, which is another word for reference, which is an empty sign that refers 
to another empirical sign or object.
For Derrida the expressive represents pure ideality, a stratum of sense 
separated from empirical data, it is a form of transcendental signified and a 
metaphysics of presence.Derrida questions the strict distinction between the 
expressive and the indicative that Husserl makes. For Derrida this rigid 
dichotomization leads to a form of phonocentrism and logocentrism. Derrida 
questions the strict distinction between the transcendental and the empirical and 
argues for an interweaving between the two. This interweaving he calls differance, or 
the repetition of Vorstellung(ideality) in empirical life, which he calls 
Vergegenwartingung, reproductive repetition.Vergegenwartigung involves the 
objectification of something as being itself absent (past, merely imaginary) whereas 
repetition and recognition of an expression does not. The sign is thus made possible 
by its repeatability, or iterability, and it is in this repetition that Derrida locates the 
movement of trace, differance, or supplementarity. Derrida argues that it is the sign’s 
possibility of repetition that conditions presence, thus non-presence constitutes 
presence rather than the reverse and in this sense ideality is bifurcated into two. As 
Derrida puts forth, the presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the 
reverse.81
Derrida questions the possibility of making a rigid distinction between the 
expressive and the indicative and isolating the expressive in order to privilege it as a 
site of presence. In questioning the reduction of indication, Derrida wishes to question
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159
the possibility of the existence of exclusive expressive signs, he argues that 
expression and indication is always interwoven and mutually implicated.
For Derrida the privileging of the expressive amounts to a privileging of 
presence at the expense of what the indicative signifies: absence and differance, 
which opens up the possibilities for alterity and the embracing of the other.Derrida 
questions the linking of logos with phone- which is what pure expression symbolizes-
the privileging of speech and presence over absence and writing.Derrida questions the 
idea that consciousness can ever be completely present to itself and hermetically 
sealed off from the world- because this leads to a transcendental idealism and 
solipsism. Derrida would argue that signs are by nature indicative, or that we are 
necessarily, in Heidegger’s terms, “thrown”, being-in-the world rather than isolated 
Cartesian subjects. Derrida thinks Husserl is too much of a Cartesian. Expressions that 
take place in the interior are always marked by temporality, so that expressions which 
refer the mind to itself are also always marked by a temporal absence or passing of 
that self. Such I-expressions are always aware of and structured by the passing of 
time, and they primordially accept the reality of time past, that is, they accept the 
dimunition in importance of the immediate present. There can be no self-presence, so 
auto-affection is not self-identical, and at its heart is differance, which is also at the 
heart of pure transcendence, at the heart of the reduction of the voice to the 
expression, and expression to the idea. The self-presence of the soliloquy seems to be 
impossible, because whatever occurs in signs and meaning in the present is always 
deferred to the past.
The distinction between indication and expression is tenous. Derrida argues
that expression and indication are essentially the same. The possibility of the sign is 
its ability to differ from itself. Derrida argues that the distinction between indication 
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and expression is the condition of its very own possibility. What makes the distinction 
impossible is precisely what makes the relation possible. It is the possibility of the 
distinction between expression and indication that enables phenomenology, and rather 
than distinguish and privilege one aspect of phenomenology, ie. expression, Derrida 
argues that phenomenology should be viewed holistically as consisting of the two. 
Derrida suggests that expression must implicate indication and there is an intertwining 
or commisibility between the two rather than a rigid distinction. The distinction 
between expression and indication is the very condition of its own possibility, and 
Derrida suggests that Husserl, by excluding indication from ideal phenomenology, 
does not come up with a complete metaphysics. Hence, Derrida’s gesture is to save 
metaphysics by including what is necessary to it, its very own condition of possibility.
It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it was 
transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs. The quasi-
transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and 
difference, identity and non-identity. Were there no indication, Husserl would not be 
able to distinguish expression from it and hence his expulsion was misled about the 
structure of metaphysics because transcendental and empirical exist in dynamic 
relation to each other through repetition with a difference and not as ontologically 
separate substances. Yet it was necessary, as Husserl requires the exclusion of 
indication for the maintenance of the transcendental subject. Transcendental thus 
exists only in relation to the empirical through differance and iterability.
Derrida also wishes to question the separability of the transcendental ego from 
the empirical ego; as he argues, ideality and empiricism, expression and indication are 
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intertwined, rather than mutually exclusive.Derrida puts to question the possibility of 
expression as pure interiorization or a soliloquy of meaning: for this leads to a form of 
solipsism and privileging of ideality, or the noumenal.This could also amount to an 
attack on identity and the privileging of the same.Derrida writes that ‘expression is 
exteriorization’. By this I think he means that Husserl consigns meaning to an 
extrinsic metaphysical realm, separating signified and sign, which Derrida thinks is a 
form of Platonism. Derrida’s questioning of a pure metaphysics of presence and his 
arguments for the interweaving of the transcendental and the empirical is a move to 
inscribe metaphysics as something more powerful, a metaphysics that includes non-
presence and absence at the heart of presence, thus enlarging its sphere of inclusion. 
This is a metaphysics that embraces alterity, otherness and differance that is 
constitutive at the heart of presence rather than external to it.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the conditions of possibility for the 
perpetuation of phenomenology through an account of Derrida’s tracing back to the 
roots of metaphysics which takes differance into account, the dynamic and a priori 
difference between the transcendental and empirical which translates as nothing. This 
accounts for metaphysics’ conditions of possibility and its mode of production 
through the concept of iterability. Iterability translates into repetition with a difference 
which maintains the difference between the transcendental and empirical as nothing 
and becomes the trace of repeatable traces which maintains the illusion that the 
transcendental and empirical are distinct when they are in fact, the same and 
interchangeable. As argued earlier, the Absolute only exists as a signature or a 
difference from origin, communicated through space and time, differing and deferred 
through differance. 
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The supplement as the quasi-transcendental and differance, translates into that 
which enables the transcendental by bringing it into being as its condition of 
possibility.Indeed, philosophy becomes an infinite chain of supplements referring to 
each other rather than a referential signature for a transcendental signified or mythical 
origin. Repetition, or iterability, constitutes ideality as the transcendental is produced 
as separate from the empirical only through the illusion and theatrical movement of 
the trace. Derrida’s meta-concept of differance demonstrates that the transcendental-
empirical, hyle-morphe, noema-noesis distinction is an illusion and the difference 
which separates them is a difference which is nothing. As a fundamental trace of 
repeatable traces it produces the transcendental and empirical through the play of 
differences which in effect, separate nothing. This is because the transcendental 
translates into the empirical. The fundamental aporia of metaphysics is that the 
distinction that separates the transcendental and empirical is ultimately a repetition of 
it as the same, or iterability. Through demonstrating that the transcendental and 
empirical are essentially the same, Derrida democratizes phenomenology in showing 
what had been excluded or supplementary is an equal and necessary condition of 
possibility for metaphysics. Derrida thus opens phenomenology up to its other, and 
reveals the unthought that forms the basis of thought in demonstrating there is no 
hierarchy but sameness in difference between the transcendental and empirical, 
presence and absence, philosophy and non-philosophy. What the reduction had 
excluded is transcendental-empirical difference or the quasi-transcendental which 
forms the very basis of metaphysics to function. Derrida demonstrates that 
transcendental is not conceivable without the empirical. The empirical is the iteration 
or trace that brings it into existence. Derrida thus democratizes phenomenology by 
opening it up to its other. Derrida does this through demonstrating philosophy and 
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non-philosophy, transcendental and empirical, presence and absence are separated by 
an illusory distinction, a difference which is nothing or a non-difference and thus 
translates into a sameness. These are thus fundamentally the same rather than 
mutually exclusive or hierarchically related. As transcendental-empirical difference is 
an illusion, Derrida posits truth as quasi-transcendental, neither transcendental nor 
empirical but the spacing, limit, and trace between which conditions the thinking of 
both. The quasi-transcendental or written mark functions as if it was transcendental, 
but without it no distinction between the transcendental or empirical would be able to 
take place, and were the distinction impossible no transcendental or pure expressive 
realm would take place either. Hence the phenomenological project becomes possible 
through this paradoxical relation of the quasi-transcendental, relating the 
transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity in non-
identity. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology in a more powerful form by 
discovering its condition of possibility as the quasi-transcendental.
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Heidegger on Destruction
In this chapter I will examine Heidegger’s move to set out the task of 
philosophy as the destruction of metaphysics to move into the realm of ontology, or 
an inquiry into the being of Being. I will read destruction in various Heidegger texts 
and point out its problematic as suggested by Derrida, that every instance of the 
destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it borrows entirely from the 
structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy. The impossibility of the distinction 
between the transcendental and empirical is its own possibility as differance between 
the transcendental and empirical distinguishes and separates nothing, hence 
Heidegger’s anti-metaphysics and post-representation is no different from the 
transcendental idealism he destroys. Derrida thus rescues the phenomenological 
project by discovering the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental 
nor empirical, as the condition that allows the thinking of both through iterability and 
differance.
Heidegger writes that the task of philosophy is the destruction of the history of 
ontology:
We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as 
our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we 
arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of Being- the ways which have guided us ever since.
82
Written in 1927 in Being and Time, this notion of destruction of ancient ontology may 
be illuminated further what Heidegger writes of the end of philosophy in his 1964 
essay “The End of Philosophy and the task of thinking.”83 Originally presented at a 
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conference in France in 1964, this essay was subsequently published in French in 
1966 in a collection entitled Kierkegaard Vivant (Paris: Gallimard 1966) and 
translated into English in 1969. Heidegger’s project in these texts is to rethink 
philosophy by pronouncing an end or destruction of traditional metaphysics and 
rethink the task of thinking that takes the form of aletheia, or unconcealing of truth. 
The question we will first concern ourselves with is this destruction of ancient 
ontology. What does the destruction of the tradition entail and what are its 
implications? 
Firstly to analyze the paragraph, task refers to the task of destruction which 
means putting aside or dismantling merely historical assertions of the history of 
philosophy and metaphysics. To destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology
means to overcome metaphysics by moving beyond philosophy as realism and 
idealism, which are primarily epistemological, into philosophy as ontology, which 
involves a primordial grasp of philosophy as the disclosure or unconcealing of Being. 
As Heidegger has argued, destruction is not liquidating but putting aside and 
dismantling assertions about philosophy which are merely historical. The task of 
philosophy is now to overcome metaphysics, taking the question of Being as our clue, 
for Heidegger’s interest is moving beyond the mere metaphysical assertions about 
philosophy to move into ontology- which is a more primordial grasp of Being and the 
essence of Dasein as temporality and being-towards-death as well as the hermeneutics 
of facticity and an awareness of Dasein’s comportment to the world as worldhood, 
which relates Dasein to objects as equipment and ready-to-hand rather than present-
at-hand. The primordial experiences which have determined the ways of Being are the 
experiences of worldhood as care and anxiety, and boredom. Dasein experiences 
being-in-the-world and thrown-ness with the disclosure of this state through moods 
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such as angst and boredom, in which Dasein experiences a sense of alienation and 
inauthenticity or discomfort with Dasein’s thrown-ness in the world, or being-in-the-
world.
Primordial Experiences which determine the Nature of Being
Heidegger argues that in spite of all our interest in metaphysics, the question 
of the meaning of Being, or “the nature of Being”, has been overlooked and 
neglected. The “primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of Being- the ways which have guided us ever since” refers to 
the discosure of Dasein’s thrown-ness or being-in-the-world through moods such as 
angst and boredom. In anxiety or angst for instance, Dasein experiences a sense of 
alienation, or “not being at home” in the world, angst is directed towards nothing 
specific but is encountered as a general sense of dread directed towards “nothing” but 
“being-in-the-world”. In angst, Dasein experiences anxiety about Dasein’s state of 
thrown-ness and experiences a sense of inauthenticity in one’s involvement in the 
world. Dasein normally overcomes this by “fleeing” towards further immersion in the 
world or becoming one with the “they” in order to overcome one’s sense of 
alienation. Angst or anxiety is thus a state of disclosure of one’s thrown-ness or 
being-in-the-world through an experience of inauthenticity and alienation from 
Dasein’s involvement with the world, or the “they”. The other mood that Dasein 
experiences is boredom, which is elaborated in the next section.
Phenomenology of Boredom
In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger posits the fundamental 
attitude and comportment of Dasein as boredom. In his exposition of this fundamental 
mood of Dasein, Heidegger posits that boredom is a characteristic of the object while 
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dependent on the subject for attribution, thus conflating subject and object in the act 
of perception. Heidegger also radicalizes Husserl’s notion of intentionality in 
suggesting perception is an affect, and effect of, thing perceived. It is mutually 
implicated in the object, and the object infects the subject with the perception of 
boredom in other words. This phenomenology of boredom thus immerses Dasein in 
the world by infecting, and being infected by, the fundamental mood of boredom. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological method of conflating subject and object, perception 
and thing perceived, comes close to Derrida’s contamination of the transcendental and 
empirical. However while Heidegger seems to unite transcendental and empirical, or 
collapse transcendental-empirical difference, Derrida posits the relation between the 
two as one of difference with repetition, or differance. Derrida’s move differs from 
Heidegger’s thus in not being an empirical psychology but a metaphysics which is 
extended to include absence and differance. Rather than privileging the empirical over 
the transcendental, Derrida posits the quasi-transcendental as the spacing, trace and 
limit which enables the thinking of both transcendental and empirical and hence 
performs a meta-phenomenology rather than a reversed phenomenology like 
Heidegger.
Destroying Ancient Ontology and the task of philosophy
Heidegger writes in What is Philosophy that destruction does not mean 
destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical 
assertions about the history of philosophy84. The task of philosophy is now designated 
by Heidegger to overcome the history of metaphysics, which has trapped philosophy 
in representational thinking and Platonism. In place of metaphysics as representation 
or logos, Heidegger writes that philosophy should be an inquiry of the being of Being, 
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thus moving philosophy beyond metaphysics into the realm of ontology. The history 
of metaphysics, or ancient ontology, has to be overcome as it inaccurately creates a 
division between ideal and real, subject and object. Heidegger argues that these are 
conflated in Being. Being is the founding condition of possibility and ontological 
ground for both. The end of philosophy signals the end of metaphysics as ancient 
ontology, or representational thought which presents a perfect correlation between 
essence and existence, concept and reality, because these are conflated in Being. 
Being is the ground of possibility for thinking both. Essence and existence are united 
in Being. As Heidegger argues in The End of Philosophy:
If the questions raised are thought through even thoroughly, the illusion of being as a 
matter of course, in which the distinction of essentia and existentia stands for all 
metaphysics, disappears. This distinction is groundless if metaphysics simply tries 
again and again to define the limits of what is divided, and comes up with numbering 
the manners of possibility and the kinds of actuality which float into vagueness, 
together with the difference in which they are already placed.85
Heidegger argues that the distinction between essentia and existentia that has held 
throughout the history of metaphysics presents an illusion and becomes groundless as 
both are united in Being. Being is the ontological ground of both and thus precedes 
both. 
Heidegger argues that metaphysics has sustained itself through an illusory 
distinction between whatness and thatness, or ideal and real. Heidegger argues that 
Being, or thatness, makes possible the essence of Being, or whatness, hence 
metaphysics has proceeded along failed presuppositions. In Being, whatness and 
thatness are united, Being translates as the ontological pre-condition that determines 
both. Truth as metaphysics, which has sustained itself through the illusory distinction 
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between whatness and thatness, has thus approached its end. Heidegger argues that 
the task of thinking becomes to rethink truth as aletheia, or the disclosure of Being as 
truth. Truth has to be rethought as the unconcealing of Being as aletheia, rather than 
as a concealment as the Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle have interpreted it. 
Heidegger’s conflation of essence and existence in Being does nothing to alter the 
fundamental structure of metaphysics which he borrows from and thus affirms. 
Rather, Derrida’s notion of iterability, traces the condition of possibility for the 
production of both through the distinguishing trace of difference. This goes beyond 
Heidegger’s collapsing of this distinction into the singular Being in examining the 
meta-conditions in which essence and existence are produced.  An inversion or 
negation of metaphysics repeats it by borrowing its ontological structure and 
vocabulary, according to Derrida. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is thus a 
repetition of metaphysics in every sense of the word as a negative metaphysics 
remains a form of metaphysics, repeating its structure and vocabulary. In showing that 
metaphysics and post-metaphysics share the same ontological vocabulary, Derrida 
demonstrates that there is no difference between metaphysics and Heidegger’s post-
metaphysics. Heidegger names the essence of Being as existence, but this is merely a 
reversed metaphysics which repeats the ontological structure of metaphysics, just as 
conflating existence and essence in Being borrows from the ontological structure of 
metaphysics and thus remains metaphysics. Heidegger requires the transcendental to 
be excluded and accounted for on empirical grounds in order to maintain his situated 
realm of Being. Heidegger thus excludes the quasi-transcendental, or transcendental-
empirical difference, which is precisely what he needs to maintain his philosophy. 
Were there no quasi-transcendental or written mark, it would be impossible to 
designate as Heidegger does, a pure realm of empirical signs. Heidegger thus needs to 
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acknowledge this quasi-transcendental that he needs in order for his empiricism to 
function and thus inscribe his phenomenology in a more powerful way as Derrida 
would suggest.
Overcoming metaphysics and the End of philosophy
Still on the “destruction of ancient ontology”, Heidegger writes in The End of 
Philosophy that metaphysics is something to be overcome.Heidegger argues that 
metaphysics has been the ground of misunderstanding by preventing access in 
experience to the essence of Being. This essence of Being is something that itself 
allows the overcoming of Being, it is an acknowledgement of the temporality, 
facticity, and thrown-ness of Being. While metaphysics has been thought to be the 
truth of being, it translates as the oblivion of Being, namely, it destroys and prevents 
access to the disclosure of Being as aletheia, of Being as fundamentally situated and 
thrown in the world. The history of metaphysics becomes something to be overcome, 
as this past binds us to an erroneous conception of truth as an idea, or essence that is 
concealed. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has entered its end with the disclosure 
of Being, or aletheia, as truth in place of truth as metaphysics. In every instance of 
this description however, Heidegger repeats metaphysics by borrowing from its terms 
as something to be overcome, destroyed and denounced, and thus proceeds to re-
inscribe it entirely within its language. Heidegger thus does not escape metaphysics 
but is doomed to repeat the metaphysics he sets out to destroy by repeating its entire 
structure and ontological terminology. 
Heidegger writes that metaphysics is in decline and is approaching its end, as 
the earth informed by metaphysics has become desolate. This is evident from the 
events of the last century. This decline marks the oblivion of Being as metaphysics, as 
the truth of metaphysics has met its desolation. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has 
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been an illusion that sustained reality and is now approaching its end, in place, truth 
needs to be rethought as the unconcealment of Being as aletheia. In this disclosure of 
Being, the essence of Being in is factity, thrown-ness, temporality is revealed and the 
metaphysical past of Being meets its oblivion. 
As previously stated however, this so called overcoming of metaphysics 
becomes repetition of metaphysics in every sense as it designates metaphysics as 
something to be overcome and destroyed. It thus proceeds entirely within its terms 
rather than proceeding to new territory. While emphasizing in place facticity, thrown-
ness and temporality as the essence of Being this radicalization of intentionality 
merely subverts or reverses the existing metaphysical structure and thus repeats it as 
an empirical rather than transcendental idealism. Far from escaping metaphysics, 
Heidegger thus repeats it in every sense by being bound to the language of 
metaphysics in designating it as something to be overcome and destroyed. As Derrida 
argues, a negative metaphysics remains a form of metaphysics and is no different 
from metaphysics because it borrows entirely from its vocabulary and ontological 
structure. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is hence, a repetition of it rather 
than any true departure or overcoming of metaphysics. In showing post-metaphysics 
repeats the ontological vocabulary of metaphysics, Derrida demonstrates that 
Heidegger’s inversion of metaphysics is repetition, and hence, paradoxically, 
affirmation. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it was 
transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of empirical signs. The quasi-transcendental relates 
the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and 
non-identity. Hence Heidegger’s exclusion of idealism depends on the possibility of 
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distinguishing the transcendental and empirical through the quasi-transcendental. 
Were there no written mark or quasi-transcendental, Heidegger would not be able to 
distinguish the transcendental and empirical and reduce metaphysics to 
anthropological empiricism. Heidegger hence suppresses differance and the quasi-
transcendental as the true conditionality of metaphysics. Heidegger requires the 
exclusion of the transcendental to maintain his anthropological and empirical realm of 
Being. Empirical thus only exists in relation to the transcendental through iterability 
and differance. 
The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking
In the “End of Philosophy and the task of thinking”, Heidegger writes that 
philosophy as metaphysics has reached its end. This refers to metaphysics that thinks 
beings as being in the manner of representational thinking, which presents the ground 
of being as an absolute presence, as the transcendental making possible as the ontic 
causation of the real, as the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of 
objects. This ground of being as presence has reached its completion and perfection as 
metaphysics has fulfilled itself as a form of Platonism and all its subsequent reversals 
of it in Nietzsche and Marx’s thought have signalled that metaphysics has entered its 
final stage. Heidegger thus thinks of the end of philosophy as the completion and 
fulfillment of metaphysics, which has simultaneously exhausted itself in its 
fulfillment and is thus undergoing reversal and destruction in its final stages in the 
thought of Nietzsche and Marx. What Heidegger fails to note however that is that the 
destruction of metaphysics borrows entirely from its terms. A reversed Platonism is 
still a Platonism, just as a destruction of metaphysics remains metaphysics even if 
only in a negative sense. Heidegger, in his task of destruction, thus repeats 
metaphysics entirely by proceeding from within the bounds of its language, 
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terminology and ontological structure which he merely negates and thus paradoxically 
affirms.
The Shift from Metaphysics to Ontology
In Towards the Definition of Philosophy, Heidegger contests the philosophical 
enframing of world-view strictly in terms of science. This is part of Heidegger’s move
away from ancient ontology which philosophy must destroy to arrive at the 
primordial experiences which determine the nature of Being. The problem with such a 
philosophical enframing according to Heidegger is its circularity in trying to justify 
ontology with theory- in other words, metaphysical axioms are being used to justify 
themselves in a circle, the problem that this gives rise to is ontological difference, or 
the institution of a gulf between the transcendental and empirical. Heidegger 
questions the separation of existence and essence, arguing that the problem with 
philosophy that is strictly critical idealism or critical realism is its one-sided world 
view, in other words, both idealism and realism are circular and one-sided in failing to 
grasp the fundamental ontological difference between the transcendental and 
empirical. In Being and Time Heidegger argues that both realism and idealism fall 
short of truth, which rather than being located in either realism or idealism, is defined 
as aletheia, or the unveiling of truth through the disclosure of being. For Heidegger 
being-in-the-world or ontology precedes essence, thus critical idealism and the 
phenomenological reduction fails to grasp being- the essential whatness and existence 
of a thing. Heidegger seeks to free phenomenology from the logical prejudice of 
theory in radicalizing phenomenology by returning to concrete existence.
Heidegger’s phenomenology, in place of intuition, privileges corporeality, 
embodiment or being-in-the-world. Heidegger criticizes Husserl for his Cartesianism, 
emphasizing the situated-ness or thrown-ness of being. This radicalizes Husserl’s 
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theory of intentionality in returning to the things themselves and performing a reverse 
bracketing of intuition in its place. We will see with Derrida a middle ground, as he 
posits the quasi-transcendental, which is neither transcendental nor empirical but the 
economy of both the transcendental and empirical and the difference between them. 
Heidegger collapses the transcendental-empirical difference by suggesting that being 
precedes both essence and existence, in them the two meet and are conflated. Being is 
the ground of both the transcendental and empirical. Heidegger collapses subject-
object difference by suggesting that consciousness essentially belongs to being-in-the-
world or concrete existence. This of course, will be eventually critiqued by Derrida as 
the privileging of transcendental subjectivity and presence. 
In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger reinforces his notion of 
philosophy as ontology, or a destruction of ancient ontology and a movement towards 
philosophy as the being of Being, by defining philosophy as a philosophy of extant 
being-in-the-world. These are the primordial experiences determined by the nature of 
Being previously discussed. Heidegger reads Kant’s postulation that existence is not a 
predicate as a claim that collapses transcendental-empirical difference, being simply 
is, and is defined by its extant nature or its existence. Being is the foundation or 
ground of predication, it is a pre-condition or condition of possibility, rather than a 
property, and therefore cannot be relegated to transcendental pronouncements of its 
nature to determine it. The copula demonstrates this simple whatness of being and is 
an assertion or foundational condition of possibility of existence rather than a 
transcendental property which can be predicated. Heidegger questions the 
phenomenological reduction as it fails to acknowledge being-in-the-world, or thrown-
ness, and collapses into a one-sided privileging of the transcendental. 
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For Heidegger being-in-the-world is disclosed or unveiled through the 
equipmental nature of perception, or the experience of objects as ready-to-hand rather 
than present-at-hand. The Senegal African for instance fails to recognize the lectern 
for what it is because it is alien to him in its equipmental nature. This demonstrates 
that the world is disclosed through its instrumentality to human beings. 
Phenomenology must thus recognize this fundamental thrown-ness, or being-in-the-
world, and read objects as a disclosure of being-in-the-world rather than merely 
present-at-hand, because this is how we fundamentally experience objects, not as 
transcendental entities but in an equipmental relation to ourselves.  Heidegger 
questions the separation of perception from thing perceived, for Heidegger perception 
is the disclosure of the extant nature of thing perceived. In his statement on 
intentionality, Heidegger argues that perception is directed outwards toward the object 
and is the unveiling of the thing perceived, rather than separate from it. 
This of course, is at direct odds with Husserl’s separation of immanent and 
transcendent perception. Heidegger collapses subject-object difference in positing the 
two not as separate substances, but rather that they belong to being and perception as 
the disclosure or unveiling of being. Being thus unites transcendental and empirical or 
collapses transcendental-empirical difference in Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology 
over metaphysics. Rather than separate consciousness from the world as Husserl did, 
Heidegger posits both as co-existent in the concrete existence of Dasein. 
Derrida will not collapse subject-object difference to conflate them into Being. 
Rather Derrida posits the relation between ideal and real as differance, a difference 
that distinguishes nothing, and separates nothing, as the transcendental is nothing 
outside the empirical. Derrida thus builds on Heidegger’s collapsing of the distinction 
to posit the difference as a paradoxical difference which is not a difference, but a 
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sameness. Derrida thus builds on Heidegger’s destruction or collapsing of subject-
object difference to develop his deconstruction, which affirms the paradoxical nature, 
and aporia, of the relationship between the transcendental and empirical.
In History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger’s examination of intentionality 
and categorical intuition posits that perception is not separate from thing perceived,
but that the two are fundamentally related in the act of perceiving, the intending of an 
object is thus a disclosure of its being or existence. Heidegger thus conflates 
transcendental and empirical in his definition of perception as the disclosure or 
unveiling of being. Derrida will extend Heidegger’s observations, not by conflating 
perception with thing perceived, but by highlighting the relationship of repetition. 
Perception is the iterated of thing perceived. The differance between transcendental 
and empirical, is the condition of possibility of perception. Rather than conflate the 
transcendental and the empirical into the singular entity of being thus, Derrida stresses 
the fundamental relationship of repetition with a difference or iterability. Heidegger 
suggests that perception is a disclosure of the extant nature of being, and thus 
conflates perception and thing in his notion of being and its unveiling or disclosure. 
He thus collapses the transcendental-empirical distinction by framing it in different 
terms- being, which is transcendental, is disclosed through the empirical in the form 
of perception, and Heidegger does not posit the two as separate substances like 
Husserl. 
Heidegger disputes metaphysics or critical idealism, seeking to destroy ancient 
ontology, to return to the things themselves, or being-in-the-world, as discussed 
earlier, to the primordial experiences determined by Being, with an emphasis on 
ontology and being. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics or ancient ontology was
a call to return to truth as disclosed in being, or aleathia, which is the disclosure of 
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truth as being rather than through any transcendental metaphysical form. The problem 
with a transcendental theory of truth for Heidegger is that it is mere knowledge of 
ideas, and not an ontological grasp or unveiling of truth. This involves the disclosure 
of Being and facticity as being-in-the-world rather than a hypostasized metaphysical 
realm. In Being and Time, he calls this essential condition thrown-ness, or Dasein, 
being there. Being is disclosed in its relation to worldhood, through the disclosure of 
things as ready-to-hand rather than simply present-at-hand, again this is the 
equipmental nature of objects making themselves apparent to Dasein. This sense of 
worldhood is one of the senses of the primordial experiences which determine the 
nature of Being. This emphasis on worldliness is essentially an anthropologistic return 
to the material realm, though Heidegger hypostasizes this realm by naming it the 
realm of Being. Heidegger’s phenomenology marks a fundamental shift in its 
emphasis on the situated-ness of perception or being-in-the-world, this thrown-ness is 
at direct odds with idealism as it is a swing to the other end of the intentional scale in 
prioritizing the empirical object and its situatedness. In this sense he disputes the 
transcendental and seeks what Derrida, in the Ends of Man, sees as an anthropological 
solution in positing Being or the Human as absolute. Derrida’s solution to the 
transcendental-empirical conundrum differs from Heidegger’s, in that he does not 
dispute the transcendental. Rather he finds a mid-point and meeting ground between 
the transcendental and empirical. This he does through his positing of the quasi-
transcendental, or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical, and the 
relationship between the transcendental and the empirical is coined as differance, a 
nothing that separates the transcendental and empirical that remains a difference 
rather than performing an inversion of metaphysics only to repeat it as Heidegger 
does. The quasi-transcendental is the condition of possibility that grounds 
178
metaphysics as the space between the transcendental and empirical which belongs to 
neither but forms the conditionality of thinking both through the movement of 
differance and the trace. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning 
as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of empirical signs. The quasi-transcendental relates 
the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and 
non-identity.
The distinction between “Ready-to-hand” and “Present-at-hand”
Heidegger defines the “present-at-hand” as something alien to Dasein’s 
character and Dasein’s sense of utility. As Heidegger puts it: “ Ontologically 
existential is tantamount to being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially 
inappropriate to Dasein’s character.” 86 The present at hand is thus alien to Dasein’s 
notion of his Being and existence, which conceives of things in relation to himself as 
ready to hand.
As Heidegger states: “The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly 
those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not “properties” present-
at-hand of some entity which “looks” so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are 
in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is 
which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with 
the term ‘Dasein’ we are expressing not its “what”but its Being.” 87
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Dasein thus appropriates objects not in terms of its “whatness” or “presence-at-hand”
but in terms of its being, which is related in terms of its equipmentality, or ‘readiness-
to-hand”.  
Heidegger further writes that “All entities whose being “in” one another can 
thus be described have the same kind of Being – that of Being-present-at-hand- as 
Things occurring within the world. Being-present-at-hand “in” something which is 
likewise present-at-hand. And being-present-at-hand-along-with (Mitvohardensein) is 
the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same 
kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call “categorical” they are of 
such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of 
Dasein.”88
Being present-at-hand is thus a thing which Dasein does not conceive a 
relationship to in terms of his Being, and existence, we can take certain objects, for 
instance, an inanimate stone, rock or starfish, which we do not conceive a relation to 
in terms of function and utility, and thus these objects become merely present-at-hand. 
Being ready-to-hand, on the other hand, is defined thus: “The kind of Being which 
equipment possesses- in which it manifests itself in its own right- we call “readiness-
to-hand” (Zuhandenheit). Only because equipment has this “Being-in-itself” and does 
not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense, and at our disposal.” 89
Readiness-to-hand is thus how Dasein relates to the Being that surrounds himself, 
including Nature, it is how Dasein conceives its own worldhood by relating to the 
objects that surround himself, in terms of its equipmentmentality, function and utility.
Heidegger further discusses the distinction: “Similarly, when something ready-to-
hand is found missing, though its every presence (Zugegensein) has been so obvious 




that we have never taken notice of it, this makes a break in those referential contexts 
which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and 
now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what 
it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh. What is thus lit up 
is to not itself just one thing ready-to-hand among others, still less is it something 
present-at-hand upon which equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded, it is in the 
‘there’ before anyone has observed or ascertained it. It is itself inaccessible to 
circumspection, but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection.” 90
The ready-to-hand is thus what the environment discloses itself to Dasein as 
being and equipment, it is separate from the present-at-hand which is not merely a 
concealed ready-to-hand but something which is alien to the worldhood of Dasein and 
his Being. The present-at-hand is what is not appropriated by Dasein to his sense of 
worldhood, it is alien to Dasein in terms of equipmentality. Further, “But if the world 
can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already been 
disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible 
for circumspective concern. The world is therefore something wherein Dasein as an 
entity already was, and if in any matter it explicitly comes away from anything, it can 
never do more than come back to the world. Being-in-the-world, according to our 
Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in 
references or arguments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of 
equipment.” 91
Dasein’s fundamental comportment to the world is thus this disclosedness or 
unconcealing of objects as ready-to-hand and as equipment, rather than present-at-
hand which describes objects that are alien to Dasein’s being or character. These 




present-at-hand objects describe mere things which are beyond the everyday uses of 
Dasein and are not appropriated by Dasein into his worldhood as equipment. Yet what 
is present-at-hand can become ready-to-hand if Dasein decides to appropriate it as 
such into his worldhood, the disclosure of ready-to-hand is essentially an act of 
interpretation in terms of equipmentality which changes according to the needs of 
Dasein. An inanimate stone thus, that might seem present-at-hand for a moment, will 
become ready-to-hand when Dasein wishes to use it, for example, to attack someone 
or as construction equipment.
Heidegger on phenomenology as destruction
Heidegger analyses the terms phenomenology to derive the terms 
‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’. For Heidegger, the phenomenon is what an appearance 
reveals or discloses itself to be, combined with logos, which means truth. The Greeks 
have misinterpreted truth as a form of covering up or concealing in terms of ideas 
which remain inaccessible. Heidegger argues that phenomenology is not a privileged 
access to ideas which have been concealed, but an interpretation of appearances, and a 
disclosure of being as aleathia, truth discloses itself as being rather than as pure ideas 
as Husserl had argued. Dasein interprets appearances or phenomenon in terms of its 
equipmentality, as objects disclose themselves as ready-to-hand. Phenomenology is 
thus the hermeneutics and interpretive study of phenomena which disclose themselves 
as being present or being ready, Dasein appropriates objects and phenomena in terms 
of their relation to his worldhood.
Heidegger argues truth is not a concealing or a covering up, but an 
unconcealing, a disclosure of truth as aleathia, and this truth that is disclosed is the 
truth of Being. Truth at most remains a non-perception but is never a concealing or 
covering up but always an unconcealing and a disclosure, or aleathia. 
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Heidegger argues truth is disclosure or aleathia rather than covering up, and further 
clarifies a misconception that a Greek conception of truth suffers from – it is only a 
‘doctrine of ideas’ and a philosophical knowledge. It is not grounded in Being or 
facticity which is the authentic truth, Heidegger argues that truth is the disclosure of 
Being rather than a prism of ideas or pure knowledge which remains undisclosed or 
covered up.
Phenomenology is thus a hermeneutic, an interpretation of Dasein’s being, or 
an analytic of the existentiality of existence, it is thus an active interpretation of 
Being-in-the-world, thrown-ness and facticity rather than a knowledge of ideas which 
remain concealed. It is an interpretation of Dasein’s ontological historicity, and in 
every sense a hermeneutic which is not derived from the methodology of 
historiological sciences but an active interpretation of Being and existence.
The Nature of Being
Heidegger further argues that the fundamental nature of being, is temporality. 
Being is disclosed through its essential temporality and experience of care, or anxiety,
for the future and being-towards-death. This sense of phenomenological disclosure 
through temporality is of course, a departure from Husserl who does not define the 
essence of being as time, but in terms of transcendental consciousness, and the 
purified transcendental ego which consciousness must be reduced to. Where Husserl 
and Heidegger converge, however, is their emphasis on the human subject and 
transcendental subjectivity. This is deemed by Derrida as an essential 
anthropocentrism and a privileging of being as presence. 
To Husserl, this presence is intuition, given purely to itself, to Heidegger, this 
presence is the temporal notion of the present which is emphasized over the absences 
of past and the future which are actually the conditions of possibility for being. 
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Heidegger’s emphasis on the historicity of being further emphasizes its facticity, and 
situated-ness; being is grounded in the world by its past and defined by its present 
comportment towards the future in terms of choices- its facticity. This is essentially an 
empirical situatedness, which is of a radically different emphasis from Husserl’s 
transcendental ego. Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology and the return to the things 
themselves in emphasizing being-in-the-world is a radicalization of Husserl’s notion 
of intentionality and an emphasis on empirical rather than transcendental constitution.
As discussed above, Derrida’s notion of differance mediates between the two by 
discovering the neither transcendental nor empirical quasi-transcendental which is the 
condition of possibility for thinking both.
The meaning of Being is a hermeneutic, Dasein interprets the world around 
him in terms of its equipmentality or readiness to hand, phenomenology is thus an 
active interpretation and hermeneutics of Being rather than a static access to a prism 
of concealed ideas as metaphysics has had it.
The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way that 
the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation. 
In the framework of our treatise, which aims at working out that question in principle, 
we can carry out this destruction only with regard to stages of that history which are 
in principle decisive.92
The destruction of the history of ontology is thus a shift beyond metaphysics that has 
historically determined philosophical thought to move into a thinking of something 
which is more primordial than metaphysics – which is the question of Being, which 
Heidegger will argue is the ground of metaphysics and what precedes it ontologically 
as its condition of possibility.
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Being becomes thus defined in terms of its potentiality for discourse, its 
possibilities in terms of choices in existence, defined in the present and the future. The 
“nature of Being” is defined in terms of its temporality. Being is conceived as a form 
of presence, it relates to past and future in terms of an absolute present which defines 
the past and future. Heidegger argues that ontology should move away from dialectic, 
which has become superfluous as in Being, subject and object are conflated, concept 
and exemplar are united. Being translates as the primordial structure of philosophy 
that precedes dialectic. Being appropriates possibilities in terms of making an object 
present to himself, this translates as the elevating of Being to presence which Derrida 
will eventually problematize as past and future are structurally necessary as absences 
or differance to the thinking of presence.     
Aletheia
Moving on to Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia, reading from Heidegger:
What does the word about the untrembling heart of unconcealment mean? It means 
unconcealment itself in what is most its own, means the place of stillness which 
gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with. That is the opening of what 
is open. We ask: openness for what? We have already reflected upon the fact that the 
path of thinking, speculative and intuitive, needs the traversable opening. But in that 
opening rests possible radiance, that is, the possible presencing of presence itself.93
This unconcealment as a form of opening translates as the presencing of presence, a 
disclosure of presence, where it had previously remained hidden or concealed. 
Heidegger argues that this unconcealing is a radicalization of intentionality in 
returning to the things themselves.
Heidegger takes the call for a return “to the things themselves” as a call to 
move beyond metaphysics into ontology, to move beyond the thinking of idealism 
into the thinking of Being. Truth, which had been previously described as a form of 
                                               
93 Martin Heidegger. On Time and Being. Chicago, University Of Chicago Press. 2002,  68 
185
concealment in Plato and Aristotle, becomes now reconfigured into aletheia, or 
unconcealing of Being, with Heidegger.  Aletheia is not so much the disclosure of 
truth but what grants the very possibility of truth. The task of thinking becomes thus 
aletheia, to think that which grants the very possibility of truth as the unconcealing or 
disclosure of Being, an opening of presence to the outside rather than an 
imprisonment of it behind a veil of disclosure. The task of thinking as aletheia 
becomes thus a disclosure of Being, which opens presence to its outside, and thus to 
our ontological grasp of it. Being is thus disclosure rather than, as metaphysics has 
traditionally had it, a form of concealment and imprisonment in hidden ideal forms 
which remain inacessible. This ontological grasp of Being as aletheia becomes thus 
the disclosure of truth, which renders accessible to us the primordial ways of Being 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Heidegger further discusses aletheia in 
“The Origin of the Work of Art”:
The artwork lets us know what the shoes are in truth. It would be the worst self-
deception to think that our description, as a subjective action, had first depicted 
everything thus and then projected it into the painting. If anything is questionable 
here, it is rather that we experienced too little in the nearness of the work and that we 
expressed the experience too crudely and too literally. But above all, the work did 
not, as it might seem at first, serve merely for a better visualizaing of what a piece of 
equipment is. Rather, the equipmentality of equipment first expressly comes to the 
fore through the work and only in the work.94
Heidegger thus discusses aletheia as the disclosure of the truth of Being through art in 
terms of its equipmentality, or readiness-to-hand. Art discloses the truth of Being in 
its relation to Dasein in terms of its function as equipment for Dasein, indeed this is 
how Dasein fundamentally relates to the world, through the experience of things as 
either ready or present to hand. However, Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia, 
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borrows its entire ontological framework of Being as presence from metaphysics.
Heidegger describes this aletheia as an opening of presence to the outside the 
fundamental structure of presence as repetition, of essence and existence. Despite
being conflated and unified in Heidegger’s work, aletheia borrows and proceeds 
entirely from the language of metaphysics and thus repeats the metaphysics he 
attempts to destroy. Heidegger’s unconcealing or aletheia does not alter the 
fundamental structures of metaphysics he sets out to destroy in the form of essence 
and existence which he conflates into Being but does not effect a change in the 
metaphysical or ontological structure by merely re-describing it as Being and its
aletheia.
Heidegger radicalizes the notion of truth by describing it as unconcealing 
rather than concealing. In fact, what Heidegger is describing is the simple mediation 
of truth- truth can be reduced to its appearance rather than relegated to an external and 
concealed realm. Heidegger performs a reverse bracketing of truth by reducing 
phenomenology to appearance which conceals nothing and discloses truth, as he 
discusses in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Phenomena reveals truth by disclosing 
its equipmental nature. Heidegger thus performs a negation of transcendental truth by 
reversing the nature of the phenomenon in describing it as not secondary and 
representative of the ideal but describes it as the fundamental principle of the ideal-
phenomena discloses rather than conceals. There is no disjuncture or separation 
between signifier and signified, both are related in the principle of disclosure and 
revelation- the signifier is the signified, reality is ontological and a disclosure of 
equipmentality rather than a metaphysical reflection or representation of a 
transcendental signified. Truth is not representational. Rather, truth is disclosure of 
Being through the phenomenon. Truth is ontological rather than a metaphysical 
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abstraction. Heidegger thus conflates signifier and signified in his conception of truth, 
but does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of metaphysics. Heidegger’s 
notion of disclosure rather than concealing still presents truth as a dual entity-
consisting of the phenomenon and its presentation of truth as aleatheia, or the 
unconcealing of Being. Positing that truth is something to be disclosed still separates 
truth ontologically into two realms, pre-disclosure and post-disclosure of the 
phenomenon as the revelation of Being. Heidegger thus repeats metaphysics although 
he reverses and negates it, as Derrida points out, a negative repetition of metaphysics 
proceeds entirely from its vocabulary and ontological structure. Heidegger’s 
radicalization of truth in describing it as unconcealing rather than concealing, is thus a 
negation or reversal and thus a repetition of metaphysics rather than a destruction of 
it. Heidegger thus does not manage to escape metaphysics, as he sets out to do.
Derrida’s questioning of Heidegger
What Heidegger fails to note however with his destruction of metaphysics and 
his task to move beyond it is that in the process he repeats metaphysics and thus 
reinscribes it in his very task of destruction. There is no thought that escapes structure, 
whether it involves building a system around an arche or a system that decenters it. 
There is no language outside metaphysics and the structures that determine it. All 
languages and thought affirm the structurality of structure. As Derrida puts it: “This 
event I call a rupture, the disruption I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, 
presumably would have come about when the structurality of structure had begun to 
be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said this disruption was repetition 
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in every sense of the word.” 95 The rupture of metaphysics thus involved repetition 
and redoubling rather than being any simple decentering of metaphysics. Derrida 
argues that the event of a rupture that comes with the decentering of metaphysics 
involves a redoubling of metaphysics and an opening of metaphysics to think its 
Other. To quote Derrida, “What would this event be then? Its exterior form would be 
that of a rupture and a redoubling.”96 Structure is something that has either been 
affirmed or deviated from, all the time being re-inscribed in discourse. No discourse 
escapes structure and the metaphysical constraints it imposes in the form of the 
structurality of structure, whether the center is affirmed or negated. As Derrida 
argues: “There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to 
shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax or lexicon- which is foreign to 
this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not 
already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely 
what it seeks to contest.”97 Derrida thus argues that we have no language which is not 
already informed by metaphysical presuppositions, hence all destructions of 
metaphysics that proceed from within the confines of language repeat the metaphysics 
they seek to destroy.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined Heidegger’s move to set out the task of 
philosophy as the destruction of metaphysics to move into the realm of ontology, or 
an inquiry into the being of Being. I have traced this movement of destruction in 
various Heidegger texts and pointed out its problematic as suggested by Derrida, that 
every instance of the destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it 
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borrows entirely from the structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy. Derrida 
critiques Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics in suggesting a non-metaphysics or 
destroyed metaphysics remains a metaphysics, and thus ultimately a destruction of 
metaphysics is simply a repetition or reproduction of it and hence, the same as 
metaphysics. Derrida thus discovers that metaphysics is repeated even in its 
destruction and thus is no different or the same as non-metaphysics or destroyed 
metaphysics. The impossibility of the distinction between the transcendental and 
empirical is its own possibility as differance between the transcendental and empirical 
distinguishes and separates nothing, hence Heidegger’s anti-metaphysics and post-
representation is no different from the transcendental idealism he destroys. In so
doing Derrida democratizes phenomenology, by showing that a non-metaphysics or 
destroyed metaphysics is no different and not superior to metaphysics as Heidegger 
had envisioned. Where Heidegger had sought to show that metaphysics is a fallacy, 
Derrida demonstrates that Heidegger does not manage to escape metaphysics as he 
sets out to do and thus Heidegger’s non-metaphysics does not differ essentially from 
metaphysics. As such, truth is neither representational nor post-representational, it is 
not a matter of choosing between transcendental or empirical, but quasi-
transcendental; as the quasi-transcendental functions as the limit and spacing that 
enables the thinking of both transcendental and empirical through the distinguishing 
movement of differance and the trace. As transcendental-empirical difference is an 
illusion, then Derrida democratizes phenomenology in showing that metaphysics and 
post-metaphysics are paradoxically similar in their difference, identical in their non-
identity. This space of the quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and 
empirical in a relation of sameness in difference, distinctions translate paradoxically 
into non-distinctions because the transcendental and empirical are distinguished by 
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nothing. It is the aporia between the transcendental and empirical which enables the 
thinking of both as differance, the interval between transcendental and empirical 
translates as a non-difference or sameness. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written 
mark, functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the 
conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of 
impossibility for designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or 
empirical signs in converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and 
empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The 
necessity for the quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical 
makes it impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation 
depends on the other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no 
transcendental, then it would be impossible to distinguish, as Heidegger does, a pure 
empirical situatedness and idealism from it. The transcendental thus inhabits the 
empirical even as it is separated from it through the written mark or quasi-
transcendental. Heidegger thus requires the transcendental in order to exclude it from 
his radical empirical situatedness and Being. Empirical thus exists only in relation to 
the transcendental through iterability and differance. Heidegger thus needs to 
acknowledge the quasi-transcendental in order for his phenomenology to be inscribed 
more powerfully through acknowledging the conditions that make it possible.
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Derrida on Heidegger
In this chapter I will be examining Derrida’s texts on Heidegger in order to 
establish the relation of Derrida’s deconstruction to Heidegger’s destruction. Derrida, 
while acknowledging the importance of aletheia for radicalizing the notion of truth 
for western philosophy, establishes some distance from Heidegger in his readings of 
Heidegger’s post-metaphysics and post-representational thinking. Derrida 
demonstrates that Heidegger’s negation of metaphysics does not manage to overcome 
or destroy metaphysics as he sets out to do because Heidegger’s reversals of 
metaphysics remain bound to the ontological structure and vocabulary of 
metaphysics. Derrida argues that a non-metaphysics and reversal of metaphysics 
remains a form of metaphysics and is no different from metaphysics, while 
Heidegger’s attempts to overcome representational thinking in Aletheia retain some 
semblance to representational thinking, as the assumption of the Platonic thing-in-
itself is implicit in the concealed entity, and its utility and equipmentality becomes its 
unconcealed entity; thus betraying a dual ontological structure that resembles 
metaphysics. While Derrida appreciated Heidegger’s attempts to go beyond the 
strictures of metaphysics, Derrida argues that a simple negation or reversal of 
metaphysics remains a repetition of it in borrowing its ontological structure and 
vocabulary. Derrida locates the origin of metaphysics in that which structures the very 
possibility of Husserl’s transcendental or Heidegger’s Being as presence, namely 
differance.  Differance enables the thought of both as it grounds the possibility of 
structurality and structure. Derrida thus traces the roots of  Husserl’s and Heidegger’s 
philosophy to locate the origin of metaphysics in a non-origin, or differance. It is the 
aporia, or differance, between the transcendental and empirical that enables 
metaphysics. Transcendental and empirical idealism embodied by Husserl and 
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Heidegger’s thought fails to acknowledge differance as a meta-condition which 
enables the very structurality of their philosophies. Derrida thus locates the root origin 
of metaphysics in a non-origin and affirms the impossibility of univocal truth and 
responsibility, as the necessity of iteration, and the division of the mark from itself 
undermines the possibility of absolute truth and presence. Rather truth is constituted 
by differance, the impasse and aporia between the representational and post-
representational but implicated in both.  Truth is apprehended by understanding its 
impossibility. Truth is the inability to choose and the undecidability between 
competing systems, as every inscription of speech and writing subverts its authority 
from the outside by differing from the original mark. Truth is aporia, or the space 
between the transcendental and empirical. As transcendental-empirical difference is 
an illusion, truth is neither representational not post-representational, but implicated in 
both. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology more powerfully through his discovery 
of its condition of possibility as differance and the quasi-transcendental.
This chapter will first examine the deconstruction of Being as presence in 
Derrida’s readings of Heidegger from Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, and 
Margins of Philosophy, demonstrating that non-presence and differance are essential 
to determining presence, then proceed to examine the problematic of the relation 
between metaphysics and its destruction in Spurs, The Truth in Painting and Of Spirit; 
demonstrating that non-metaphysics remains a repetition of metaphysics.  In between, 
I will examine Derrida’s explicit statement on the relation of his deconstruction to 
destruction in Positions and examine his attempts to distance himself from 
Heideggerean destruction.
Early texts such as Of Grammatology and Writing and Difference were 
concerned with a certain rethinking of the structurality of structure as having been 
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replaced by a non-centre rather than a centre, as the signified was shown to be 
mediated and thus did not originate in a transcendental signified but relayed through 
the differences or play between signifiers. Margins of Philosophy was concerned with 
the non-presence that determined presence in the essay “Ousia and Gramme” through 
a deconstruction of Time as something iterable; and “The Ends of Man” through a 
deconstruction of anthropomorphic philosophy in demonstrating non-Being is 
essential to determining Being. These early texts thus show the origin of philosophy 
to be a non-origin, or differance. Later texts such as Spurs, The Truth in Painting and 
Of Spirit were concerned more with the non-difference between metaphysics and non-
metaphysics. Spurs examines the relation between metaphysics and non-metaphysics, 
The Truth in Painting examines the relation between representational and post-
representational thought, and Of Spirit examines the relation between Heidegger’s de-
spiritualization of his ontology and his paradoxical embracing of the spirit of Nazi 
philosophy. I will examine Derrida’s claim that metaphysics and non-metaphysics 
remain metaphysical forms and adopt the same ontological structure through close 
readings of these later texts.
Of Grammatology
Echoing Heidegger in “The End of the book and the beginning of writing”, 
Derrida takes similar steps to pronounce the end of a certain epoch of philosophy but 
further distances himself from Heidegger’s destruktion by including Heidegger’s 
onto-theology as a system of presence, logocentrism and phonocentrism which 
philosophy must now think anew by reconsidering the origins of philosophy, not in 
Being and presence as Heidegger had designated but in the trace, the space between 
the transcendental and empirical, and differance.  For example Derrida states that:
From the Introduction to Metaphysics onward, Heidegger renounces the project of 
and the word ontology. The necessary, originary and irreducible dissimulation of the 
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meaning of being, its occultation within the very blossoming forth of presence, that 
retreat without which there would be no history of being which was completely 
history and history of being, Heidegger’s insistence on noting that being is produced 
as history only through the logos, and is nothing outside of it, the difference between 
being and the entity- all this clearly indicated that fundamentally nothing escapes the 
movement of the signifier and that, in the last instance, the difference between the 
signified and the signifier is nothing. 98
Derrida argues that while onto-theology had designated presence and being as origin, 
this had led to a logocentrism that rigidly delineated the difference between signifier 
and signified. Derrida argues that the movement of the trace erases the difference 
between signifier and signified, as this difference is shown to be a difference that 
separates nothing, and distinguishes nothing. The transcendental is nothing outside the 
empirical. There is no difference between the signified and the signifier as 
logocentrism or Heidegger’s notion of being as presence had described. The origin of 
philosophy is thus a non-origin, an origin and difference that is nothing, or differance. 
Derrida thus pronounces the end of the book and the beginning of writing as we see 
the end of philosophy as presence that Derrida describes as the death of speech and 
phonocentrism, or absolute proximity of the signified to the signifier, which 
determines philosophy as presence in referring to a transcendental signified. In place, 
Derrida demonstrates that there is “nothing outside the text” and “every signified is in 
the place of signifier”, philosophy does not refer to a transcendental or mythical origin 
or topos noetos but is a chain of supplements that refer infinitely to each other as 
philosophy is irrevocably mediated. The signified is nothing outside the signifier, 
meaning is nothing outside the text which brings it into being through iterability, or 
repetition with a difference. The signified, or the transcendental, is thus nothing 
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outside a system of differences that defer meaning infinitely in its representation and 
mediation only through signifiers and supplements that refer infinitely to each other. 
Meaning thus becomes plurivocal and free from a referential origin or transcendental 
signified which designates meaning only as something to be comprehended, where 
Derrida shows that this infinite deferral of meaning will always allow a surplus of 
meaning and for meaning to escape the text by being opened up to an infinity of 
possibilities. 
Structure, Sign and Play
            Derrida says that it is naive to refer to an event, doctrine or an author to 
designate the occurrence of decentering and a thinking of structurality of structure, as 
it is no doubt part of the totality of an era, but still it has always already begun to 
proclaim itself and begun to work. The names he chooses, Nietzsche, Freud and 
Heidegger are indications only of a movement and a thinking of decentering and the 
structurality of structure that always has been already inscribed in the discourse itself. 
He thus implies that the thinking of the structurality of structure has always been 
implicit in discourse and these names that he chooses could be entirely arbitrary but 
are those that have formulated the thinking of the structurality of structure in its most 
radical formulation.
There is no thought that escapes structure, whether it involves building a 
system around an arche or a system that decenters it. There is no language outside 
metaphysics and the structures that determine it. All languages and thought affirm the 
structurality of structure. As Derrida puts it: “This event I call a rupture, the disruption 
I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, presumably would have come about when 
the structurality of structure had begun to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this 
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is why I said this disruption was repetition in every sense of the word.” 99The rupture 
of metaphysics thus involved repetition and redoubling rather than being any simple 
decentering of metaphysics. Derrida argues that the event of a rupture that comes with 
the decentering of metaphysics involves a redoubling of metaphysics and an opening 
of metaphysics to think its Other. To quote Derrida, “What would this event be then? 
Its exterior form would be that of a rupture and a redoubling.”100 Structure is 
something that has either been affirmed or deviated from, all the time being re-
inscribed in discourse. No discourse escapes structure and the metaphysical 
constraints it imposes in the form of the structurality of structure, whether the center 
is affirmed or negated. As Derrida argues: “There is no sense in doing without the 
concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no 
syntax or lexicon- which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single 
destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and 
the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.”101 Derrida thus argues 
that we have no language which is not already informed by metaphysical 
presuppositions, hence all destructions of metaphysics that proceed from within the 
confines of language repeat the metaphysics they seek to destroy.
            The center is a function of the structurality of structure rather than an arche or 
telos. This is demonstrated by the fact that it can be decentered and substituted 
infinitely by supplements that extend the play of signification infinitely. As Derrida 
argues, “ Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that 
the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no 
natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an 
infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the moment when 
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language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a 
center or origin, everything became discourse- provided we can agree on this word –
that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental 
signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of 
the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification 
infinitely.”102 As Derrida argues, there is nothing outside the text, the absence of the 
transcendental signified or absolute origin frees signification to an infinite amount of 
possibilities. The transcendental signified is not exterior to the text and is indeed 
absent, signification refers to an infinite number of supplements referring to each 
other rather than corresponding to an absolute referent or transcendental signified.
           Arguments between philosophers might differ in opinion about the absence or 
presence of a center, but essentially affirm this center either as absence or presence 
and hence reinscribe the structurality of structure. As Derrida argues, “But we cannot 
do without the concept of the sign, for we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity 
without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity, or without 
the risk of erasing difference in the self-identity of a signified reducing or deriving the 
signifier into itself or, amounting to the same thing, simply expelling the signifier 
outside itself.”103 Derrida argues that the destruction of the center only repeats 
metaphysics by affirming its complicity with the structure of metaphysics through its 
affirmation of the primacy of the sign. Furthermore, there is no difference between 
signifier and signified or transcendental and empirical, they are essentially the same. 
There is no signified and signifier, no transcendental or empirical, there is nothing but 
the distinguishing movement of the trace that produces the illusion that these are 
separate through an illusory movement of distinction called differance. As Hegel has 
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affirmed, no difference thus exists between philosophers as philosophy is a thinking 
of the Absolute and the arche in different forms.
           While Derrida describes the aporias that haunt metaphysics, his thought does 
not escape these aporias. While it is a meta-reflection on the structurality of structure 
and the conditions of possibility of metaphysics, Derrida’s thought does not escape 
this structure, and affirms this structure. Derrida does not offer any alternative to 
metaphysical or logocentric thinking. He does however alert us to its meta-conditions 
that enable the very possibility of metaphysical thinking or philosophy. As Derrida 
argues, “For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge and 
accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do not believe that today 
there is any question of choosing – in the first place because we are in a region (let us 
say, provisionally, a region or historicity) where the category of choice seems 
particularly trivial; and in the second, because we must first try to conceive of the 
common ground, and the differance of this irreducible difference.”104 Derrida affirms 
the interval that is neither transcendental nor empirical that is situated between the 
transcendental that enables the thought of both as their condition of possibility : this 
interval is the quasi-transcendental, or differance. Differance is the space or nothing 
between the transcendental and empirical that enables the thought of both. Derrida 
thus locates the condition of possibility for metaphysical thinking with his meta-
concepts of the quasi-transcendental and differance.
              There is thus nothing outside the text, the text being the structurality of 
structure, whether it negates or affirms presence all thought affirms that the possibility 
of metaphysics comes about through its repetition, or iterability. The sense of history 
implied by the structure of repeatability is the history of the determination of being as 
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presence, where there is an origin that is referred to and recalled in its repetition. The 
nostalgia for a lost origin, a presence and self-presence of innocence of a prior time 
untainted by chance and skepticism, is what has determined the structure of 
repeatability, a history of being as presence. As Derrida says, “The thematic of 
historicity, although it seems to be a somewhat late arrival in philosophy, has always 
been required by the determination of Being as presence.” 105 The notion of proper 
(property, properties, appropriateness, appropriation, etc.) undergoes a contamination 
with the movement of the mark. The “proper” time of a repeatable mark is its rupture  
and contamination with the origin and cause to inscribe itself as a difference from the 
original mark, where chance and discontinuity become essential to determining the 
repetition as a rupture and a discontinuation or difference rather than a mere 
coincidence with the original. The “proper” time of a repeatable mark is thus its 
discontinuation of it, or its effect as rupture and difference, and its contamination of 
the original as the trace. As Derrida states, “For example, the appearance of a new 
structure, of an original system, always comes about- and this is the very condition of 
its structural specificity – by a rupture with its past, its origin, and its cause.” 106 The 
'original' mark is the historic determination of being as presence where a transcendent 
origin or ideal concept must be represented through its repetition as the empirical. 
Derrida argues that this historic determination of being as presence is a myth, the 
mark only exists through its mediation and iteration, it does not exist separately from 
its iteration. As Derrida argues, “The Absolute is passage.” Ideality is constituted 
through repetition. Hence there is no instance of the mark that lies outside the 
structure of its iteration. All thought is always delay, it is communicated to us through 
the passage of differance. It follows that the structurality of structure has determined 
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human thought and philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche. Metaphysics has always re-
inscribed itself in human thought whether as a positive or a negative. Metaphysics has 
been repeated even in non-metaphysics like Heidegger’s- Heidegger’s destruction of 
metaphysics is in every sense a repetition of it. Derrida thus demonstrates that 
destruction is repetition and hence paradoxically, affirmation.
Differance
Derrida argues that Heidegger’s ontology belongs to the tradition of Western 
metaphysics which has privileged Being and presence and thus, tended towards 
logocentrism. For instance in his ‘Differance’ essay he argues:
What is the present? What is it to think the present it its presence?
Let us consider, for example, the 1946 text entitled Der Spruch des Anaximander. 
“The Anaximander Fragment”).  In this text Heidegger recalls that the forgetting of 
Being forgets the difference between Being and beings: “…to be the Being of beings 
is the matter of Being (die Sache des Seins). The grammatical form of this enigmatic, 
ambiguous genitive indicates a genesis (Genesis), the emergence (Herkunft) of what 
is present from presencing (des Anwesenden aus dem Answen). Yet the essence 
(Wesen) of this emergence remains concealed (verbogen) along with the essence of 
these two words. Not only that, but even the very relationship between presencing 
and what is present (Anwesen und Anwesendem) remains unthought. From early on it 
seems as though presencing what is present were each something for itself. 
Presencing itself unnoticeably becomes something present….The essence of 
presencing (Das Wesen des Anwesens), and with it the distinction between presencing 
and what is present, remains forgotten. The oblivion of Being is oblivion of the 
distinction between Being and beings. (p. 50)
In recalling the difference between Being and beings (the ontological difference) as 
the difference between presence and the present, Heidegger advances a proposition, a 
body of propositions, that we are not going to use as a subject for criticism. This 
would be foolishly precipitate; rather, what we shall try to do is to return to this 
proposition its power to provoke..107
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In Derrida’s examination of Heidegger’s account of presence, Derrida argues that 
Heidegger has acknowledged the difference between Being and beings as the trace 
which belongs neither to presence or absence. However, Heidegger elides this 
difference by collapsing it into unitary Being and presence. Derrida would argue that 
this collapse of the difference between Being and beings- differance, fails to 
acknowledge the trace, or the nothing and interval between presence and absence, as 
the very structure and conditionality on which both are premised. Differance, or the 
interval between Being and beings, presence and absence, is what conditions 
metaphysics and ensures its structurality. Hence Heidegger, by suppressing the trace 
in favour of the totality and presence of Being, also forgets the conditions of 
possibility upon which his ontology is premised. Derrida would remark that non-being 
and absence, and the difference between Being and beings or the differance between 
presence and absence, are as essential to determining presence as the simple 
ontological privileging of presence Heidegger carries out in his emphasis on the 
ontological certitude of Being. This relegates non-Being and non-presence to 
something secondary when it is in fact, essential to determining Being and presence. 
The differance, or interval between Being and beings, otherwise known as the trace, 
determines the structurality of metaphysics and Heidegger elides this in his simple 
privilege of Being and presence in his onto-theology. Derrida notes that erasure and 
dislocation belongs to the structure of the trace. In other words, presence is 
determined by the deferral, spatially and temporally, otherwise known as differance, 
of the trace which conditions both presence and absence by being the interval or 
spacing between both, spatially and temporally, from which presence and absence 
both originate. The origin of presence is thus a non-origin, or differance, rather than 
pure Being or presence. Derrida argues that erasure belongs to the structure of the 
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trace. As a difference which is paradoxically a non-difference or a sameness, the trace 
relates the transcendental and empirical in a movement which institutes a 
simultaneous distinction and collapse of distinction or sameness between the two. 
This is because the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, and the trace, or 
differance, which separates the transcendental and empirical, distinguishes nothing 
and separates nothing. The movement of the trace thus erases the distinction between 
the transcendental and empirical in its simultaneous separation and relation of the 
two. The trace thus relates the transcendental to the empirical in a movement of 
differance which is paradoxically a non-difference, or a sameness. The present thus 
becomes a sign of a sign, because the division between Beings and beings is properly 
the trace, which distinguishes nothing, separates nothing and erases difference 
through the movement of difference. It thus dislocates the present and determines
presence through non-presence as nothing lies outside the text and the transcendental 
and empirical are paradoxically divided by a non-difference, or a sameness.
Derrida thus seeks through following the movement of the trace that 
Heidegger has elided in his emphasis on presence, to think the unthought and the 
other of language. He also acknowledges non-presence, non-Being, absence, silence 
and ellipsis as equally a condition of philosophy as Being and presence. Differance 
defers and delays spatially and temporally and hence language always becomes other 
to itself, a repetition with a difference, an iteration of an origin that only is 
retrospectively produced through the movement of the trace. Derrida argues that 
Heidegger, while acknowledging the difference between Being and beings, violently 
collapses this difference into univocal Being and presence which fails to acknowledge 
the differentiating movement of the trace that produces both presence and absence, 
Being and non-Being. The trace, or differance, is the true meta-condition that 
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perpetuates presence rather than Heidegger’s self-referential and anthropologistic 
privilege of Being and presence. Derrida thus discovers the trace as the meta-
condition that perpetuates Heidegger’s very notion of Being as presence, thus 
discovering the origin of philosophy to be a non-origin, or differance. The text of 
metaphysics has been determined thus by its limit or margin, as non-presence, 
differance and the trace have determined presence, thus instituting a death at the heart 
of life. Metaphysics is a pyramid, instituted as a sign of a sign or writing, rather than a 
referential origin or transcendental signified. The transcendental and empirical are 
paradoxically divided by a difference which is not a difference, or a sameness. The 
trace relates the transcendental and empirical in a movement which institutes their 
distinction as a paradoxical sameness as the transcendental is nothing outside the 
empirical, they are fundamentally the same. It is the quasi-transcendental or the 
written mark, functioning as if it was transcendental, that enables metaphysics as it is 
the conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition 
of impossibility for designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, 
or empirical signs in converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and 
empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The 
necessity for the quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical 
makes it impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation 
depends on the other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no 
transcendental, it would be impossible to distinguish, as Heidegger does, a pure 
empirical situatedness and idealism from it. The transcendental thus inhabits the 
empirical even as it is separated from it through the written mark or quasi-
transcendental. The transcendental and empirical exist only through a dynamic 
relation of differance, iterability and as traces of each other. Heidegger thus requires 
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the transcendental to exclude it from his realm of situated Being. Empirical thus exists 
only in relation to transcendental through differance and iterability.
“Ousia and Gramme”
Time’s impossible possibility is that while Heidegger defined it as the present, 
it is always defined by what it is not and thus con-taminated by the simultaneous 
existence of non-presence and absence, the past and the future. The aporia of time is 
thus that it is the co-existence of the simultaneous and the non-simultaneous, thus 
deconstructing Being and presence as centre as what is supplementary to it (non-
presence- the past and future) are its very conditions of possibility. Time iterates the 
simultaneous with the non-simultaneous to produce the impossible possibility that is 
time, and the difference between the simultaneous and non-simultaneous or the 
differance between them is what grounds the possibility of time. Pure presence is thus 
impossible because time has to be iterated to be produced, thus introducing absence 
and differance into the equation. Time is constituted by the absences or non-presences 
that are the past and future which are simultaneous with the now in order to enable it, 
time has to be iterated as these non-presences or nothingness in the form of past and 
future in order to be continuous. Presence is thus constituted by non-presence, it is the 
differance or iteration between the present and non-present that enables time.
The Ends of Man
In this essay Derrida discusses two strategies for moving beyond metaphysics 
into a new terrain. The first is “to attempt an exit and a deconstruction without 
changing terrain”—that is, by remaining within metaphysics—“by repeating what is 
implicitly in the founding concepts and the original problematic, by using against the 
edifice the instruments or stones available in the house, that is equally in language”
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108. The second is “to decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive 
fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute break and 
absolute difference.”109. The first method Derrida identifies with Heidegger. The risk 
of this method is that by using metaphysical concepts and by trying to transform 
metaphysics from within, we can end up only more firmly consolidating metaphysics. 
The second strategy, which Derrida associates with French structuralism, runs the risk 
of naively falling back into metaphysics that it attempts to displace. Derrida believes 
that one ought not to choose between these two strategies, but “weave and intertwine”
them together. Derrida writes that the Humanism of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger 
was anthropologistic and lead to the privileging of Man as a centre. This humanism is 
a metaphysical centre, be it the onto-theological centre of Being or the 
anthropologically teleological centre of transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and 
Hegel. Derrida writes that Being, which is a nothing simultaneously, is an ontic 
metaphor that deconstructs essence only to metaphorize and relegate essentiality to 
Being and the present. Derrida argues that this persistent sense of teleological 
humanism through Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger lead to the reduction of meaning 
through positing man as an end as it confines philosophy to an anthropomorphism. 
Derrida also questions if it is a question of choosing between superior man 
(Heidegger) and superman (Nietzsche), as these are metaphysical terrains 
nevertheless. Derrida says it is not a question between choosing between two ends of 
men as both are metaphysical and onto-theological, but rethinking the metaphysics of 
humanism that has led to the privileging of the concept of Man in general at the 
expense of what is supplementary to it- that is, that which is not man or not 
anthropocentric. Derrida deconstructs Being to show that what is supplementary to 
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Man holds an equal dimension and privilege as Dasein should not be constricted to an 
interpretation as Man alone. In Margins of Philosophy thus, Derrida deconstructs 
Being and presence to demonstrate that differance, iterability and non-presence 
determine presence and Being. These are determinants rather than transcendent Being 
or onto-theology.
This chapter has examined the deconstruction of Being as presence in 
Derrida’s readings of Heidegger from Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, and 
Margins of Philosophy, demonstrating that non-presence and differance are essential 
to determining presence. Derrida demonstrates in these texts that non-presence, 
differance, nothingness and non-being are essential to establishing presence and 
being. Metaphysics is thus determined by non-presence and differance rather than 
presence. It is the interval between the transcendental and empirical, the quasi-
transcendental or differance, which establishes presence rather than transcendental 
Being. I examined how Derrida deconstructs Time by showing how it is iterable in 
“Ousia and Gramme” as well as Being in showing how non-Being is essential to 
determining Being in “The Ends of Man”.  The origin of philosophy is thus a non-
origin, or differance.  The quasi-transcendental or written mark functions as if it was 
transcendental, but without it no distinction between the transcendental or empirical 
would be able to take place, and were the distinction impossible no transcendental or 
pure expressive realm would take place either. Hence the phenomenological project 
becomes possible through this paradoxical relation of the quasi-transcendental, 
relating the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, 
identity in non-identity.
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Derrida’s Later readings of Heidegger
In this chapter I will be examining later texts such as Spurs, The Truth in 
Painting and Of Spirit which were concerned more with the non-difference between 
metaphysics and non-metaphysics. Spurs examines the relation between metaphysics 
and non-metaphysics, The Truth in Painting examines the relation between 
representational and post-representational thought, and Of Spirit examines the relation 
between Heidegger’s de-spiritualization of his ontology and his paradoxical 
embracing of the spirit of Nazi philosophy. I will examine Derrida’s claim that 
metaphysics and non-metaphysics remain metaphysical forms and adopt the same 
ontological structure through close readings of these later texts. Derrida demonstrates 
that metaphysics and non-metaphysics are repetitions and doublings of each other 
rather than contradictions and negations or reversals. Heidegger’s non-Christian 
philosophy thus shares more in common with Christian theology and metaphysics 
than he cares to concede as his reversal of metaphysics remains a repetition of it and 
thus bound to its metaphysical and ontological structure.
Spurs
In Spurs, Derrida charges that Heidegger eludes Nietzsche’s allegations about 
the gendered nature of truth in his quest to confine truth to asexual questions of Being. 
The claim that truth is a woman might hold more force that Heidegger cares to 
concede. Derrida argues that there is more force to Nietzsche’s claim that truth is a 
woman than Heidegger cares to concede in his attempts to avert this claim as purely a 
matter of hyperbolic style and to render his philosophy asexual. The feminization of 
truth is no different from the Platonic ideal, in Derrida’s view. Heidegger’s attempt to 
avert differance in suppressing the gender of truth consigns him to a privileged view 
of truth as asexual or masculine, where Derrida argues there is no difference between 
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a feminine truth and a masculine truth. There is therefore less difference between 
Heidegger and Nietzsche than Heidegger would admit. Indeed, Heidegger shares the 
same notion of truth with Nietzsche of truth as being a form of non-metaphysics. 
Derrida demonstrates that the question of the gender of truth is a non-issue as a 
feminine truth is essentially the same as a masculine truth.  Heidegger thus shares 
more common ground with Nietzsche than he concedes. 
Derrida argues that the opposition between the sexes is not determinate and 
fixed but a fluid and dialectical dynamic that can be negotiated and exchanged. As 
Derrida argues, the position is not one of ontological decidability. Thus the definition 
of truth as woman or feminine is simply an equivalent version of truth rather than an 
inversion or negation of it; because male and female are interchangeable rather than 
fixed in logocentric or phallogocentric determination. As Derrida remarks, the relation 
between the sexes is one of propriation or expropriation and exchange rather than 
rigidly delineated and determinate.  This further affirms Derrida’s argument that 
Heidegger’s version of truth is interchangeable with Nietzsche’s, there is no 
difference between them as the gender of truth is a site of interchangeability and 
indeterminacy rather than a fixed, absolute origin or concept.
Heidegger also commits himself to notions of truth as Being and ultimate 
presence, which Derrida will argue elides the movement of differance. Derrida thus 
critiques Heidegger’s post-representational thinking as remaining caught in the trap of 
representation through his insistence of truth as Being and presence. As Derrida puts 
it,
In its turn, the opposition between metaphysic and non-metaphysic encounters its 
limit here, the very limit of that opposition and of that opposition’s form. This might 
give the impression then of a new metaphysic of property, and indeed a new 
metaphysic. The many instances of such an impression are in fact attested to by the 
abundance and connotative qualities of statements to that effect. But – if the form of 
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opposition and the oppositional structures are themselves metaphysical,then the 
relation of metaphysics to its other can no longer be one of opposition. 110
Derrida argues that each attempt to de-limit metaphysics by limiting it to non-
metaphysics by Heidegger opens it up to its other, as in the ghost of metaphysics 
comes to haunt it as its other. According to Derrida, there is thus no opposition 
between metaphysics and non-metaphysics as these structures are both fundamentally 
metaphysical. Indeed these are repetitions and doubling of each other, rather than 
contradictions, or negations; as Derrida had earlier argued in Of Spirit. There is no 
difference between metaphysics and non-metaphysics - they are fundamentally the 
same as both derive from metaphysical structures ontologically. Hence, there is no 
contradiction between metaphysics and non-metaphysics. As Derrida had argued, 
Heidegger shares more common ground with the Christian theologians and 
metaphysicians than he would admit. Derrida would argue that metaphysics and non-
metaphysics share common ground in both being metaphysical forms. Derrida thus 
demonstrates that non-metaphysics is no different from metaphysics as it shares the 
same ontological structure and vocabulary, and hence translates as repetition and 
affirmation.
In terms of form, Spurs is rendered alongside a French translation of the text 
to demonstrate the equivocal and double meaning of truth- truth is both masculine and 
feminine, and neither is privileged as these are essentially the same. Stylistically 
Spurs is committed to rhetorical flourishes to demonstrate the plausibility of 
Nietzsche’s claim that truth is a woman, or feminine rather than masculine.
                                               




Derrida contests the idea that the Derridean grammatic is modelled in its major 
lines, on Heideggerean metaphysics, which it attempts to “deconstruct” by 
substituting the anteriority of a trace for the “presence of logos”; it constitutes itself an 
onto-theology based on the trace as “ground”, “foundation”, “origin”. Derrida asks 
how one models oneself after what Derrida deconstructs and if one can speak so 
simply of Heideggerean metaphysics. Derrida reiterates that the trace is neither a 
ground nor foundation, nor an origin, and is thus not providing for a disguised 
ontotheology.111Derrida thus argues that he is not performing destruction in the 
manner of Heidegger or replacing Heidegger’s onto-theology of Being with an onto-
theology of the trace as ground. Derrida seeks to trace the foundations of Heidegger’s 
onto-theology with his notion of differance rather than inscribe a disguised alternative 
onto-theology. Derrida is more interested in the meta-conditions which determine 
Heidegger’s onto-theology rather than substituting it with a different onto-theology 
based on trace as ground. The meta-conditions which determine Heidegger’s onto-
theology, as argued in the previous readings from Margins of Philosophy, are 
differance and the trace, non-presence and nothingness rather than Being or presence. 
Death thus lies at the heart of philosophy and constitutes it, death is the impossible 
possibility that enables life.
Truth in Painting
In the Truth in Painting, Heidegger’s attempt to “go beneath or behind the 
metaphysical determination of truth”112 remains committed to the anthropological 
project. While Heidegger sought to break away from representation, Heidegger 
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remained humanist and anthropomorphic. Derrida illustrates this through examining 
the Heidegger-Shapiro correspondence about Van Gogh’s shoes to explore this theme. 
Derrida contrasts Shapiro, the city dweller, with Heidegger, the champion of peasant 
ideology, and illustrates the paradox of the controversy- that both contenders share 
more common ground that they believe : the trap of representational thinking. Rather 
than defend either Heidegger or Shapiro, he exposes the “tacit institution” in their 
correspondence 113. The shared philosophical assumption concerns a representational 
mode of epistemology. Derrida thinks Shapiro assumes representational thinking in 
seeking the identity of the person who dons the shoes, while Heidegger does so more 
subtly.
In disputing the identity of the person who dons the shoes, Derrida alleges that 
both Shapiro and Heidegger have assumed the traditional paradigm of painting :
realism and representation. Both assume that the shoes must belong to a real 
correspondent person : a peasant or Van Gogh, which the painting merely depicts or 
represents. While Shapiro takes a strictly realist approach to the picture in insisting it 
is Van Gogh’s depiction of his own city shoes, Heidegger too does not escape the trap 
of representation in assuming that the shoes’ status as equipment must be disclosed by 
the painting, which presupposes the Platonic idea of the naked thing stripped of use 
value, prior to the painting which the painting must henceforth disclose or unconceal 
as equipment or of utility, as Derrida calls it, a being-product. This artistic presencing 
of the authentic mode of the shoes as equipment and utility is but another form of 
representational thinking that Heidegger fails to escape. This happens even though 
Heidegger proclaims his work a form of post-metaphysical and post-representational 
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thinking. The ghost of Plato and his concept of the naked thing haunts Heidegger’s 
conception of aletheia. Reading from Derrida on this symptom:
From the moment he is interested here in the work of art, Heidegger insists and 
makes his question more precise: does this (dominant) form-matter complex have its 
origin in the being-thing of the thing or else in the being-work of the work and in the 
being-product (with the participation of man, it is understood, whence the temptation 
to take this matter-form complex to be the immediate structure of the thing) of the 
product? In other words, would it not be on the basis of the thing as work or as 
product that this general) interpretation (or rather one secretly constituted? Now 
reread the chapter: in the course of this questioning about the product as informed 
matter, the example of the pair of shoes appears at least three times before and in the 
absence of the least reference to a work of art. 114
Derrida argues that Heidegger has not escaped a metaphysical concept of the thing in 
conceiving in terms of a matter-form complex. Derrida further notes that Heidegger is 
more interested in the thing as a metaphysical object to be unconcealed, than as an
artwork- that form and matter : is renamed the concealed and unconcealed through 
Heidegger’s treatise on the artwork, but presumes a similar metaphysical and 
ontological structure. Hence Heidegger repeats metaphysics rather than deviates from 
it. 
Derrida contends that Heidegger assumes the Platonic conception of form and 
matter by conceiving of the thing divested of use value, a naked thing stripped of its 
equipmentality, as well as the artwork that unconceals its use value or equipmentality 
for us. Derrida argues that the “naked” thing is an import from Plato and that the 
remainder is not a naked thing as the object is nothing outside its mediation- the 
signified is nothing outside the signifier and the transcendental is nothing outside the 
empirical. Derrida argues that Heidegger’s realm of the “concealed’ naked thing 
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stripped of equipmentality and use value is a metaphysical abstraction that has 
imprints of Platonic metaphysical thought in it. Derrida thus demonstrates that
Heidegger, for all his post-metaphysical and post-representational rhetoric, repeats 
metaphysics rather than managing to escape it with his reconfiguration or truth as 
aletheia. Derrida is not however critical of this repetition of metaphysics, he only 
contends that it does not set out what Heidegger sought to do- which was to destroy 
and overcome metaphysics. Derrida wishes to point out the aporias of this destruction 
which paradoxically becomes repetition rather than negation. Derrida argues that both 
Shapiro’s realism and Heidegger’s aletheia are committed to a form of representative 
epistemology which involves detachment of the object from its context and re-
attaching it to another function or identity, be it a person in the form of Van Gogh or a 
function as being-product and utility. Representation, in the form of referential 
signification, is thus implicit in both Shapiro’s realism and Heidegger’s aletheia. 
Derrida refers to the logic of representation as the logic of the cut or 
decontextualization. This logic of decontextualization or the logic of the cut leads to 
opposition as the object is made to refer to that which is entirely other. Derrida argues 
that this logic of opposition or decontextualization, or strict reference, sublates 
differance. Derrida points out to the aporia of such an opposition – it is 
simultaneously stricturation and destricturation as it removes the object from its 
context to refer it to a meaning wholly other. This wholly other takes the form of
identity of a person or function of utility in terms of being product. It thus frees, while
binding simultaneously. However, this movement suppresses and sublates differance 
as it binds the object to the meaning which is wholly other, rather than examining the 
play between object and referent. This is an indeterminable space rather than the strict 
determinate space of representation as Heidegger and Shapiro would have it. 
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Derrida argues that re-attachment involves a certain violence in putting 
uselessness to utility, thus removing its surplus value and subjecting it entirely to 
utility. In giving itself fully to utility and remarking it entirely as useful, the 
differance, surplus and indeterminacy of object is erased by lending itself fully to 
representation as something useful, or equipment. Derrida thus argues that post-
representational thought, or aletheia, does not escape representational violence as it 
designates uselessness and utility as a metaphysical and ontological duality that 
reinscribes aletheia in representation and metaphysics. Heidegger’s thought thus does 
not escape the trap of representational thinking and indeed re-inscribes its 
metaphysical structure and repeats it in every sense. Derrida thus demonstrates that 
there is no difference between representational and post-representational thinking, 
these are repetitions rather than divergences, and hence paradoxically, affirmations of 
each other.
Derrida further argues:
The work of art as such will be talked about, it seems, only as if in passing and after 
the event. At the moment when Heidegger proposes to turn toward the picture, he is 
thus not interested in the work, but only in the being-product of which some shoes-
any shoes –provide an example. If what matters to him and what he describes at this 
point are not shoes in painting, one for itself, nor, in consequence, criticize its 
appositeness. So what is he up to and why does he insist so much on the being 
product? He too, has a suspicion, and a hypothesis, has not the thing, pure and simple 
thing I, been secretly determined on the basis of thing 2, of the product as secretly 
informed matter? Must we not try to think the being-product, ‘before’, ‘outside’, 
‘under’ this supervening determination?115
Derrida thus further argues that Heidegger, for all his post-representational rhetoric, 
has assumed the fundamental metaphysical concept of the thing which bears imprints 
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of Plato in its matter-form division. Derrida also argues that Heidegger’s aletheia
divides representation into ‘being product’ or thing 2, and pre-disclosed thing naked 
of equipmental function, or thing I.This falls into the trap of repeating the 
fundamental representational logic of thing and perception or signified and signifier.
This happens although he claims to have eluded in aletheia by renaming it pre-
disclosure and disclosed being-product. Heidegger thus assumes the ontological 
structure and vocabulary of representational thinking and metaphysics by betraying a 
dual ontological structure to his post-metaphysics, dividing it into pre-disclosure and 
being-product. Hence, Heidegger’s post-representational thought is not subversion but 
repetition and paradoxically affirmation of metaphysics and representational thinking. 
Derrida contends to conceive of the naked thing, prior to disclosure, translates into an 
absurdity as signifier is not separable from signified, meaning is irrevocably 
mediated, the shoes are only disclosed to us as being-product and not as a naked thing 
stripped of equipmentality. This is because presupposing the naked thing repeats the 
ontological structure of metaphysics by dividing perception into pre-disclosure and 
post-disclosure. This betrays a dual ontological structure that resembles metaphysics 
and representational thinking. We know of no naked thing as an abstraction apart 
from its mediation as equipment, Derrida argues that abstracting the naked thing 
assumes Plato’s matter-form division and hence repeats metaphysics. There is thus no 
division between disclosed thing, and its remainder, the naked thing. This is because
what we encounter is the mediation of the transcendental and the empirical in 
encountering the pair of shoes as useful without conceiving it as an abstraction that 
exists prior to representation. Heidegger by abstracting the naked thing thus repeats 
the ontological structure of representational thinking, thus paradoxically affirming 
representational thinking rather than deviating from it with his notion of aletheia.
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Painting according to Derrida is inseparable from its idiom. This is shown
above as the inseparability of the transcendental and empirical, painting is not 
separable from its representation as mode. Painting is only realized through its mode 
of representation. Heidegger and Shapiro assume the trap of representational thinking 
in assuming realism and aletheia as a form of disclosure. Derrida would affirm that 
idiom is fundamental to rendering the object. The object knows no realization outside 
its idiom. Derrida highlights that representation is mediation, content is inseparable 
from its mode of production, this is what Derrida elsewhere calls iterability, or 
repetition with a difference. Painting is nothing outside its rendering or representation, 
as content is inseparable from idiom. The fallacy of Heidegger and Shapiro according 
to Derrida is the trap of representational thinking in assuming form and content are 
separate, while Derrida would argue that form and content are related in a dynamic 
relation of iterability and difference. Content knows no instantiation outside its mode.
Painting is not divisible into subject and object. These are one and the same. Painting 
is nothing outside its idiom; it is not separable from idiom, but rendered and mediated 
through its idiom.
Derrida would argue in The Truth in Painting that the representational 
paradigm is a failed paradigm, because each representation differs from the original 
and its meaning always exceeds the origin through the relay of differance, the gap 
between the painting and its object. The representational paradigm of painting seems 
inadequate according to Derrida, because Derrida would argue that each rendering 
separates the image from its origin in surplus and differance of meaning. Elsewhere, 
Derrida argues that meaning is relayed only through the passage of differance, each 
empirical instantiation of an origin has to differ from it spatially and temporally, and 
hence become altered in its re-inscription as repetition with a difference. Each 
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representation supplants presence. Each reproduction is an iterated form, a separation 
and differing from the original mark which knows no instantiation outside this 
structure of repetition. Rendering would always thus fail, because each rendition 
differs from the original as a trace, or imperfect rendition of the origin, if this indeed 
exists. As Derrida argues, there is nothing outside the text, meaning is irrevocably 
mediated. As argued earlier, content and idiom are inseparable. They do not exist 
outside the fundamental structure of mediation that relate each other in a dynamic 
relation of differance.
The correspondence theory of truth: or that subject correlates to object, fails in 
art because aesthetics is perspectivism and subjectivity rather than representation. 
According to Derrida, meaning always exceeds its origin by being subject to 
interpretation. Derrida argues that the representational mode of thinking for aesthetics 
is a failed paradigm, because there is nothing outside the text. Representation assumes 
a correlation between the signifier and signified. Derrida argues for a surplus and 
excess of meaning that exceeds its origin. Heidegger and Shapiro thus operate by the 
fallacy of the realist paradigm in assuming rendering is a theory of correspondence or 
an objective reality. In contrast, Derrida demonstrates that art always exceeds its 
origin and differs from the original as differance. The representational mode of 
painting is founded upon failed assumptions because representation is always excess 
and surplus, differing from the original across the passage of differance and 
iterability. Representation only retrospectively produces the original because painting 
is nothing outside its rendering, content is inseparable from idiom.
In terms of style, Truth in Painting is written in a highly elliptical form in 
order to capture the fact that representation never fully renders its meaning, and thus 
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Derrida’s deconstruction of both representational realism and post-representational 
aletheia shows that there will always be a surplus of meaning, an excess, as well as its 
caesuras and silences and gaps between meaning, that will render fully accurate 
representation inadequate. Derrida, through formal elements such as breaks, ellipsis, 
and punctuation, demonstrates that no rendering in painting is ever adequate and there 
is always a surplus of meaning, or differance. Derrida demonstrates through these 
formal aspects of representation with his writing. Examples of this are the use of 
ellipsis and punctuation to demonstrate that pure representation that correlates to a 
transcendental signified, be it a referent or utility, does not quite happen as there is 
always a surplus and excess of meaning, or differance.
Of Spirit
In Of Spirit, Derrida demonstrates that the distance Heidegger attempts to 
achieve from metaphysics by purging his philosophy of Spirit only conjures Spirit as 
a ghost that returns to haunt the purged body of philosophy, as ashes that remain after 
flames. For instance, Heidegger seeks in Being and Time to destroy metaphysics and 
the Christianity and spirituality of theologians by rooting his notion of man in 
ontology and Being rather than metaphysical abstractions. A destruction of Spirit will 
only mark its absence and negation as a place to be haunted and doubled by its ghost 
– Spirit returns to haunt the text it was expunged from. Derrida demonstrates however 
this purging of Spirit from Heidegger’s philosophy returns as a ghost to haunt it in the 
form of a fascist spirit of German nationalism that arose when he invoked his rectoral 
address as a Nazi. While distancing himself from metaphysical Spirit in philosophy, 
Heidegger embraced spirituality, indeed elevates and valourizes it, in his nationalism. 
In Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Heidegger, the negation of Spirit only leads to 
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its doubling and a haunting of the vacated text by its ghost, the spirit of fascism. As 
Derrida comments on Heidegger’s rectoral address:
The celebration corresponds properly, literally, to an exaltation of the spiritual. It is 
an elevation.  This is not only a question of kerygmatic tone, of proclamation or 
declaration. But of an exaltation in which is declared and erected the most high. As 
always, the profound and the haughty are allied in the most high the highest of what 
guides the spiritual guides of die hohe Schule and the depth of the forces of earth and 
blood.116
On the other hand, Heidegger thus confers the most reassuring and elevated spiritual 
legitimacy on everything in which, and on all before whom, he commits himself, on 
everything, he sanctions and consecrates at such a height. One could say that he 
spiritualizes National Socialism.117
Derrida argues that Heidegger, while evading Spirit in Being and Time, spiritualizes 
National Socialism in his rectoral address as a Nazi. It is not an avoidance and fleeing 
of Spirit as Heidegger had it in Being and Time, but an embracing and valourization 
of Spirit in terms of the elevation of the Spirit of German nationalism. Heidegger thus 
expels Spirit from his philosophy in Being and Time only have it haunted by the 
ghostly Spirit of fascism he invokes in his rectoral address. 
Derrida argues that Heidegger evades theological and Platonic notions of spirit 
in his philosophy in Being and Time only to embrace the metaphysical structure of 
spirituality in his politics. Derrida’s reading thus conflates the ontological with the 
political, arguing that a philosopher’s political outlook betrays his metaphysical 
presuppositions as much as his ontology, overtly de-spiritualized as it is. Derrida 
argues that while spirit is not a metaphysical subjectivity that is being exalted, it is a 
spirit of German nationalism that is being elevated and raised. It is a spiritualization 
of Nazism. The ghost of the fascist spirit haunts the philosophy of Heidegger, though 
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he claims to have expelled the Christian-theological notion of spirit from his 
philosophy.
In his final attempts to ventriloquize the Christian theologians and Heidegger, 
Derrida demonstrates there is no distinction between them and they are fundamentally 
the same. Metaphysics and anti-metaphysics are repetitions and doublings of each 
other rather than contradictions or negations. Derrida thus argues, from a 
deconstructive point of view, that Heidegger’s anti-metaphysics and anti-spiritualism 
bears no difference from the overt spiritualism of Christianity. As Derrida imagines 
the interlocutor’s reply to Heidegger:
“Yes, precisely,’ his interlocutors would then reply, ‘that’s just what we’re saying, at 
the crossing of paths, and these paths would be equally but otherwise circular: we are 
appealing to this entirely other in the memory of a promise or a promise of a memory. 
That’s the truth of what we have always said, heard, tried to make heard. The 
misunderstanding is that you hear us better than you think or pretend to think. In any 
case, no misunderstanding on our part, from now on , it’s enough to keep talking, not 
to interrupt- between the poet and you, which means just as much between you and us 
– this Zwiesprache. It’s enough not to interrupt the colloquium, even when it is 
already late. The spirit which keeps watch in returning (en revenant, as a ghost) will 
always do the rest. Through flame or ash, but as the entirely other, inevitably. 118
No substantial difference thus arises between Heidegger and the Christian theologians 
as metaphysics and anti-metaphysics are repetitions and doublings of each other, 
ghosts to each others texts which return as flame to the ashes to haunt each text. This 
is because an inversion or negation of spiritualism understands spiritualism better than 
Heidegger thinks or argues, as it is its repetition and ghostly doubling. This is because
it borrows from its ontological structure. Heidegger thus repeats metaphysics, indeed 
Spirit returns as a ghostly double to haunt his vacated text, as ashes after the flame. As 
Derrida imagines the theologian’s response to Heidegger:
                                               
118 Ibid.,  113
221
The first, then, those I called theologians and all those they might represent, would 
say to Heidegger: ‘But what you call the anti-originary spirit, which you claim is 
foreign to Christianity, is indeed what is most essential to Christianity. Like you, it’s 
what we would like to revive under the theologemes, philosophemes, or common 
representations. We give thanks for what you say, you have a right to all our gratitude 
(reconnaissance) for what you give us to hear and think- and which we do indeed 
recognize. It’s precisely what we have always been seeking. And when you speak of 
promise, this Versprechen, of a more than matutinal dawn beyond a beginning and an 
end of history, before and beyond East and West, do you realize how close to us you 
are?119
Derrida thus imagines the Christian-theologians affirming there is no difference 
between Heidegger’s anti-metaphysics and the overt spiritualism of Christianity, 
Heidegger shares the same metaphysical assumptions and mode of representational 
thought with Christian-theologians and thus as much as he seems to dismiss 
Christianity, his reversal of metaphysics borrows from the metaphysical structure of 
Christian-theological thought and thus affirms it.
This is illustrated also in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s designation of 
animals as poor in worldhood and thus not of the status of Being. Derrida 
deconstructs the distinction between Man and Animal and demonstrates that there is 
no substantive distinction between them that Heidegger so vigorously defends.
Heidegger’s attempts to expel Spirit and animals from his text thus only repeat these 
as ghosts that return to haunt the text as the metaphysical and ontological doubles that 
repeat the structure of metaphysics through the act of exclusion and hierarchy. As 
Derrida argues, Heidegger repeats dialectic and traditional teleology of metaphysics. 
Again we see Heidegger repeating metaphysics in his destruction of it. Heidegger 
thus, paradoxically, fails to escape Spirit or metaphysics that he seeks to overcome 
and destroy.
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In terms of form, Derrida demonstrates that the ghostly double of fascism 
always returns as spirit to return and haunt Heidegger’s text, as ashes after the flame 
by doubling the reading wherever Heidegger confines his text to de-spiritualization. 
This demonstrates that a haunting by the spirit of fascism and Christian-theology or 
animals always occurs whenever Heidegger seeks to simply expel them. Derrida thus 
demonstrates that this haunting of the text by its ghosts, be it Christian-theology, 
fascism or animals, repeats the structure of metaphysics entirely and thus Heidegger 
does not manage to escape metaphysics in his destruction of metaphysics.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined Heidegger’s non-metaphysical and post-
representational thought as Derrida has encountered it. Derrida argues that it is 
differance, non-presence, nothingness, and iterability that conditions Being and 
presence rather transcendent Being. Derrida then argues that there are more 
similarities between metaphysical and non-metaphysical or representational and post-
representational thought than Heidegger concedes. Indeed Heidegger’s post-
representation or aletheia remains a repetition of representational thinking, as his non-
metaphysics is a repetition of metaphysics. Derrida is not critical of Heidegger’s 
negative metaphysics as a repetition of it, only wishing to point out the aporia that 
what sets out to be destruction becomes repetition and hence affirmation. Derrida’s 
notion of truth traces the root conditions of Heidegger’s non-metaphysics and post-
representational thinking as he locates it in the movement of differance, the interval 
that divides metaphysics and non-metaphysics that marks the limit or aporia and 
impasse between them. Derrida’s writing affirms the impossibility of univocal and 
undivided truth as every act of speech and writing undermines it simultaneously from 
without by virtue of the contamination of the trace through the movement of iteration 
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and a priori difference. As truth is mediated, it cannot hold to an absolute unitary 
transcendental signified that exists outside the text but has to be encountered through 
differance, the relays of differences between signifiers which refer infinitely to each 
other than a transcendental signified, be this transcendental signified the a priori or 
Being and presence. The impossibility of the distinction between the transcendental 
and empirical is its own possibility as post-representational thinking is no different 
from representational thinking. Derrida locates the conditionality that structures 
philosophical systems in differance and aporia: it is the neither transcendental nor 
empirical, neither representational nor post-representational, neither Christian nor 
atheist space of aporia that is a structural condition of possibility for philosophy. It is 
the position of undecidability, indeterminacy and the inability to choose, that 
constitutes the conditionality of thinking both systems. These require each other and 
are inseparable in thinking the other as competing schools of thought, as the 
transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, representation provides the foundation 
for post-representation.  As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, then the 
space of truth is quasi-transcendental. The quasi-transcendental is that which 
translates as neither transcendental nor empirical, neither representational nor post-
representational, but is implicated in both.  Derrida thus democratizes phenomenology 
in demonstrating representational and post-representational thought are fundamentally 
the same rather than antagonistic to each other. What metaphysics has excluded is the 
quasi-transcendental or the thinking of a priori difference which is the conditionality 
of thinking both transcendental and empirical. Derrida demonstrates that Heidegger’s 
non-philosophy in seeking to raise itself to absolute status repeats metaphysics rather 
than truly diverging from it. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, 
functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the 
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conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of 
impossibility for designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or 
empirical signs in converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and 
empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The 
necessity for the quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical
makes it impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation 
depends on the other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no 
transcendental, it would be impossible to distinguish, as Heidegger does, a pure 
empirical situatedness and idealism from it. The transcendental thus inhabits the 
empirical, even as it is separated from it through the written mark or quasi-
transcendental. Pure empiricism thus translates into an absurdity as the empirical 
needs the transcendental to distinguish and remove itself from in order to come into 
being, the empirical is but the repeated trace of the transcendental. One cannot define 
the empirical in isolation as the exclusion of the transcendental is necessary to its 
definition, just as Husserl, in excluding the empirical, lands phenomenology in an 
aporia by expelling the quasi-transcendental or written mark that conditions 
metaphysics as differance and through iterability. Derrida thus inscribes 
phenomenology in a more powerful form through his discovery of the quasi-
transcendental which is necessary to distinguish the transcendental and the empirical, 
as well as that which makes it impossible to separate them because the transcendental 
is simultaneously the empirical.Without the quasi-transcendental phenomenology 
would not function. Derrida thus strengthens the phenomenological project by 
bringing it to terms with its condition of possibility.
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The turn to ethical phenomenology in Ricoeur and Levinas
In this chapter I will examine the radical empiricisms of Ricoeur and Levinas. 
As previously shown with Heidegger, I will demonstrate that radical empiricisms 
translate into repetitions rather than deviations from metaphysics. Ricoeur, Levinas 
and Merleau-Ponty's turn to existential phenomenology and intersubjectivity 
represents a turn to overcome metaphysics, not unlike Heidegger, and thus repeat it by 
inscribing it as a negative or Jewish variant in the emphasis on Otherness and 
intersubjectivity in place of Being and presence. Their “ethical turn” was a turn to 
privilege Other over self and corporeality over transcendental which elides differance 
and the quasi-transcendental. In place of this radical empiricism or non-philosophy 
Derrida would argue for the importance of the quasi-transcendental as the meta-
condition that grounds philosophy and non-philosophy. As we have argued in earlier 
chapters on Husserl, the difference between the transcendental and the empirical, 
differance, translates into a difference which is nothing. The turn towards a radical 
empiricism that we witness with Ricoeur, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot thus 
reinscribes metaphysics as a negative, which is a repetition of the transcendental as
the empirical, or iterability. Derrida thus discovers the condition of possibility of 
phenomenology as the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor 
empirical but enables the thinking of both, and hence inscribes phenomenology more 
powerfully.
Far from escaping metaphysics thus, the radical empiricisms of Ricoeur, 
Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot merely reinscribe metaphysics by repeating it 
as a negative. The negative is no different from the positive. This is because the 
transcendental and the empirical are paradoxically identical and non-identical, their 
difference translates into a sameness. Nothing separates the transcendental and 
226
empirical. The empirical is but the iteration of the transcendental, just as I had 
previously showed the transcendental cannot exist outside the empirical. 
Transcendental and empirical exist only in a dynamic relation to each other through 
differance and iterability. As such, the transcendental-empirical distinction is an 
illusion. In the previous chapters we have been examining the relation of 
deconstruction to phenomenology as defined by two of its major proponents, Husserl 
and Heidegger. The deconstructive reconfiguration of phenomenology also saw some 
precedent in the work of Ricoeur and Levinas, whom we will now turn towards 
examining. Ricoeur’s early engagement with Husserl saw him breaking from 
phenomenology as an ‘egology’ and solipsistic enterprise towards a definition of 
phenomenology as an engagement with intersubjectivity and “otherness”. Ricoeur is 
interested in limiting phenomenology and defining it in terms of its concrete and 
existential manifestations, which he defines in Fallible Man as the symbolics of evil 
and the disproportion or discrepancy between the finite and the infinite. Ricoeur’s 
approach to phenomenology differs from Derrida’s in as he is less interested in the 
meta-conditions of phenomenology. Rather he seeks to define its limitations as well 
as to inscribe fallen-ness as a theological concept into phenomenology as its limit. 
The notion of limit is more prominent in the thought of Ricoeur than Derrida, who 
seeks not so much to examine phenomenology’s limitations as define the conditions 
of possibility that enable phenomenology.
Ricoeur’s existential phenomenology
Ricoeur does not think the “Other” is subordinate to the ego as the 
transcendental reduction performs in bracketing the world, indeed Ricoeur argues that 
phenomenology is premised upon ‘Otherness’ in allowing a definition of subjectivity 
to take place. Ricoeur thinks that the ‘Other’ is essential to determining selfhood, 
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indeed Ricoeur takes the Other as the foundation of his phenomenology. Ricoeur
elevates the ‘Other’ to something primary rather than secondary in phenomenology. 
Ricoeur argues that Husserl’s importance was in discovering intersubjectivity as the 
condition of his phenomenology rather than the traditional view of Husserl’s 
phenomenology as a Cartesian, ego-centred phenomenology. Ricoeur defines the 
Other as essential to determining selfhood and subjectivity in Oneself as Another: 
Myself as flesh, before the constitution of the alter ego, is what the strategy of the 
intersubjective constitution of nature obliges us to think. That we owe to this 
impossible enterprise the formation of the ontological concept of flesh is indeed the 
divine surprise. As we know, the methodological decision rests in the reduction to the 
sphere of ownness from which would be excluded all objective predicates indebted to 
intersubjectivity. The flesh would then prove to be the pole of reference of all bodies 
belonging to this nature (ownness).120
Ricoeur thus argues that the objective self is predicated and premised upon the 
foundation of “Otherness”, rather than derived from what he calls a strictly Husserlian 
“egology”. Indeed he defines the “Other” as the “pole of reference” for the definition
of own-ness, or selfhood. The “Other” is the ontological foundation of the self, rather 
than something which is simply exterior or alien to the concept of the ego as Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction would have it. 
Ricoeur defines selfhood as concretely and ontologically situated as “the 
flesh”, subjectivity is embodied and corporeal as well as situated in relation to the 
“Other”. Indeed this relation to the Other is the fundamental defining trait of 
subjectivity, selfhood exists only in relation to the Other, it is thus dynamically 
constituted by this relation to the Other rather than being any simple form of 
“egology”. Ricoeur describes the “flesh” as the foundation of passive synthesis upon 
which active synthesis is grounded, selfhood is inextricably bound up with this 
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relation to the Other upon which it proceeds to define itself. Ricoeur argues that 
“Otherness” is the foundation upon which the ego is premised, as he argues, “the 
otherness of the flesh would still precede it”, as the ego is derived from the Other and 
the Other is thus its origin rather than its subordinate as performed in the 
phenomenological reduction. 
Ricoeur thus takes Husserl’s most original discovery to be the discovery of 
intersubjectivity as well as the idea that subjectivity is fundamentally embodied- a 
condition which Ricoeur explores with his notion of “the flesh”. Subjectivity is 
corporeal and situated in relation to an ontology rooted in Otherness rather than 
existing in a vacuum, as the phenomenological reduction would result in a form of 
solipsism and isolation of the ego, which, in existential conditions, is not a true 
assessment of the situation of the self according to Ricoeur. As Ricoeur argues with 
his point on nonbelongingness of the self as subject in a system of objects in 
Wittgenstein, the self is fundamentally situated in relation to the Other. Self does not 
exist alone without definition to this existential concrete reality of the Other or in a 
vacuum. The spatiality of flesh is its concrete embodiment in existential terms rather 
than being defined as immaterial or transcendental, without corporeal definition or an 
existential, concrete form of tangible reality. Ricoeur goes on to define subjectivity as 
a fundamentally existential condition, taking his cue from Heidegger, arguing that 
selfhood is a thrown-ness or situatedness and a facticity, and thus an ontological 
reality, rather than a transcendental or immaterial substance existing without concrete 
or existential definition.
In his volume on Husserl, Ricoeur further argues:
Thus, the “appresentation” of the psyche of the Other has its original reference- its 
ursprungliche Vorlage- in the solipsistic experience of a total compresence of the 
psychic and the physical. The unity of man is present only there, or more precisely 
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“only in tactile and affective sensations. The “appresence” of the psyche of the Other 
“in” his body is a transferred compresence. The Other senses and thinks as I do, his 
body too, is a psychic field, just as mine is an originary sensorial field. But the range 
of action of this transfer is boundless. All compresence is transmuted into empathy: 
the hand of the Other that I see “appresents to me” the solipsistic touching of that 
hand and all that goes along with this touching. A whole world is born to this hand, a 
world that I can only “presentiate” “render” present to myself, without its being 
present to me. Thus, bit by bit, an art of signs is formed, a vast grammar of 
expressions of which the most notable illustration is language. To understand these 
signs is to constitute man, to apprehend the Other as “analogue of myself”.121
Ricoeur thus argues that phenomenology up to Husserl has been solipsistic and that 
the Other is an “analogue of myself”, the Other constitutes the self, as Ricoeur argues, 
the brain is always the brain of another. Ricoeur argues that Husserl’s original 
discovery is the discovery of intersubjectivity and that this idea of the self being 
relational and constituted by the Other is fundamental rather than marginal to 
phenomenology. The Other is not reducible as it is the fundamental relational entity 
upon which the self is premised. The self can only be defined in relation to the Other. 
It does not exist as an ipseity or a solipsistic and solitary entity as Husserl’s Cartesian 
inclinations would have it. Ricoeur thus premises his ontology and phenomenology 
upon the Other. Derrida, in “Violence and Metaphysics”, will argue that this flight 
towards the Other is a characteristic of Jewish philosophy. Derrida does not privilege 
the Other in his phenomenology, but examines the aporia and differance between 
presence and absence which enables phenomenology. The notion of the quasi-
transcendental, or the differance between transcendental and empirical, or philosophy 
and non-philosophy, which enables phenomenology, is Derrida’s contribution to 
phenomenology. Derrida does not think that Ricoeur’s existential phenomenology 
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manages to escape metaphysics as it is a Jewish and negative repetition of 
metaphysics which its emphasis on “Otherness” and intersubjectivity in place of 
Being and presence. As argued above, the radical empiricism of Ricoeur and his turn 
to privilege the Other over the Same, merely inscribes metaphysics as a negative and 
thus does not overcome metaphysics as the transcendental and the empirical are the 
same, as argued in the Husserl chapters. The movement of the trace institutes the 
difference between the transcendental and empirical as a non-difference, or a 
sameness. By seeking so rigorously to elevate the Other over the Same Ricoeur 
merely repeats metaphysics as differance or the trace determines the difference 
between the transcendental and empirical as a difference which is nothing and 
separates nothing. The transcendental exists only through the empirical in the 
dynamic relation of iterability, and hence an empirical idealism like Ricoeur’s which 
negates the transcendental lands phenomenology in an aporia, in a manner similar to 
the way the transcendental reduction lands phenomenology in an aporia, because it 
simply reverses the effects of the transcendental reduction. The difference which 
separates the transcendental and empirical is a difference which is nothing, or 
differance, and hence Ricoeur’s turn to radical empiricism repeats metaphysics 
because the transcendental and empirical are separated by nothing, differance, and are 
the same. The transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion, as demonstrated in 
the chapters on Husserl. Hence, empirical idealism is a repetition of transcendental 
idealism rather than a deviation from it. Derrida thus differs from Ricoeur in not 
performing philosophical anthropology or existential philosophy but examining the 
meta-conditions which allow phenomenology to take place, naming these as 
differance and iterability. The transcendental and empirical are related in a 
paradoxical relation of simultaneous identity and non-identity, because their 
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difference translates into a sameness and non-distinction. Hence, the quasi-
transcendental is a paradoxical distinction that is a non-distinction and thus aporetic 
rather than immanent, inclusive, or contaminating as previous critics have argued.
Rather than privilege an empirical idealism or subvert transcendental idealism like 
Ricoeur, Derrida locates the space of truth as quasi-transcendental, neither 
transcendental nor empirical but the limit, spacing and interval between them that 
allows the thinking of both through the differentiating movement of differance and the 
trace. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it was 
transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or empirical signs in 
converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in 
simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The necessity for the 
quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical makes it 
impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation depends on the 
other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no transcendental, it would be 
impossible to distinguish, as Ricoeur does, a pure empirical idealism from it. The 
transcendental thus inhabits the empirical even as it is separated from it through the 
written mark or quasi-transcendental. Ricoeur requires the transcendental to exclude it 
from his radicam empiricism. Empirical thus exists only in relation to transcendental 
through iterability and differance. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology in a more 
powerful form through his discovery of the quasi-transcendental, which is the 
condition of possibility of phenomenology as it would be impossible to differentiate 
the transcendental and empirical without it, while it also institutes the impossibility of 
their separation as the transcendental is simultaneously the empirical. Derrida’s 
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dialogue with Ricouer is important because where Ricoeur performs anthropological 
phenomenology, Derrida discovers that Ricoeur’s existential phenomenology falls 
into aporia by negating differance and the quasi-transcendental. Ricoeur’s existential 
phenomenology requires the transcendental to be excluded from it in order to 
establish itself. Ricoeur’s empiricism would not hold if there were no transcendental, 
hence Derrida’s intervention in establishing the meta-conditions of iterability and 
differance addresses this aporia. It is the quasi-transcendental which enables 
phenomenology as the transcendental is simultaneously the empirical, there would be 
no transcendental-empirical distinction without it and yet it is simultaneously 
impossible to separate the transcendental and empirical because nothing separates 
them. Derrida thus establishes a phenomenology which is reflexive of its own 
conditions and functioning in contrast to Ricoeur’s anthropological and empiricist 
phenomenology, which in its privilege of the empirical, lapses into blindness and 
logocentrism. Derrida thus saves Ricouer’s phenomenology from blindness in his 
positing of the quasi-transcendental, or the repetition of the transcendental in the 
empirical as the transcendental does not exist outside its relation to the empirical and 
vice versa, hence Ricoeur’s empirical idealism requires the transcendental as a point 
of exclusion. Paradoxically hence, Ricouer expels that which is necessary to 
determining his phenomenology by insisting on a pure empiricism and Other-directed 
phenomenology because the empirical does not exist outside the structure of 
repetition from the transcendental through iterability and differance.
In Fallible Man, Ricoeur attempts to bring an affective dimension to 
phenomenology in examining the reality of misery as a human condition, as well as to 
define man as essentially fallen and capable of evil, which paradoxically also enables 
man’s capacity for good. In Fallible Man, Ricoeur defines the relation between the 
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finite and infinite as one of disproportion and discrepancy. Ricoeur is thus interested 
in the limits of man and a theological notion of evil which had not been written into 
phenomenology prior to Ricoeur as phenomenology had been largely a-theological 
and without a concept of man’s fallen-ness or sin. Phenomenology according to 
Husserl had been defined as transcendental. In contrast, according to Ricoeur, such a 
reading elides man’s fallen nature and capacity for evil, as the transcendental had 
been defined according to Kant as the basis for man’s capacity for virtue and reason, 
who grounded his metaphysics of morals in it. Ricoeur examines the limitations of 
phenomenology defined according to a transcendental framework as he argues that 
there is a disproportion or discrepancy between the finite and infinite. Man thus is 
fallen and inadequate to the infinite because he is circumscribed by his finitude and 
flawed nature which Ricoeur writes into his phenomenology as a symbolics of evil. 
Ricoeur is interested in the interweaving and inextricability of the finite and infinite as 
infinity can only find expression in finitude.  This he explores in his notion of 
synthesis. Derrida also explores this contamination of the transcendental and 
empirical, but where Derrida is interested in the phenomenon of mediation and the 
enabling conditions of transcendental genesis Ricoeur is more interested in reducing 
the portrait of man as infallible and good.
Ricoeur highlights fallibility as a theological concept much more than 
Derrida, who is interested not so much in a theological conception of man as the 
meta-conditions which enable metaphysical thinking. Where Ricoeur emphasizes the 
intertwining of good and evil in man to highlight the essential theological condition of 
man as Christian, Derrida’s expansion of Husserl’s notion of Verflechtung or the 
interweaving of the transcendental and empirical is an examination of iterability, or 
repetition, as the condition of possibility of metaphysics. Ricoeur is interested in the 
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discrepancy between the finite and infinite while Derrida is more interested in the 
aporia that enables the instantiation of the transcendental as iterability or repetition 
with a difference. Derrida has less interest in the incommensurability of the finite to 
the infinite than the enabling condition of the transcendental and empirical as the 
movement of the trace or differance. Essentially, Derrida’s differance differs from 
Ricoeur’s fallibility in terms of the theological and Christian import of Ricoeur’s 
interest in fallen-ness and sin and Derrida’s more meta-phenomenological concerns in 
the movement of differance and the trace as the enabling condition of metaphysical 
thought. The movement of the trace, or differance, distinguishes nothing and separates 
nothing, hence in place of an incommensurability or disproportion as Ricoeur argues, 
Derrida would argue that the transcendental and empirical are the same. Nothing 
separates the transcendental and empirical as the transcendental-empirical difference 
is an illusion. Ricoeur brings to bear a notion of synthesis that allows the expression 
of the infinite in the finite. This notion of synthesis however, is to be distinguished 
from Derrida’s notion of iterability and mediation. 
Where Ricoeur argues for an interweaving of the finite and infinite because 
man’s capacity for evil paradoxically is also his capacity for good, Derrida is 
interested in the meta-phenomenological conditions which allow metaphysical 
structures to come into being. Their difference of interest is thus on the one hand, 
theological definitions of phenomenology as a description of man’s fundamentally 
Christian condition and meta-phenomenological definitions of differance and 
iterability as the conditions of possibility for metaphysics. Ricoeur’s disproportion 
also differs from Derrida’s differance, in that Ricoeur is interested in describing 
man’s limits and fallibility, while Derrida is interested in the meta-conditions that 
allow phenomenological structures to play out in the first place. Derrida’s differance 
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is a meta-condition that allows the very possibility of phenomenology, while Ricoeur 
is simply seeking to circumscribe phenomenology in describing man as fallen and 
finite. The ends of these philosophers are thus different. Ricoeur is a theologian 
interested in the fallen nature of man, whereas Derrida is interested in that which 
enables phenomenology to play out in transcendental and empirical determination, as 
iterability and differance. Derrida is hence a philosopher of the very conditions of 
phenomenology as a metaphysical dynamic that relates transcendental and empirical 
through differance and iterability, whereas Ricoeur is interested in limiting the 
theological conception of man to finitude and fallen-ness with his inscription of a 
natural propensity to sin and fall short of divine goodness with man’s natural 
inclination toward evil. Ricoeur further argues on disproportion:
The “disproportion” between sense and perspective, between intending and looking, 
between the verb and point of view, is as the melodic germ of all the variations and 
all the developments that culminate in the ‘disproportion’ between happiness and 
character.
This “disproportion”, we remember, vouched for itself in the simple fact of reflection. 
Man’s finitide, we said, is such that it can be known and expressed; and it can be 
expressed only because speaking itself is already a transgression of point of view and 
finite perspective. However, that ‘disproportion’ between speaking and perspective 
was still only the theoretical aspect of human disproportion. What we are trying to 
express now is the global character of disproportion. 122
As we can see from the above paragraphs, Ricoeur is interested in limiting the 
concept of the good and the infinite in phenomenology in his emphasis on 
disproportion and discrepancy between the finite and the infinite. Ricoeur is also 
interested in the notion of synthesis. Happiness is not an abstraction or a finite 
concept but an interweaving of the two because it is affective and existentially 
manifested. Ricoeur’s difference from Derrida is thus in his interest as well in the 
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affective aspects of phenomenology, in concrete existential manifestations of 
phenomenology in emotions such as happiness and misery, taking his cue perhaps 
from Heidegger’s notions of moods such as boredom and anxiety. To examine 
Ricoeur further on his notion of disproportion:
All human action bears the mark of this indefiniteness.  Upsets the structure of acts at 
the vital level, acts characterized by a cycle of lack or avoidance, of pain, of initiating 
something, of attainment, of pleasure or pain. The criteria of ‘satiety’ alone would 
allow us to give a strict meaning to the idea of affective regulation; but these criteria 
can no longer be applied. ‘Satiety’ would be reached if all tensions could be totally 
saturated. But action, insofar as it unfolds at the beck of the three fundamental quests 
of self-being, is in principle a perpetual movement. The Thomist and Cartesian 
description of the love-desire-pleasure cycle becomes unusable. Extending this cycle 
or introducing delays into it is no longer sufficient; it is necessary to open it up. No 
action is any longer terminal, all actions have become strangely intermediary.123
In the above passage Ricoeur introduces a further notion of indefiniteness, the self is 
essentially not determinate and constantly becoming or in the process of definition. 
This notion of ‘becoming’ is quite existential and is also explored by Sartre who 
argues that being is a nothingness, there is no essential self, the self is constantly in a 
process of definition. Derrida will differ from this opinion in by no means being an 
existential phenomenologist but a phenomenologist who performs meta-
phenomenology in examining aporia as the condition that defines phenomenology, the 
transcendental-empirical relation is one of paradox and repetition rather than any 
existential or anthropologistic return to the realm of Being. Derrida would find 
Ricoeur’s phenomenology anthropologistic, as he found Heidegger’s. Derrida 
demonstrates that non-being is as essential to determining Being as presence and the 
transcendental, because the transcendental is constituted by differance and iterability.
The transcendental and empirical are related by the trace which institutes their 
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difference as a paradoxical sameness. The impossibility of the distinction between 
Ricoeur’s empiricism and Husserl’s idealism is its own possibility as empirical 
idealism and transcendental idealism are the same, separated by differance, a 
difference that is not a difference, rather than mutually exclusive. It is the aporia 
between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both as the 
transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, their distinction translates into a non-
distinction or a sameness.
Ricoeur seeks to elevate the Other in his phenomenology and circumscribe it 
to finitude. Yet the Other is no different from the Same, in seeking so rigorously to 
elevate the Other over the same, Ricouer repeats metaphysics and reinscribes 
metaphysics as an empirical idealism, which is no different from a transcendental 
idealism. In his emphasis on man as fallible, finite and fallen, Ricoeur commits 
phenomenology to an anthropological and empirical idealism, which does not differ 
essentially from transcendental idealism as transcendental-empirical difference is an 
illusion, as argued in the chapters on Husserl. As argued previously, the 
transcendental and empirical are repetitions rather than divergences from one another. 
Transcendental and empirical exist only in and through each other in a dynamic 
relation of differance and iterability. As transcendental exists only through the 
empirical, it is absurd to conceive of empiricism without idealism or vice versa as 
both are produced only through the distinguishing movement of the trace in a 
movement of repetition and iterability. The empirical is but the repeated trace of the 
transcendental, it does not exist outside this dynamic of iterability and repetition with 
a difference, to conceive of empiricism without the transcendental is to suppress the 
movement of differance and iterability which are the true conditions of metaphysics. 
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As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, circumscribing phenomenology 
to empiricism repeats metaphysics rather than escaping it.
By so rigorously seeking to elevate the Other over the same, Ricoeur 
suppresses differance, which is the true condition of possibility for metaphysics. 
Empirical idealism is no different from transcendental idealism as the difference 
between the transcendental and empirical translates as a difference which is nothing 
and separates nothing. By suppressing differance, Ricoeur forgets to acknowledge the 
true founding condition of possibility of phenomenology as the quasi-transcendental. 
The quasi-transcendental, or the difference between the transcendental and empirical, 
conditions metaphysics in its entirety as it functions as the limit and spacing which 
produces both transcendental and empirical and allows metaphysics to perpetuate 
itself through the distinguishing movement of the trace.
Ricoeur thus reinscribes phenomenology as a negative or empirical idealism 
which does not differ essentially from transcendental idealism upon close 
examination, as the difference between the transcendental and empirical translates as 
a non-difference or a paradoxical sameness. While seeking to escape metaphysics by 
elevating the Other and circumscribing it to finitude and fallibility, Ricoeur does not 
manage to evade it as he repeats it by borrowing entirely from its terms, ontological 
structure and vocabulary. The terms finite, fallible, fallen are borrowed from 
empiricist accounts of phenomenology, and by circumscribing phenomenology and 
limiting it to the finite and the fallible Ricoeur commits himself to empiricism, which 
differs only in name from idealism as nothing separates the transcendental and 
empirical, their difference is an illusion. The difference between the transcendental 
and empirical translates into a paradoxical non-difference or sameness, identity in 
non-identity as they are simultaneously similar and different. The quasi-
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transcendental conjoins the transcendental and empirical in this paradoxical relation 
of sameness in difference, identity in non-identity as their difference is paradoxically 
a non difference or sameness. Ricoeur’s notion of disproportion interests him more as 
a form of limit to phenomenology and a circumscription, thus privileging empirical 
idealism. In contrast Derrida would take pains to suggest that differance constitutes 
metaphysics. The quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor 
empirical, is the true condition for metaphysics as it produces metaphysics in an 
economy rather than privileges either transcendental or empirical. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, transcendental and empirical are but historical names derived from 
metaphysics. Their difference is an illusion, hence privileging empirical idealism as 
Ricoeur does, represses differance and aporia which are the true conditions of 
metaphysics. 
The empirical idealism of Ricoeur thus reinscribes metaphysics by instituting 
a distinction which collapses through the movement of the trace and differance, which 
designates the a priori distinction between the transcendental and empirical as a 
repetition of the same. The transcendental does not exist outside the empirical, just as 
the empirical is the repeated trace of the transcendental through iterability. Ricoeur 
does not differ from Husserl as transcendental and empirical are repetitions of the 
same through iterability. Derrida thus democratizes phenomenology in showing that 
Ricoeur does not differ essentially from Husserl despite seeking to invert 
phenomenology in directing it towards Otherness and empiricism.
In this section I have examined Ricoeur’s phenomenology and its points of 
divergence with Derrida’s. Ricoeur developed phenomenology in a theological 
direction and directed phenomenology’s emphasis towards intersubjectivity and an 
examination of how Otherness is constitutive of the self and the fundamental unit of 
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phenomenology rather than ipseity or the ego. As I have argued in the above section, 
Derrida differs from this emphasis on Otherness in his discovery of the quasi-
transcendental, or the differance between the transcendental and empirical which 
enables phenomenology. Derrida thus performs a meta-phenomenology in place of 
Ricouer’s existential phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. Derrida 
inscribes phenomenology more powerfully by bringing it to terms with its condition 
of possibility.
Levinas and the overcoming of ontology towards a metaphysics of transcendence
Levinas, like Ricoeur, directed phenomenology towards an overcoming of 
essentialist conceptions of being and towards the Other. Levinas calls this the 
overcoming of ontology towards metaphysics, his movement is a flight away from the 
totality of Being towards embracing the infinity of the Other, as the Other exerts a 
demand and responsibility upon being, indeed, the Other holds one hostage and exerts 
an ethical demand upon one to be responsible to the Other, thus limiting one’s 
freedom. Like Ricoeur Levinas critiques an ontology of ipseity, the Same, and 
essence, directing phenomenology towards Otherness and a transcendence of Being 
towards embracing the Other as the exteriority which defines and limits Being. As I 
have mentioned in the previous section on Ricoeur, this flight towards Otherness is a 
repetition of metaphysics in a Jewish rather than Greek sense according to Derrida in 
“Violence and metaphysics”; Derrida seeks to trace the conditions of possibility of 
phenomenology as the trace or differance between Jew and Greek, presence and 
absence, everything and nothing. According to Derrida, God and history is written in 
this play between presence and absence, transcendental and empirical, it is differance 
which is the meta-condition determining presence rather than what Ricoeur and 
Levinas embrace as an anti-essentialist and Other-directed phenomenology. Levinas 
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writes in a Jewish idiom with his ethics for the Other in mind, with phrases such as 
“neighbour” and the “infinity” of the Other, as well as “care” and “responsibility”; it 
is a Jewish ethics of care and compassion for the Other, in Judaeo-Christian religious 
ethics of loving the neighbour as oneself that is being elaborated by Levinas. Levinas 
a primarily concerned with moral agency as set out by a Judaeo-Christian framework 
in raising the Other to absolute as a site of transcendence and infinity. At the
foundation of his concerns on “responsibility” and “justice” are a definition of an 
ethical relation to the Other which has the holocaust in mind, Levinas’ ethics are 
defined in relation to the horrors of the holocaust and are an imperative for an ethics 
which takes Jewish alterity as the ‘Other’ in account.
Totality and Infinity
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes the fundamental unit of 
phenomenology as the face of the Other. The face of the Other is naked and destitute, 
thus exerting a strong demand on one towards responsibility for the Other. Self is 
defined according to a countenance of the face of the Other, who exerts a burden of 
responsibility upon one and a demand for transcendence of Being and selfhood 
towards the infinity of the Other, as the self becomes circumscribed, defined and 
limited by this relation towards the Other. Levinas contrasts the totality of the self and 
Being with the infinity of the Other, the other is a site of transcendence as one goes 
beyond the bounds of ego to relate to the Other in a transcendent ethical relation with 
alterity and difference. The Other as exterior to Being exerts a demand and call upon 
one’s existence towards responsibility for the Other.  
Levinas argues that ontology reduces the Other to the same, and thus 
renounces metaphysical desire. This metaphysical desire is the desire for 
transcendence of the self towards the exteriority of the Other which exerts a limit on it 
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and thus curtails one’s freedom, because it exerts the burden of responsibility upon 
one. This relation, a calling by the Other to responsibility upon the self : Levinas calls 
an ethical relation. Levinas argues that this transcendence towards the infinity of the 
Other in an ethical relation is a more accurate portrayal of existential circumstances 
than the ipseity of ontology. Yet this reversal of the reduction of the Other to the 
Same is but a repetition of metaphysics rather than a deviation from it. Levinas’ 
radical empiricism is no different from transcendental idealism because the 
transcendental and empirical are the same, nothing separates the transcendental and 
empirical, as argued in the Husserl chapters. The transcendental and empirical are 
related in paradoxical identity in non-identity, sameness in difference, as nothing 
separates the transcendental and empirical. The movement of the trace relates the 
transcendental and the empirical in a paradoxical institution of a difference which is a 
sameness. Transcendental and empirical are thus repetitions of the same through 
iterability. The transcendental does not exist outside the empirical, nothing separates 
the transcendental and empirical. As argued in the Husserl chapters, the 
transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion. Further Levinas argues:
The “egoism” of ontology is maintained even when, denouncing Socratic philosophy 
as already forgetful of Being and already on the way to the notion of the “subject” 
and technological power, Heidegger finds in Presocratism thought as obedience to the 
truth of Being. This disobedience would be accomplished in existing as builder and 
cultivator, effecting the unity of the site which sustains space. In bringing together 
presence on the earth under the firmament of the heavens, the waiting for the gods 
and the company of mortals in the presence to the things- which is to build and to 
cultivate- Heidegger, with the whole of Western history, takes the relation with the 
Other as enacted in the destiny of sedentary peoples, the possessors and builders of 
the earth. Possession is pre-eminently the form in which the other becomes the same, 
by becoming mine. In denouncing the sovereignty of the technological powers of man 
Heidegger exalts the pre-technological powers of possession. His analyses do not 
start with the thing-object, to be sure, but they bear the mark of the great landscapes 
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to which the things refer. Ontology becomes ontology of nature, impersonal 
fecundity, faceless generous mother, matrix of particular beings, inexhaustible matter 
for things.124
In the above passage, Levinas describes ontology as”egoism”, an emphasis on ipseity, 
and like Ricoeur, argues that ontology presupposes metaphysics. The self can only be 
defined in relation to the Other, selfhood does not exist without the Other as an 
interlocutor, Levinas describes the relationship with the Other as the ultimate relation 
in Being. Levinas argues that comprehension of Being cannot dominate the 
relationship with the Other, the Other is not subordinate to the ego but essential to 
defining selfhood, indeed selfhood is defined by an existential confrontation with the 
Other as interlocutor. Levinas is concerned to reverse Heideggerean ontology which is 
an ontology of power with its emphasis on Being. Levinas argues that ontology 
reduces the Other to the same, where this Other is an irreducible unit of 
phenomenology which must be taken into account. As argued above, a reversal of 
Heideggerean ontology presupposes the separation of the transcendental and 
empirical, which is not possible, because these are related in a dynamic relation of 
iterability and differance. The trace, which separates the transcendental and empirical, 
paradoxically institutes this difference as sameness. The transcendental and empirical 
are thus simultaneously identical and non-identical, distinguished by nothing and thus 
the distinction translates into sameness. A reversal of Heideggerean ontology thus 
repeats it rather than overcoming it in any sense.
Levinas describes Heideggerean ontology as an essence murderous of the 
Other, ontology has occluded the Other with a violence of suppression, while Levinas 
describes phenomenology as ethical and defined only in relation to this irreducible 
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Other. As Levinas argues, ontology presupposes metaphysics. Otherness is the 
fundamental unit of ontology rather than the ego and the same, because a 
phenomenology of egoism reduces the Other where this Other is an irreducible unit of 
phenomenology because subjectivity is only defined in existential confrontation with 
the Other as interlocutor. Levinas further defines his ethical phenomenology in 
relation to Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology of subjectivity and egoism when 
he reinforces his idea of phenomenology as intersubjectivity and an engagement with 
the Other as that which defines subjectivity. The Other is the horizon upon which 
Being and the self is defined. It is the limit of the self and the fundamental 
phenomenological unit upon which the self is premised, as the Other exerts a call 
upon one to responsibility and is an interlocutor of one’s existence. Levinas describes 
this as a veritable inversion objectifying cognition, the Other is irreducible to 
cognition, and is the fundamental unit of ontology rather than something reducible or 
subordinate to the ego as previously defined by Heidegger and Husserl. This move to 
privilege Otherness is a radical empiricism that repeats metaphysics rather than 
escaping it, as empirical is no different from the transcendental, existing in a relation 
of iterability, and repetition with a difference; rather than an ontological separation 
from each other. The empirical is not separable from the transcendental as the a priori 
difference which separates the transcendental and empirical translates into a 
difference which is nothing. Radical empiricism thus repeats metaphysics rather than 
escaping from it. As discovered in the Husserl chapters, transcendental empirical 
difference is an illusion; truth is neither transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-
transcendental, the interval between the transcendental and empirical that conditions 
the thinking and production of both. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, 
functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the 
245
conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of 
impossibility for designating an exclusive sphrere of empirical signs. The quasi-
transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and 
difference, identity and non-identity. The necessity for the quasi-transcendental to 
distinguish the transcendental and empirical makes it impossible to separate 
transcendental and empirical as each separation depends on the other term for the 
distinction to be upheld. If there were no transcendental, then it would be impossible 
to distinguish, as Levinas does, a pure empirical idealism from it. The transcendental 
thus inhabits the empirical even as it is separated from it through the written mark or 
quasi-transcendental. Levinas requires the transcendental to exclude it from his 
radical empiricism. Empirical only exists in relation to transcendental through 
iterability and differance. 
Otherwise than Being, or beyond essence
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas further defines his ethics of alterity and otherness:
The infinite orders to me the neighbour as a face, without being exposed to me, and 
does so the more imperiously that proximity narrows. The order has not been the 
cause of my response, nor even a question that would have preceded it in a dialogue. I 
find the order in my response itself, which, as a sign given to the neighbour, as a 
‘here I am’, brings me out of invisibility, out of the shadow in which my 
responsibility could have been evaded. This saying belongs to the very glory of which
it bears witness.125
Levinas describes the face of the other as the fundamental unit of phenomenology 
which commands one into existence. It exerts an ethical demand upon one and calls 
one to responsibility for the Other. Levinas describes it as a trace of a wandering 
cause, inscribed in the self. According to Levinas thus, the relation to the Other is not 
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secondary but primary as it calls being into existence, it is a command to respond with 
responsibility and an ethical relation. Further Levinas argues:
Consciousness is born as the presence of a third party. It is in the measure that it 
proceeds from it that it is still disinterestedness. It is the entry of the third party, a 
permanent entry, into the intimacy of the face to face. The concern for justice, for the 
thematizing, the kerygmatic discourse bearing on the said, from the bottom of the 
saying without the said, the saying as contact, is the spirit in society. And it is because 
the third party does not come empirically to trouble proximity, but the face is both the 
neighbour and the face of faces, visage and the visible, that, between the order of 
being and of proximity the bond is unexceptional. Order, appearing, phenomenality, 
being are produced in signification, in proximity, starting with the third party. The 
apparition of a third party is the very origin of appearing, that is, the very origin of an 
origin.
The foundation of consciousness is justice. Not that justice makes a pre-existing 
meditation intervene. An event like meditation- synchronization, comparison, 
thematization- is the work of justice, an entry of the diachrony of proximity, of the 
signifyingness of saying into the synchrony of the said, a ‘fundamental historicity’ in 
the sense of Merleau-Ponty.126
As Levinas argues, the Other calls the self into existence, consciousness is only born 
as the presence of the third party. Phenomenology is an account of this third party and 
the Other as the fundamental unit which calls the self into existence through 
existential confrontation and a demand for responsibility. The Other is an infinity 
which commands one out of solipsism into existence, selfhood does not exist in a 
vacuum but in an ethical relation to the Other as a neighbour. Phenomenology is thus 
an account of this ethical relation to the Other as justice. Subjectivity comes with 
duties and responsibilities because of the ethical demand and burden that the Other 
exerts upon one, the self does not exist desituated in a concept of a non-reciprocal 
relationship with the Other but in a situated context of reciprocity and existential as 
well as ethical relationship with the Other.  Levinas’ existential phenomenology is 
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thus fundamentally concerned with ethics, justice and the burden of responsibility that 
the Other exerts upon the self. As argued above, this radical empiricism in the flight 
towards the Other repeats metaphysics as the empirical is no different from the 
transcendental. The trace, which separates the transcendental and empirical, translates 
into a difference which distinguishes nothing and separates nothing. Transcendental 
and empirical are thus paradoxically identical in their non-identity, and an empirical 
idealism thus is not a divergence from transcendental idealism but a repetition of it.
As argued previously in the Husserl chapters, transcendental-empirical difference is 
really an illusion as they are repetitions of the same.
Violence and Metaphysics
Derrida defines Levinas’ metaphysics as a Jewish metaphysics rather than a 
Greek metaphysics which had privileged light and being, while Derrida argues that 
metaphysics is actually the difference or differance between Jew and Greek, presence 
and absence, everything and nothing. Phenomenology is enabled by the quasi-
transcendental, or the interval between transcendental and empirical, presence and 
absence, as we have discussed in previous chapters, this difference is paradoxically a 
sameness because it distinguished nothing and separates nothing. Derrida thus 
demonstrates that Levinas’ phenomenology translates as a repetition of metaphysics 
rather than an escape from it, not unlike Heidegger’s repetition in his attempt to 
overcome metaphysics. Reading from Derrida:
This complicity between empiricism and metaphysics is in no way surprising. By 
criticizing them, or rather by limiting them with one and the same gesture, Kant and 
Husserl indeed had recognized their solidarity. It calls for closer meditation. Schelling 
went quite far in this direction.127
                                               
127 Ibid., 190
248
Derrida thus describes the relationship between empiricism and metaphysics as 
complicity rather than inversion or negation as Levinas would have it. Derrida 
describes the relation as an economy and solidarity rather than one of exclusion and 
negation, so Levinas does not, in his radical empiricism, manage to escape 
metaphysics. Further Derrida argues:
Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the 
Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history. We live in and of 
difference, that is, in hypocrisy, about which Levinas so profoundly says that it is 
“not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a world 
attached to both the philosophers and the prophets.”(TI,p. 24)128
Derrida thus argues that there is no difference between Levinas’ non-philosophy and 
philosophy as there exists a complicity between the Jew and the Greek, truth is to be 
situated between Jew and Greek, truth is neither Jew nor Greek metaphysics but 
quasi-transcendental. This is the difference and differance between Jew and Greek. 
Jew and Greek thought are not negations but repetitions of each other, they are the 
same and not negations or inversions of each other. Truth is quasi-transcendental and 
the difference or differance between Jew and Greek rather than either strictly Jew or 
Greek. Derrida would also demonstrate, as I have outlined above in the section on 
Ricoeur, that Levinas’ turn to radical empiricism is a repetition of metaphysics as the 
transcendental and the empirical are the same, the movement of iterability relates the 
transcendental and empirical as repetitions of the same, rather than ontologically 
separable phenomena. 
In “Phenomenology, Ontology, Metaphysics”, Derrida argues that Levinas’ 
notion of metaphysics has been informed by a need to overcome the “egology”, 
‘sameness’ and ‘being’ of ontology which has confined metaphysics to a totality and 
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interiority. It is blind to the infinity and exteriority of the Other which exerts an 
ethical demand on one towards transcendence, thus transforming metaphysics and 
ontology into ethics through embracing the infinity of the Other. As Derrida argues, 
desire permits itself to be appealed to the absolute exteriority of the other to which it 
must remain infinitely inadequate.129 For Derrida, desire is excess and thus cannot be 
confined to the solipsistic ontology of being, desire is always a flight to transcend 
totality towards the infinity of the Other. This makes the metaphysics of desire a 
metaphysics of infinite separation. The flight towards the Other is a transcendence of 
the solipsism, ipseity and egology of the self, thus separating the self from itself to 
embrace the Other in the ethical demand that the Other exerts on One. As Derrida 
interprets this separation, this transcendence and infinite separation from the self is 
not unhappy consciousness but opening and freedom. As Derrida argues, the ego 
confines ontology to a metaphysics of the Same. On Levinas’ interpretation, 
transcendence towards the Other, overcoming ontology of ipseity and sameness 
towards the infinity of the Other is what truly constitutes metaphysics by defining it as 
ethical. History has blinded the ego to the Other according to Levinas by confining it 
to Sameness, solipsism and ipseity.  Derrida however makes the qualification that one 
accepts this expansion of ontology into metaphysics of exteriority and ethics if one 
accepts Levinas’ equation of the ego and the Same.  Were one to resist the idea that 
resistance to the same is not real but intelligible as intelligible resistance, one would 
not follow Levinas on his arguments about metaphysics being a prioritization of the 
Same and ipseity.
Derrida thus defines the confrontation with the absolutely Other as something 
which exceeds the confines of the concept relationship as it is not a representation, 
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limitation nor a conceptual relation to the same. It is an encounter which resists 
conceptualization, resistant to all categories, something which exceeds the bounds of 
conceptualization or categorization or the notion of horizon, which limits one to the 
horizon of the same and unity over heterogeneity. In a move which anticipates 
Derrida’s own, Levinas locates the encounter in a future and beyond that is present 
not in ontology, presence, ipseity or horizons but the trace, present at the heart of 
experience. It is thus a non-presence which determines presence, the trace of the 
Other in which one encounters its infinity and beyond exists at the heart of presence 
as a non-presence or dislocation of presence rather than something which can be 
determined within its horizon. The encounter of the Other is an ethical relation which 
is religious, encompassing the religiosity of the religious, not achieved by an intuition 
of a positive presence, but as a prayer addressed to freedom or a commandment. The 
face of the Other is accusative, it calls one out of indifference into an ethical relation 
of respect and responsibility, into a non-violent relation of seeing and recognition for 
the Other as other and not a subsumption under the conceptual category of the Same. 
Levinas’ restitution of metaphysics thus radicalizes and systematizes previous 
reductions of phenomenology and ontology by opening up metphysics towards seeing 
the Other as Other and infinite in its beyond, grasping the Other not as a concept or 
totality which reduces it to the same but as a trace. This confrontation is deeply 
religious and commands the self into a recognition for the Other as an infinite beyond, 
irreducible to the self or sameness. This confrontation with the Other frees 
metaphysics from the light of Being, or its Greek conceptualization of metaphysics 
towards a Judaic conceptualization of metaphysics which adopts the ethical relation 
towards the Other as the fundamental unit of metaphysics. Yet Derrida will 
demonstrate that this Jewish variant on metaphysics presupposes its Greek form 
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because it assumes it as a point of departure, radicalization, inversion and negation 
and thus does not free itself completely from its metaphysical vocabulary. Derrida 
then goes on to interpret Heideggerean ontology as an “egology”, which neutralizes 
the Other of Being into the same, ontology is a philosophy of power which negates 
and refuses to accommodate the existence of the Other. Heideggerean possibilities 
thus remain powers, oppressive and possessive. Yet Levinas’ alternative in rejecting 
idealism and subjectivity is doomed to repeat it through his negation of Logos and 
thus paradoxically affirms the structurality of structure. He does this in affirming 
logocentrism through his denunciations of a center. The non-philosophy of Levinas 
remains logocentric as it affirms the non-centre as centre and thus reinscribes the 
structurality of structure by deviating, and hence simultaneously affirming the 
presence of a centre. Derrida eventually affirms that both philosophy and non-
philosophy end up being logocentric in affirming or deviating from the presence or 
absence of a centre, and rather than choosing between philosophy and non-philosophy 
truth is rather quasi-transcendental and the differance between Jew and Greek, in 
which God and history are written and inscribed, unfolding between presence and 
absence as the play which constitutes the world. Derrida thus demonstrates the 
difference between Jew and Greek translates paradoxically as a sameness, Jew and 
Greek are repetitions rather than deviations and hence since this transcendental-
empirical difference is an illusion, truth is the diferrance between these two extremes.
The fundamental unit of Levinas’ metaphysics, the face, is a unit which 
exceeds conceptualization and categorization as well. It is not a metaphor or a figure, 
but a fundamental expression which calls one into existence through exerting a 
command on one into responsibility and ethical obligation to the Other. This Other is 
irreducible, not conceptualizable, calling one into existence and ethical obligation 
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through its expression as a command of one into existence in relation to the Other. 
Derrida then proceeds to argue that a world which recognizes the face, in which there 
is a true seeing and apprehension of the irreducibility of Other as Other, there would 
be no war. Yet the world as it exists is a world where there is no longer a face as war 
clearly exists. Yet the world without a face is also a world without a cause for war as 
it is a world without the Other which one has a confrontational relationship with. It 
follows that with, or without God, who guarantees the existence of a face, there is war 
and thus God becomes implicated in war. War supposes and excludes God because 
God should guarantee the face as acknowledgement of the Other so no war would 
ensue, and yet clearly in this world there is no acknowledgement of the face and thus 
an exclusion of God. Hence because war exists, war is the difference between the face 
and the finite world without a face. The reality is that God exists in the play between 
this presence and absence of a face, the world as it exists is a play between a world 
with a face and a world without a face and hence war and peace erupt and exist 
simultaneously. God exists as the play between the presence and absence of a face. 
God is thus the play, and differance between the world with a face and the finite 
world without a face. God exists in the play between presence and absence rather than 
as a strict presence to the world as God is differance, written in the play between 
everything and nothing, presence and absence, in which history unfolds. The face of 
God disappears forever in showing itself because it is not meant to be countenanced 
as a sacred and divine component of the transcendental beyond. The face is thus 
neither the face of God nor the figure of man but their resemblance. The Other 
resembles God but is not God, the Other is the resemblance between humanity and 
God.
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Derrida argues that God is not infinitely Other as a positive infinity, but in a 
relational sense, through differance. As Derrida sees it, the Other cannot be infinitely 
Other except through finitude and mortality. Transcendental has to be mediated 
through empirical in a relationship of iterability and differance. God is not an either 
All or Nothing, Life and Death but named in the difference or differance between 
these terms, God is inscribed in this difference which we term history. Derrida then 
argues that Levinas is not a thinker of differance or the quasi-transcendental but 
inversion of metaphysics or radical empiricism, which is a negative theology that 
repeats metaphysics rather than departing in any meaningful sense from it. Differing 
from Levinas, Derrida demonstrates that metaphysics is economy rather than alterity. 
Metaphysics is the difference between Jew and Greek, presence and absence, all or 
nothing, unfolding between these limits as history and inscribed as God rather than a 
choice of either totality or infinity as Levinas would have it. While Levinas would 
argue that presence is violence and the meaning of finitude, Derrida asks why we 
should choose finitude and history or radical empiricism over Greek metaphysics of 
light, power and oppression as Levinas has defined the phenomenologies of Husserl 
and Heidegger. Derrida argues it is not a matter of choosing between Greek 
conceptualizations of metaphysics or Jewish conceptions of metaphysics but seeing 
truth as quasi-transcendental and the differance between these two extremes. There 
exists complicity rather than difference between philosophy and non-philosophy. 
Non-philosophy is really a repetition of philosophy and truth is rather not a choice 
between philosophy or non-philosophy but the difference and differance between the 
two.
In his later commentary on Husserl in Rogues, Derrida affirms two principles 
that his critique of Husserl’s phenomenology from Speech and Phenomena and 
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Introduction to Origin of Geometry had outlined. Firstly, Derrida had argued for the 
impossibility of pure Presence due to the necessity of temporalization. The two evils 
of rationalism named by Husserl in his Crises of the European Sciences, irrationalism 
and objectivist naivete, nonetheless are bound to the myth of reason as a certain 
presence. In Rogues, as Derrida has argued previously in Speech and Phenomena, the 
present is produced only by altering and dissimulating itself. Presence has to be 
temporalized and made simultaneous with non-presences in the forms of past and 
future in order to be communicated, the transcendental has to be repeated with a 
difference and relayed through differance in order to be communicated, and hence 
pure Presence as Husserl posits as the solution to grounding the sciences in an 
Absolute Present of transcendental idealism is a myth. Derrida argues that because 
Husserl has identified the two fallacies of reason, irrationalism and objectivist naivete, 
it is not a crises that cannot be overcome. Derrida would argue that Husserl has 
located the aporia of phenomenology, in reifying itself into two extremes of 
irrationalism and objectivism, truth is to be located as quasi-transcendental and the 
difference between these two extremes rather than a return to privilege presence and 
transcendental idealism as Husserl does. Derrida thus affirms at the end of his career 
that Husserl had discovered the fundamental aporia of phenomenology- that the two 
extremes of rationalistic fallacy- irrationalism and objectivist naivete were dead ends 
and the solution to overcoming fallacy was acknowledging impasse, paradox and the 
quasi-transcendental. Derrida argues that the crises is resolvable by acknowledging it 
is not a matter of choosing one extreme over the other but acknowledging paradox 
and aporia as truth. To cite Derrida,
“If this crisis remains ambiguous, if this double critique calls into question a certain 
rationalism and a certain irrationalism, the only possible conclusion is that the crisis 
can be overcome. It is not an irreversible failure. The failure of which we are 
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speaking, if it indeed fails or goes aground (the event of an accidental running 
aground or the event of an intentional grounding, linked, therefore, to some freedom 
or transcendental evil), fails only in appearance and indicates only an apparent failure 
of rationalism. An apparent failure of rationalism- that is precisely Husserl’s 
conclusion. If it is going to inspire a call to save the honor of reason (Husserl wants 
no such rescue) but to endure a heroism of reason, which, I think you will grant me, is 
not too far away.”130
Reason can thus be saved by acknowledging the failure of reason is only apparent, it 
is resolvable by acknowledging aporia rather than commiting to transcendental evil or 
freedom. Truth is quasi-transcendental, neither materialist or transcendental, but the 
space between that conditions the thinking of both.
The second principle that Derrida affirms is that incalculability and history is 
intrinsic to an axiom rather than separable from it. Transcendental has to be mediated 
through history and the empirical, and hence contingency, incalculability is 
inseparable from the transcendental axiom as the transcendental axiom has to be 
realized through the relative and the contingent, or the empirical. Incalculability and 
undecidability are thus intrinsic to transcendental axioms rather than separable from 
them as Husserl performs through his reduction. Hence closer to the end of his career, 
Derrida has not fundamentally changed his critique of Husserl as he reiterates the two 
principles upon which he has found Husserlian phenomenology caught in an aporia-
the necessity of temporalization of the presence which makes pure presence and 
transcendental idealism impossible, and the necessity of incalculability and 
undecidability to the realization of transcendental axioms. Derrida’s argument about 
Husserl has not changed essentially- it concerns the necessity of acknowledging 
differance and iterability as the condition of possibility for phenomenology- presence 
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has to be mediated by non-presence, and axioms have to be mediated through 
contingency and undecidability through history and the empirical. Derrida’s 
contribution to phenomenology thus has been the acknowledgement of the quasi-
transcendental and differance which are essential to determining presence as meta-
conditions. Derrida does not critique presence but he examines the conditions of 
possibility in which presence and logocentrism are made possible – which he names 
as differance, iterability and the quasi-transcendental. Throughout his career as we see 
an affirmation of the same principles in which he uses to critique Husserl at the 
beginning and end of his career. Derrida’s concern has been to discover 
temporalization as necessary to the establishing of presence, as well as to affirm that 
iterability, and hence incalculability, is necessary to determining transcendental 
axioms and presence. Over a vast career hence, Derrida has been concerned to save 
phenomenology from its aporias and contradictions rather than to destroy or invert 
phenomenology as critics have alleged. He does this by discovering the meta-
conditions of phenomenology- differance, the quasi-transcendental, and iterability. 
In this section I have examined Levinas’ turn to an ethical phenomenology in 
his call to take the Other into account in his phenomenology as the Other exerts an 
ethical demand for responsibility for one. I then examined how Derrida does not think 
Levinas manages to escape metaphysics but repeats it as a Jewish variation of the 
Greek metaphysics as radical empiricism or non-philosophy. Derrida’s contribution to 
phenomenology, as discussed in earlier chapters, is the discovery of the quasi-
transcendental or differance which enables phenomenology rather than privileging 
either Jew or Greek philosophy because philosophy is neither but situated between 
these intervals as differance.
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In this chapter I have examined Ricoeur and Levinas’ turn to an ethical 
phenomenology in their emphasis on intersubjectivity and integrating the Other into 
phenomenology. Derrida would argue however that this overcoming of ipseity and 
being and essence as a form of non-philosophy repeats metaphysics as a Jewish 
variant and inscribes metaphysics negatively and thus does not manage to escape 
metaphysics. Derrida’s quasi-transcendental, the difference between philosophy and 
non-philosophy, or the difference between Jew and Greek, is then shown to be the 
grounding conditionality of philosophy and phenomenology as differance. Derrida 
thus performs a meta-phenomenology rather than a reversed phenomenology or a 
negative phenomenology as Riceour and Levinas had done. As I have argued in this 
chapter, the difference between the transcendental and empirical is paradoxically a 
non-difference, or a sameness. The impossibility of the distinction between the 
transcendental and empirical is its own possibility as these are separated by 
differance, an interval which is a nothingness. Hence, the transcendental and the 
empirical are the same. This demonstration of the similarity between transcendental 
and empirical democratizes phenomenology as radical empiricisms such as Ricoeur 
and Levinas’ are shown to repeat metaphysics rather than escaping from it, or 
overcoming it, as an empirical idealism is not distinct from a transcendental idealism,
but a repetition of it. As I have argued earlier in my chapter on Husserl, 
transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion. The transcendental and empirical 
are simultaneously identical and non-identical as the distinction translates into a 
sameness, paradoxically, difference translates into non-difference and thus 
transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. Derrida has thus democratized 
phenomenology in showing radical empirical empiricisms such as Levinas’ and 
Ricoeur’s are the same and repetitions of metaphysics rather than deviations or 
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subversions of it. As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth is then 
shown to be neither transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-transcendental, the 
interval between the transcendental and empirical which conditions the thinking of 
both. It is the aporia between the transcendental and empirical which enables the 
thinking of both as transcendental is nothing outside the empirical through iterability 
and differance. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it 
was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or empirical signs in 
converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in 
simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The necessity for the 
quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical makes it 
impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation depends on the 
other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no transcendental, then it 
would be impossible to distinguish, as Levinas and Ricoeur do, a pure empirical 
situatedness and idealism from it. The transcendental thus inhabits the empirical even 
as it is separated from it through the written mark or quasi-transcendental. There is 
thus no empirical without the transcendental as these exist through a dynamic relation 
of iterability, repetition with a difference and differance. It is archi-writing, or the 
system of differences that determines the structure of metaphysics, relaying signifier 
to signifier in an infinite chain of supplements. Empirical is thus the trace of the 
transcendental just as transcendental is the trace of the empirical. These cannot exist 
in isolation from each other. Levinas and Ricoeur require the transcendental to 
exclude it from their radical empiricisms. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology in a 
more powerful form through his discovery of the quasi-transcendental as it would be 
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impossible to distinguish the transcendental and empirical without the quasi-
transcendental and the law of iterability. The transcendental is simultaneously the 
empirical, and hence it is impossible to separate the transcendental from the empirical. 
The quasi-transcendental thus enables phenomenology by instituting the possibility of 
the distinction between the transcendental and empirical and the impossibility of their 
separation.
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Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot’s negative phenomenology
In this chapter I will be examining the negative phenomenologies of Merleau-
Ponty and Blanchot. I will argue that their reversals of phenomenology repeat its 
metaphysical structure rather than managing to escape it. In place, Derrida discovers 
the quasi-transcendental, or that which is neither transcendental nor empirical but the 
interval between these, as the condition of possibility for phenomenology. Derrida 
thus inscribes phenomenology in a more powerful form through discovering the 
quasi-transcendental as its condition of possibility as the quasi-transcendental upholds 
the possibility of the transcendental-empirical distinction as well as the impossibility 
of their separation. Merleau-Ponty occupies a mid-point between idealism and 
empiricism, emphasizing instead the intertwining of mind and body as he believes 
perception is embodied – there is no perception that does not interact sensually with 
the body. Merleau-Ponty highlights this condition in Phenomenology of Perception by 
using instances of unusual perception by those afflicted by war injuries or 
pathologies. These instances of distorted perception highlight the inextricably sensual 
nature of perception- perception depends on bodily conditions and if these are subject 
to some sort of affliction- as in the case of Schneider and schizophrenics, perception 
also is affected by these bodily or psychiatric afflictions. 
Merleau-Ponty however, is to be distinguished from Derrida in that his 
phenomenology is a phenomenology of embodiment and explores the intertwining of 
mind and body rather than transcendental-empirical mediation. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology is interested in the embodied and situated character of perception and 
experience, while Derrida is interested in the meta-conditions that enable 
metaphysical production in phenomenology. While Merleau-Ponty’s ecart bears some 
resemblance to Derrida’s differance as these are the points of interaction between 
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transcendental and empirical, mind and body, it is to be distinguished as Merleau-
Ponty is more interested in the intersection of mind and body and the interaction 
between them rather than the phenomenon of repetition Derrida is interested in that 
enables metaphysical production. Derrida argues that all presentation is 
representation, while Merleau-Ponty is interested in the intertwining of mind and 
body and the interaction between them rather than the meta-conditions that enable 
phenomenology.
Merleau-Ponty uses numerous examples of disturbed perception in those 
suffering from physical and mental afflictions to demonstrate that perception is 
inextricable from physical, physiognomic conditions. One instance of this is phantom 
limbs or those who continue to feel the presence of limbs that have been amputated. 
This example would illustrate the inadequacies of empiricism as the phenomenon of 
phantom limbs demonstrate that psychology and memory is a factor in the experience 
of sensation, thus showing us the intertwining of mind and body. 131Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the relation between mind and body is not one of causality but an 
existential relation which intertwines mind and body situated as being in the world.  
The phantom limb is an existential condition of being afflicted by the memory and 
emotion of the lost limb, thus bringing about the bodily sensation of the lost limb, 
demonstrating the inextricable interaction between mind and body. Merleau-Ponty 
thus shows us that perception is an existential condition of being-in-the-world and that 
mind and body interact in significant ways to produce the sensation of a lost limb 
through recollection and memory. Merleau-Ponty further discusses the disturbances of 
perception in a wounded soldier Schneider whose vision, mental-processing 
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functions, and sexual function have been impaired due to a bullet injury at the back of 
his head. Reading from Merleau-Ponty:
We notice that Schneider’s motor disturbances are associated with large scale 
deficiency of knowledge gained by visual means. We are therefore tempted to regard 
psychological blindness as a distinctive variety of pure tactile behaviour, and since 
consciousness of bodily space and abstract movement, which has potential space in 
view, are almost totally absent, we are inclined to conclude that the sense of touch 
alone give us no experience of objective space. We shall then say that touch by itself 
is not of a kind to provide a background to movement, that is to say, to set out in form 
of the moving subject his departure and arrival points in strict simultaneity. The 
patient tries to provide for himself a “kinaesthetic background” by means of 
prepatory movements, and is successful in this “marking” the position of his body at 
the outset and in launching into the movement, yet this kinaesthetic background is 
precarious, and could not possibly equal the visual background in constantly relating 
motion to its points of departure and arrival throughout the movement’s duration. It is 
thrown out of gear by the movement itself and needs to be restored after each phase 
of the movement. That is to why, as we might put it, Schneider’s abstract movements 
have lost their melodic flow, why they are made up fragments placed end to end, and 
why they often “run off the rails” on that way. The practical field which Schneider 
lacks is non other than the visual field. 132
Merleau-Ponty notes that because of Schneider’s visual impairment, Schneider has 
lost his sense of space and his abstract movements have lost their flow. Touch alone is 
insufficient to give Scheider a sense of objective space. Here we note that due to the 
physical impairment of Schneider- his lost of sight, perception is affected- he has lost 
his sense of objective space which results in awkward movements which have lost 
their melodic flow. Perception is thus inextricably linked with the condition of the 
body, and where sight is impaired, other senses of perception such as objective space 
are impaired as well. Reading further on Schneider:
The relationship between matter and form is called in phenomenological terminology 
a relationship of Fundierung: the symbolic function rests on the visual as a ground; 
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not that vision is its cause, but because it is that gift of nature which Mind was called 
upon to make use of beyond all hope, to which it was to give a fundamentally new 
meaning, yet which was needed, not only to incarnate, but in order to be at all. Form 
integrates within itself the content until the latter finally appears as a mere mode of 
form itself, and the historical stages leading up to thought as a ruse of Reason 
disguised as Nature. But conversely, even in its intellectual sublimation, content 
remains in the nature of a radical contingency, the initial establishment or foundation 
of knowledge and action, the first laying hold of being or value, whose concrete 
richness will never be finally exhausted by knowledge and action, and whose 
spontaneous method they will ceaselessly apply. The dialectic of form and content is 
what we have to restore, or rather, since “reciprocal action” is as yet only a 
compromise with casual thought, and a contradictory principle, we have to describe 
the circumstances under which this contradiction is conceivable, which means 
existence, the perceptual re-ordering of fact and hazard by a reason non-existent 
before and without those circumstances.133
Again Merleau-Ponty highlights the relation between matter and form as being one of 
interaction and reciprocal action rather than causality as traditional transcendental 
phenomenologies would have had it. Form is intertwined with content and inseparable 
from it, just as mind is nothing outside body. It remains however a contingent 
relation, a foundation of knowledge and action which will never be exhausted by 
knowledge and action. Form is inextricable and inseparable from content, involved in 
a reciprocal relation, as mind is intertwined with body. Derrida however would not 
suggest the intertwinement or inextricability of mind and body in order to collapse it 
into a corporeality or a radical empiricism like Merleau-Ponty but emphasize that the 
transcendental and empirical are separated by nothing, or differance. Merleau-Ponty’s 
emphasis on intertwining and corporeality is a collapse into empirical idealism when 
Derrida demonstrates that such an empirical idealism is no different from 
transcendental idealism, as the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical and 
                                               
133Ibid., 145-147
264
nothing separates the transcendental and empirical. As argued in the Husserl chapters, 
transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. The transcendental and empirical 
are simultaneously identical and non-identical as their difference translates into a 
sameness or a non-distinction.
Schneider’s impaired vision affects his perception of mental space and 
practical space, so the embodied nature of Schneider’s perception causes his damaged 
vision to distort his perception of space as well. From this we see that perception is 
embodied and contingent upon the function and status of the body, mind and body 
interact to produce perception which is in Schneider’s case, distorted because of his 
afflicted vision. Reading further on Schneider:
If we want to observe what underlies the ‘symbolic function’ itself, we must first of 
all realize that even intelligence is not reconcilable with intellectualism. What impairs 
thought in Schneider’s case is not that he is incapable of perceiving concrete data as 
specimens of a unique eidos, or of subsuming them under some category, but on the 
contrary, that he can relate them only by quite explicit subsumption.134
Merleau-Ponty argues against intellectualist accounts of perception as well in the 
above example by arguing that living thought does not exist in subsuming under 
categories as Schneider is unable to apprehend the analogy between them as sense 
organs until he relates it to language. In this case the senses do not categorize 
according to the object’s function as the intellectualist account of perception would 
have it, Schneider’s damaged cognition makes him unable to draw an analogy 
between eye and ear until he relates it not through sense and perception or judgement 
but through the processes of language. Hence as we have seen above in earlier 
examples, Merleau-Ponty finds both intellectualist and empiricist accounts of 
knowledge inadequate as perception is rather the intertwining and interaction of mind 
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and body, in this case the mediating capacity for language, which enables perception 
rather than solely either intellectualist or empiricist accounts of knowledge. Merleau-
Ponty elaborates further on Schneider’s deficiencies. Merleau-Ponty documents the 
range of Schneider’s disturbances in perception as a result of his injury- he is blind to 
numbers or does not understand their significance, only performing counting and 
sums as rituals and habit that have no meaning to him. He is sexually dysfunctional. 
He only goes out on the spur of habit and errand rather than any intentional desire. He 
is incapable of forming political or religious views. He has to will his body to move 
and plan his speeches in advance. He cannot act or imagine a situation outside reality 
and thus is ‘tied’ to reality. The “intentional arc” which brings together the unity of 
the senses and intelligence, or sensibility and motility, has gone limp in illness as 
Schneider’s sensual- intellectual processing is disturbed, for instance he no longer has 
any sense of time. All the above demonstrate that mind is inextricably linked to body 
and hence when one suffers from a physical or physiognomic affliction such as 
Schneider’s, there will be disturbances in sense perception as well. Perception is 
embodied as Schneider’s case all too painfully illustrates.
Merleau-Ponty highlights the intertwining of mind and body and their 
inextricability, and hence emphasizes corporeal situatedness of mind in body. 
However this corporeal situatedness translates into empiricism which does not differ 
from idealism upon close examination, as the transcendental-empirical difference is 
an illusion. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on corporeality and situated modes of knowing 
commits phenomenology to an empirical basis, which suppresses aporia and 
differerance. This is because the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, just 
as the empirical is just the repeated trace of the transcendental. Nothing separates the 
transcendental and empirical as transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. The 
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difference between the transcendental and empirical translates into a paradoxical 
sameness as the transcendental and empirical are simultaneously identical and non-
identical, similar and different. The quasi-transcendental inscribes this opposition as a 
simultaneous sameness because nothing separates the transcendental and empirical. 
The quasi-transcendental is both the grounds of possibility and impossibility of the 
distinction between the transcendental and empirical, lending to phenomenology an 
aspect of heterogeneity and undecidability, because truth translates as aporia and that 
which is neither transcendental nor empirical. This is the quasi-transcendental, the 
limit, spacing and trace between the transcendental and empirical which allows the 
thinking of both and allows metaphysics to function. It is the quasi-transcendental or 
the written mark, functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics 
as it is the conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the 
condition of impossibility for designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or 
expressive signs, or empirical signs in converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the 
transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and 
non-identity. The necessity for the quasi-transcendental to distinguish the 
transcendental and empirical makes it impossible to separate transcendental and 
empirical as each separation depends on the other term for the distinction to be 
upheld. If there were no transcendental, then it would be impossible to distinguish, as 
Merleau-Ponty does, a pure empirical situatedness and idealism from it. The 
transcendental thus inhabits the empirical even as it is separated from it through the 
written mark or quasi-transcendental. Merleau-Ponty thus requires the transcendental 
to exclude it from his corporeality and radical empiricism. Empirical only exists in 
relation to transcendental through iterability and differance. Merleau-Ponty thus needs 
to acknowledge the quasi-transcendental as a condition of possibility for his 
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phenomenology to inscribe it more powerfully. Merleau-Ponty excludes from his 
phenomenology that which is necessary to thinking it as the transcendental needs to 
exist in order for the distinction between the empirical to be upheld. Merleau-Ponty 
thus needs to acknowledge that his empirical does not exist outside its relation to the 
transcendental through iterability and diferance.
Merleau-Ponty, while emphasizing inextricability of mind and body, lapses 
into privileging corporeality and empirical situatedness of mind in body. Such a move 
suppresses the quasi-transcendental and iterability as the true condition of possibility 
of metaphysics. As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, an empirical 
idealism like Merleau-Ponty’s repeats rather than diverges from metaphysics. 
Transcendental and empirical are repetitions, rather than anti-thetical to each other. 
The transcendental and empirical only exist in relation to each other through 
differance and iterability. The quasi-transcendental, which is the limit, spacing and 
trace which upholds metaphysics and allows metaphysics to function, is the true 
condition of metaphysics as the transcendental has to exist only in and through the 
empirical. An empirical idealism like Merleau-Ponty’s thus suppresses aporia and 
differance and fails to acknowledge that it borrows entirely from the ontological 
structure and vocabulary of metaphysics, hence repeating metaphysics rather than 
truly departing or diverging from it.
Merleau-Ponty in emphasizing corporeality and embodiment thus lapses into 
empiricism, which is essentially the same as idealism as the difference between the 
transcendental and empirical translates into a non-difference or sameness. The 
empirical is not conceivable outside the dynamic relation of iterability and differance 
which relate the transcendental and empirical. Truth is not to be situated as either 
transcendental or empirical, because such a move suppresses aporia and differance. 
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Truth translates rather as that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, or the 
quasi-transcendental, the limit, spacing and trace which allows the thinking of both.
The empirical idealism of Merleau-Ponty thus reinscribes metaphysics by 
instituting a distinction which collapses through the movement of the trace and 
differance, which designates the a priori distinction between the transcendental and 
empirical as a repetition of the same. The transcendental does not exist outside the 
empirical, just as the empirical is the repeated trace of the transcendental through 
iterability. Merleau-Ponty does not differ from Husserl as transcendental and 
empirical are repetitions of the same through iterability. Derrida thus democratizes 
phenomenology in showing that Merleau-Ponty does not differ essentially from 
Husserl despite seeking to reverse phenomenology.
In this section I have examined Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
embodiment. Merleau-Ponty argues that mind and body are intertwined and interact to 
produce sensation and critiques the limitations of both intellectualist and empiricist 
modes of knowledge. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is a function of one’s existential 
being in the world and one’s embodied state. This shift towards an emphasis on 
corporeality and being-in-the-world Derrida would find a form of non-philosophy in 
its emphasis on body and intersubjectivity in place of being and thus, as argued 
earlier, a repetition rather than a reversal of metaphysics and philosophy. Derrida 
locates the condition of phenomenology and philosophy as the quasi-transcendental or 
the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy, thus performing meta-
phenomenology rather than inverting or negating phenomenology as Levinas, Ricoeur 
and Merleau-Ponty do. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on corporeality marks his 
philosophy as a radical empiricism or non-philosophy, while Derrida would take pains 
to suggest radical empiricism is essentially the same as transcendental idealism, and 
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the difference or differance between them is nothing.This is because the 
transcendental exists only through the empirical in the dynamic relation of iterability, 
the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, just as the empirical is the 
repeated trace of the transcendental and does not exist outside of it. As transcendental-
empirical difference is an illusion, truth is neither transcendental nor empirical, but 
quasi-transcendental, the spacing between the transcendental and empirical which 
enables the thinking of both. The impossibility of the distinction between Merleu-
Ponty’s corporeal phenomenology and Husserl’s transcendental idealism is its own 
possibility as transcendental and empirical are the same, separated by a difference 
which is not a difference, differance. The aporia between the transcendental and 
empirical enables the thinking of both as differance and iterability determine the 
distinction between the transcendental and empirical as a non-distinction. In place of a 
negative phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty, Derrida thus performs a meta-
phenomenology in discovering the conditions of possibility for phenomenology to be 
differance, the quasi-transcendental and iterability. Derrida thus inscribes 
phenomenology more powerfully as it is made reflexive of its own conditions of 
possibility that enable its production and functioning.
Blanchot’s phenomenology of suffering in Writing of the Disaster
Blanchot was an enigmatic and influential French literary theorist whose 
friendship with Emanuel Levinas decisively influenced Blanchot’s notion of suffering 
and trauma, particularly post-war trauma following the Holocaust captured in 
Blanchot’s Writing of the Disaster. Blanchot’s The Writing of the Disaster is an 
endless conversation with Levinas in which the philosopher’s terms of art (for 
example “responsibility”) are inscribed in writing as though from an unknown 
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language which we speak counter to our heart and to life, unjustifiably135. Levinas 
defines responsibility as responsibility for the Other, which Blanchot takes up as an 
encumberment and a weighty burden considering the demands the Other exerts on the 
self, particularly considering the relation of assymetrical power and suffering suffered 
at the hands of the dominating Nazis. Like Levinas, Blanchot’s concern with 
Otherness and alterity derives from a Jewish idiom. Though Blanchot reverses 
Levinas’ notion of responsibility as encumberment, defining the self as ‘hostage’ in 
relation to the Other,  the concern is the same: a Jewish reaction to the horror of the 
holocaust and an ethics that is elaborated in a Jewish idiom as a reaction to the Other 
as hostile and murderous. Blanchot’s concern with “the disaster” derives wholly from 
the horrors of Jewish torture at the hands of the Nazis during the holocaust.
In Writing of the Disaster, Blanchot describes the worker’s position as one of 
subjection and passivity, and total subsumption in the role, of total oppression and 
control by the Other. One is made hostage to the Other, who dominates, alienates, and 
effaces one’s subjectivity, crushing the self out of existence. In his dialogue with 
Levinas, Blanchot posits that the very act of predicating Self and Other involves a 
certain violence in reducing the Other to an aspect of the Same and that the 
relationship between Self and Other is one of a constant struggle for supremacy and 
power, with the Other holding one hostage. Blanchot’s theory of resistance to this 
Other who encumbers and enslaves is the call to active resistance:
“ I must answer for the persecution that opens me to the longest patience and which is 
in me the anonymous passion, not only by taking it upon myself, regardless of my 
own consent; I must also answer it with refusal, resistance and combat. I must come 
back to knowledge, I must return (if possible -- for it may be that there is no return) to 
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the I that knows and knows it is exposed, not to the Other but to the adverse I, to 
egotistical Omnipotence, to murderous will”136
This is a transcendence of the dialetic of self and Other to enter the space of the 
neuter- the space outside language and this space exists in writing, or literature.
This resistance is a call for the active reclamation of free will and agency, a 
reclaiming back of the ego that has been demolished by the Other as it were. The 
Other crushes and effaces the self out of existence with his demands and the 
imposition on his will over the self’s own, and in Blanchot’s context, is hostile 
because he imposes his asymmetrical relation of power upon one, trapping one in a 
master-slave dialectic.  
According to Blanchot, rather than remaining a subject, one should overcome 
the role one is designated in the master-slave dialectic by refusing to be reduced to the 
role of the subservient, of acknowledging the irreducibility of bread as bread. In the 
relation of master and servant, bread becomes a symbol of the worker’s need and the 
master’s provision for the servant thus concretizing his relationship of mastery and 
power. By acknowledging the irreducibility of bread as bread, one transcends the 
master-servant relationship by refusing to recognize himself simply in the position of 
subject or worker, bread being an item that is not reducible to the worker’s need, but 
free of the role designated by the dominatory, this act of resistance by refusing to 
acknowledge one’s role in the dialectic comes in the form of testimony and survival 
speech. Blanchot’s response to the crushing self-alienation that results from one’s 
responsibility to the Other is thus a call to the transcendence of one’s role in the 
master-slave dialectic.  The master slave dialectic is the asymmetrical relation of 
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bondage one finds oneself in when placed in a relationship of Levinisan responsibility 
to the Other, and it is transcended through escaping the language of the dominatory in 
testimony and survival speech. In raising the Other to absolute however, Blanchot 
reverses and repeats metaphysics. We have demonstrated in preceding chapters that 
the transcendental does not exist outside the empirical but in a dynamic relation of 
iterability or repetition with a difference. Blanchot’s raising of Other to absolute 
repeats metaphysics, as elevating the Other over the Same reinscribes metaphysical 
distinctions, when no distinction actually exists as the transcendental and empirical 
are essentially the same. The trace relates the transcendental and empirical in a 
difference which is not a difference but a sameness. Nothing separates the 
transcendental and empirical. Blanchot requires the exclusion of the self as absolute in 
order to establish the Other as absolute. Blanchot thus paradoxically requires the 
transcendental self which he expels from his philosophy to establish his empiricism 
and Other-directed philosophy. Truth is thus neither transcendental nor empirical, but 
quasi-transcendental as the empirical absolute of Blanchot cannot function without the 
transcendental which he needs to expel in order to establish his philosophy. The 
empirical idealism of Blanchot in his emphasis on Other as absolute can only exist in 
relation to the transcendental which he needs to exclude in order to establish his 
philosophy. The thinking of Blanchot’s empirical thus paradoxically requires the 
thinking of the transcendental as its point of exclusion in order for the distinction to 
be upheld.
Disaster is all-consuming and overwhelms one like a blanket force. Disaster is 
an encounter in which one suffers trauma and is victimized, in Blanchot’s context it is 
particularly acute in encountering the Other. The Disaster for Blanchot is the situation 
in which one is relegated to a position of passivity and victimization in encountering 
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the Other. Disaster effaces subjectivity and leads one to suffer in the Oppression of 
the other. Blanchot’s account of suffering is demonstrated through his readings of the 
disaster and suffering of the afflicted in the aftermath. Active forgetting is the 
conscious effort made to expel traumatic experience from memory, which one, 
according to Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, is doomed to repeat.   
As Blanchot puts it:
If forgetfulness precedes memory or perhaps founds it, it or has no connection with it 
at all, then to forget is not simply weakness, a failing, an absence or void (the starting 
point of recollection but a starting which, like an anticipatory shade, would obscure 
remembrance in its very possibility, restoring the memorable to its fragility and 
memory to the loss of memory. No, forgetfulness would be not emptiness, but neither 
negative nor positive: the passive demand that it neither welcomes nor withdraws the 
past, but, designating there what has never taken place (just as it indicates in the yet 
to come that which will never be able to find its place in any present, refers us to 
nonhistorical forms of time, to the other of all tenses, to their eternal or eternally 
provisional indecision, bereft of destiny, without presence 137
Alterity is the space beyond experience that is brought about by forgetfulness, it is the 
step beyond experience in the effort to transcend suffering. “The disaster ruins 
everything,” writes Blanchot. Disaster is a phantom that has destroyed and yet its 
marks of destruction are invisible, leaving suffering and trauma in its wake.
What should be observed here is that the disaster here cannot be considered 
apart from its writing. Disaster is only confronted through the act of memory when 
one inscribes it in writing. Writing delimits the event and brings it into consciousness 
as something to be worked through. Trauma is a missed event, and it is only in 
writing, as it were, that one confronts the disaster. Writing bears witness to the 
disaster, circumscribes it and delimits it to an place in memory to be worked through. 
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It is a call to active forgetting, to consciously move beyond the disaster through 
working through it in writing. One could say then, that the only place left to the 
disaster, the only place it is to be “seen”, would be the space of literature, the space of 
the imaginary. For Blanchot however, such an imaginary space is not deprived of 
reality but contains an excess of the real. Writing is a visceral experience in which, 
through the repetition of the event, its ultimate reality is confronted and worked 
through. Testimony occupies this space of literature, which is the step outside 
dominatory language.  As we have previously seen with work, Blanchot’s 
acknowledgement of the irreducibility of bread as bread, one steps outside the 
language of the dominatory in the act of testimony and survival speech, thus escaping 
the violence of dominatory language.  
To transcend the disaster is to escape the language of the dominatory through 
escaping the bounds of thought that exert the asymmetric power-relation of the 
dominatory. Through testimony and survival speech, one escapes ordinary language 
into the space of literature and the space of writing, where the Other’s power is 
transcended. One must note however from Derrida’s viewpoint, that this overcoming 
of the Other, far from escaping the Other, is a repetition of it as the transcendental and 
empirical are the same, nothing separates the transcendental and the empirical. Self 
and Other are the same, because the trace that relates Self to Other erases the 
difference between the two and institutes the difference between Self and Other as a 
difference which is paradoxically not a difference, but a sameness. Blanchot requires 
the expulsion of the absolute Self from his philosophy in order to establish it as an 
empiricism, hence Blanchot paradoxically lands his philosophy in an aporia by 
defining Other without Self as Other only exists in relation to Self. Blanchot’s 
empirical Other can only exist in relation to the transcendent Self, hence Blanchot 
275
needs to acknowledge the quasi-transcendental, which enables transcendental 
empirical distinction and the impossibility of their separation as the transcendental is 
simultaneously the empirical. Blanchot’s empiricism can only stand as a distinction 
upheld by excluding the transcendental, hence it requires that which his philosophy 
negates paradoxically.
Blanchot writes of the Other:
In the relation of myself to the Other, the Other exceeds my grasp, The Other, the 
Separate, the Most-High which escapes my power- the powerless, therefore; the 
stranger, dispossessed. But, in the relation of the Other to me, everything seems to 
reverse itself the distant becomes the close-by, this proximity becomes the obsession 
that afflicts me, that weighs fown upon me, that separates me from myself- as if 
separation (which measured the transcendence from me to the Other)- did its work 
within me, dis-identifying me, abandoning me to passivity, leaving me without any 
initiative and bereft of the present. And then, the other becomes rather the Overlord, 
indeed the Persecutor, he who overwhelms, encumbers, undoes me, he who puts me 
in his debt no less than he attacks me by making me answer for his crimes, by 
charging me with measureless responsibility which cannot be mine since it extends 
all the way to ‘substitution,” So it is that, from this point of view, the relation of the 
Other to me would tend to appear as sadomasochistic, if it did not cause us to fall 
prematurely out of the world- the one region where ‘normal’ and ‘anomaly’ have 
meaning.138
In the above passage Blachot raises the Other to absolute, as the persecutor and 
oppressor of the self which leaves the self encumbered, overwhelmed and bereft of 
identity. In reversing the relation to self and Other and raising the Other as absolute 
however, Blanchot reinscribes metaphysics as a negative. The Other as absolute is no 
different from the self as absolute. Blanchot thus reinscribes phenomenology as the 
oppression of the Other as absolute, but does not manage to escape metaphysics as the 
Other is merely a substitute for the self as absolute, reversing the relation merely 
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reinscribes metaphysics as a negative, which is no different from the positive. The 
Other as oppressor, overlord and persecutor thus inscribes metaphysics as a negative 
rather than managing to overcome metaphysics as the Other is inscribed as absolute in 
place of the self. Blanchot’s radical empiricism is no different from transcendental 
idealism as transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, as we have 
demonstrated in the Husserl chapters. Blanchot inverts metaphysics only to repeat it. 
Radical empiricism, or an Other-directed phenomenology, does not differ essentially 
from transcendental idealism, as transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. 
The transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, just as the empirical is but the 
repeated trace of the transcendental. Transcendental and empirical only exist in 
relation to each other in differance and iterability. Hence, an inversion of metaphysics 
does not escape it as it borrows entirely from its ontological structure and vocabulary. 
Blanchot’s Other-directed phenomenology inscribes metaphysics as a negative, which 
is no different from the positive since transcendental-empirical difference is an 
illusion. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it was 
transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or empirical signs in 
converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in 
simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The necessity for the 
quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical makes it 
impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation depends on the 
other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no transcendental, then it 
would be impossible to distinguish, as Blanchot does, a pure empirical idealism from 
it. The transcendental thus inhabits the empirical even as it is separated from it 
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through the written mark or quasi-transcendental. Blanchot requires the transcendental 
and absolute self to distinguish it from his radical empiricism and emphasis on Other 
directed phenomenology. Empirical only exists in relation to transcendental through 
iterability and differance. Blanchot thus paradoxically excludes that which is 
necessary to thinking his phenomenology as his empiricism can only exist in relation 
to the transcendental through iterability and differance. 
Blanchot’s phenomenology thus builds largely on Levinas’ but is more 
concerned with a theory of suffering at the hands of the Other who takes one hostage 
and is an encumberment to one in terms of the responsibility the Other demands on 
one. Blanchot’s neuter is to be distinguished from Derrida’s quasi-transcendental in 
that Blanchot’s neuter is a space of moral ambivalence, while Derrida’s quasi-
transcendental is the enabling condition of metaphysics as differance. Blanchot is thus 
more concerned with morality and an ethics of responsibility, not unlike Levinas, 
while Derrida is concerned with a meta-phenomenology and the conditions of 
possibility of phenomenology. Differance, or nothing, separates the transcendental 
and the empirical. As argued previously, the transcendental is nothing outside the 
empirical as repetitions of the same, or iterability. Self cannot exist without a relation 
to Other just as the Other exists only in relation to self, Blanchot’s raising of the Other 
to absolute in his phenomenology is but a reversal of metaphysics which repeats it 
rather than escaping it. Blanchot’s inversion of the self-Other relation in which the 
Other is raised to an absolute totality repeats metaphysics by merely inverting its 
structure. Blanchot’s radicical empiricism of Other as absolute repeats metaphysics as 
the transcendental and empirical are the same through iterability, nothing separates 
the transcendental and empirical, hence Blanchot reverses metaphysics only to repeat 
it. The impossibility of the distinction between the transcendental and empicial is its 
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site of possibility, as Blanchot’s empirical Otherness is no different from Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism as differance between transcendental and empirical separates 
nothing. A reversal of metaphysics repeats it and hence affirms metaphysics.
In this chapter I have examined the negative phenomenologies of Merleau-
Ponty and Blanchot. Negative phenomenologies repress differance as the 
transcendental and the empirical are repetitions of the same through iterability. I 
would argue, as I argued previously with Levinas and Ricoeur, that a negative 
phenomenology or a reversal of phenomenology repeats it rather than managing to 
escape it.This is because it still proceeds within its metaphysical vocabulary and 
ontological structure. Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot thus, in inverting and reversing 
phenomenology, only repeat it by borrowing entirely from its metaphysical 
vocabulary and structure. Derrida’s phenomenology in place, is a meta-
phenomenology in discovering the origin of phenomenology as differance, or the 
difference between philosophy and non-philosophy, transcendental and empirical. 
Derrida, as I have argued in the previous chapter on Levinas and Ricoeur, discovers 
the condition of possibility for phenomenology as the quasi-transcendental, or the 
interval between the transcendental and empirical which conditions phenomenology 
in its entirety. The transcendental and empirical are paradoxically identical and non-
identical because the difference translates into sameness. The trace, which 
distinguishes the transcendental and empirical, translates into a difference which is 
paradoxically not a difference but a sameness. As this thesis has argued, the 
transcendental and empirical distinction is an illusion. The impossibility of the 
distinction between the transcendental and empirical is its own possibility as
transcendental and empirical are the same. It is the aporia between the transcendental 
and empirical which enables the thinking of both as transcendental is nothing outside 
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the empirical through differance and iterability. The empirical idealisms of Merleau-
Ponty and Blanchot thus reinscribe metaphysics by instituting a distinction which 
collapses through the movement of the trace and differance, which designates the a 
priori distinction between the transcendental and empirical as a repetition of the same.
The transcendental does not exist outside the empirical, just as the empirical is the 
repeated trace of the transcendental through iterability. Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot 
thus do not differ from Husserl as transcendental and empirical are repetitions of the 
same through iterability. Derrida thus democratizes phenomenology in showing that 
Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot do not differ essentially from Husserl despite seeking to 
reverse phenomenology. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning
as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of 
transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for 
designating an exclusive sphrere of idealism or expressive signs, or empirical signs in 
converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in 
simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The necessity for the 
quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical makes it 
impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation depends on the 
other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no transcendental, then it 
would be impossible to distinguish, as Blanchot and Merleau-Ponty do, a pure 
empirical situatedness and idealism from it. The transcendental thus inhabits the 
empirical even as it is separated from it through the written mark or quasi-
transcendental. Transcendental and empirical exist only in and through each other 
through a dynamic relation of iterability, repetition with a difference and differance.
Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot require the transcendental to exclude it from their radical 
empiricisms. They thus need to acknowledge that their empiricisms can only exist in 
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relation to the transcendental that they need to exclude from their philosophies in 
order to define their empiricisms. Truth is then localizable to neither transcendental 
nor empirical as these exist only in dynamic relation to each other through differance 
and iterability, but is situated in the paradoxical space between as quasi-
transcendental, the limit between the transcendental and empirical that allows the 
thinking of both. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology in a more powerful form 
through his discovery of the quasi-transcendental as its condition of possibility as it 
would be impossible to distinguish the transcendental and empirical without it and 
phenomenology would not function without the quasi-transcendental as the 
transcendental is simultaneously the empirical, coming into being only through 
iterability. Derrida thus brings phenomenology to terms with its own condition of 
possibility through his positing of the quasi-transcendental.
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Derrida’s Deconstruction of Jean-Luc Nancy
In On Touching Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida brings together many 
phenomenological themes we have been discussing throughout this thesis. I will 
discuss the condition of possibility for phenomenology in this chapter as iterability, 
differance and the quasi-transcendental. Derrida discusses his notion of aporia as 
fundamental to his conception of phenomenology. Thus while Jean-Luc Nancy 
privileges touch and deconstructs Christianity, Derrida demonstrates that his position 
is quasi-transcendental, neither intuitionist as Husserl nor corporeal as Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Merleau-Ponty would have it, neither Christian nor non-Christian, but a 
space between. Indeed Derrida argues that Jean-Luc Nancy, in privileging 
corporeality and touch, shares much in common with Merleau-Ponty.
Derrida argues that while Jean-Luc Nancy seeks to deconstruct Christianity 
and thus deviate from it, one can never be certain that there is no transcendental 
beyond. 139 Derrida thus again posits undecidability and unpredictability as the only 
certainties one has. Derrida argues that the spirit of Christianity, while being purged 
from Heidegger’s text through his destruction, haunts it, just as Christianity haunts the 
text of Jean-Luc Nancy. A reversal of metaphysics and spirit, only repeats it as a 
ghostly double of the text that returns to haunt it. Derrida also argues that unless 
Christianity can be adequately exemplified by the empirical manifestations of 
Christian culture, deconstruction of Christianity itself remains an infinite task as 
Christianity is a faith in things unseen and spiritual rather than its concrete 
manifestation in Christian culture. Derrida thus demonstrates that Christianity remains 
undeconstructible in its concrete manifestation because it is about a transcendental 
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beyond that exceeds the empirical rather than that which can be adequately 
represented by the empirical.
Derrida asserts that it is impossible to determine if Psyche is extended as she 
“knows nothing of this” and “nothing of herself”. 140 Derrida argues that psyche is 
characterized by paradox- she is tangible and yet untouchable. Psyche cannot be 
reduced to touch, as this is a simple reversal of the phenomenological reduction, a 
reduction of the intelligible to the sensible. Whereas metaphysics is characterized 
rather by iterability, or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical. Psyche is 
not separable from touch or reducible to it, psyche can only be mediated through 
touch. Psyche’s extension marks an aporia and paradox where the sensible and 
intelligible are conjoined through the passage of differance, hence it is insufficient to 
lapse into transcendental idealism like Descartes and Husserl or empiricism like 
Levinas, Blanchot, Ricoeur, Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty. This thesis has argued that 
truth is neither transcendental or empirical, but quasi-transcendental, the difference 
between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thought of both. Psyche 
is not reducible to extension, nor is psyche reducible to pure mind or spirit as a 
disembodied consciousness. This was argued in the chapters on Husserl on the 
occasions that he performs the phenomenological reduction, because disembodied 
mind translates into an absurdity. Psyche has to be incarnated in extension and body 
through iterability, it knows no existence separate from this corporealized and 
mediated state.
Derrida demonstrates that there is no fundamental difference between Nancy 
and Descartes in their arguments as each reduce phenomenology to either mind or 
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body when it is actually the mediation of mind and body. 141 Derrida argues against 
Descartes that the mind is reducible to one part of the body in his theory of the pineal 
gland. Derrida argues that Nancy’s inversion of mind into a spatialization as body is 
just as contradictory as Descartes’ reduction of mind to one point in the pineal gland. 
Both are reductions. Derrida argues for a quasi-transcendental nature of truth as 
something between an improbable pineal gland and a mouth before speech, instead of 
privileging either mind or body, Derrida argues that truth is neither but the mediation 
or iterability between mind and body. A reduction of mind to body or body to mind 
translates into an absurdity as the transcendental has to be mediated by the empirical. 
This thesis has argued that iterability and signature enables concepts and the ideal to 
come into being, only in and through the real through repetition with a difference. It 
knows no existence outside this mediated and iterable state as there is no difference 
between the transcendental and empirical. Phenomenologists have created an aporia 
by separating the transcendental and empirical when there is no difference between 
them and the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, just as the empirical is 
the necessary trace of the transcendental that brings it into being and does not exist 
outside of it.
Derrida observes the paradox that Freud would affirm transcendental intuition 
rather than negate it as is traditionally supposed. 142 Derrida goes on to note that 
extension as described by Kant is not a purely empirical concept, after subtracting 
empirical qualities from the object such as impenetrability, hardness, colour. There 
still remains the intuitive qualities that form empirical objects such as extension and 
figure. Derrida thus observes that Kant detaches from empiricism the intuition of 
extension and figure which is not reducible to empiricism but precedes it, yet in this 
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detachment, removes essence from its exemplar which lands metaphysics in an 
aporia, without organs, without objective knowledge. Extension is thus ‘not touchable 
through the senses’ – it is not an empirical but an abstract quality, yet is not separable 
from sense. Derrida argues for the conjunction of the transcendental and empirical-
the transcendental is not separable from the empirical- and this prevents the reduction 
of phenomena to pure illusion, as Berkeley discovered, without leading us to the 
paradoxes that Berkeley’s absolute idealism entails in reducing phenomena to pure 
subjectivism. Derrida would argue that the transcendental is only enabled through its 
iteration as the empirical. The aporia of metaphysics is thus resolved by this positing 
of the quasi-transcendental, which is the repetition of the transcendental in the 
empirical. The ideal is nothing outside the real. Concepts are irrevocably mediated, 
only existing through iterability and signature.
Nancy begins by considering the fact that Christianity can be reduced to a 
religion of flesh and blood. Nancy pronounces this an easy task, but Derrida implies 
that it overlooks the transcendental and otherworldly aspects of the religion by 
reducing it to something corporeal and empirical. Derrida describes this expulsion of 
spirit from Christianity as paradoxical : creation without creator, without principle and 
end.  Derrida describes the body as a prosthesis- technics and a technical 
appropriation of the “phenomenological” threshold of the body proper. As body is 
technics and prosthesis, it seems contradictory to describe it as its own rejection 
where one separates mind and body and reduces Christianity to a religion of flesh and 
blood. As Derrida argues, it leads only to paradox, aporia and madness – the rejection 
of spirit is a madness and impossibility for Christianity which is based on such a 
notion of spirit and otherworldliness. 
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Derrida further outlines the paradox of Christianity as a religion of flesh and 
blood- of creation without the creator, and the impossible. 143 It is a madness of flesh 
excised from spirit, in a reduction of Christianity to the material. Derrida terms this 
“corpus of sense and thus in all sense, but without possible totalization”, a madness 
because Christianity excised from spirit and the transcendental beyond is a paradox 
and impossibility. It is simply not conceivable. As Christianity is essentially an 
otherworldly and spiritualized religion, it is impossible to conceive of a material 
Christianity or a Christianity separate from the transcendental beyond that it is 
essentially premised upon. A materialized Christianity is a madness as it overthrows 
the fundamental assumptions about the religion- that a transcendental beyond exists 
and determines the sphere of the empirical. Derrida’s intervention is not that 
Christianity is an impossibility but an impossible possible enabled through differance 
and iterability, Derrida does not dispute the transcendental but only argues that it has 
to incarnated or mediated through the empirical in order to come into being.
Derrida demonstrates the undecidability of truth in a climate of religious 
pluralism. It is impossible to decide between Christianity and Islam, or Judaism; even 
as a globalatinization of Christianity has taken place and Christianity has become the 
universal religion. Derrida argues that non-Christian culture and Christian culture are 
the same rather than mutually exclusive or different. Religions are interchangeable, 
and the universalization or globalatinization of Christianity does not entail its 
Absolute status as truth. The transcendental of Christianity is not determinable as the 
absolute in a climate of religious pluralism because with the effacement of the 
transcendental signified comes democracy, the absolute status of one religion over 
another remains something that cannot be determined and undecidable. 
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To elaborate further on mediation, touching is a paradoxical activity because it 
conjoins the sensible with the intelligible and links the touchable with the 
untouchable. 144The sublime can only be expressed through the finite in thinking, thus 
rendering accessible the untouchable and unthinkable. Imagination enables the 
possibility of the impossible, possibility auto-affecting its essence of non-essence by 
bringing the transcendental into being through iterability and mediation. Imagination 
thus enables the thinking of limit which is otherwise unattainable, a thinking of the 
impossible, a mediation of the transcendental in the empirical through iterability and 
signature.
Derrida argues that his emphasis has been on exemplariness and mediation. He 
has emphasized the example as symptom of metonymy, a part that stands for the 
whole, a figurality and a figural substitute which supplements the whole that he has 
been talking about in elaborating Nancy’s philosophy of touch. 145 Touch can only be 
exemplified through the metonymy of hand as it knows no other instantiation, just as 
the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical it displays itself in as we have been 
discussing in earlier chapters.  
Derrida further elaborates his philosophy of iterability and mediation, eidetic 
intuition is always tactually filled in. 146Hence touching is no longer a cause amongst 
others as it conditions these eidetic intuitions and is coextensive with them. By 
metonymy, touch is a substitute for sensory faculties, which Husserl has bracketed out 
in his eidetic reduction. While Husserl privileges intuition as the experience of the 
present, Derrida argues that touch is precisely what enables the experience of 
presence in general. Husserl’s intuition has to be mediated through the senses in order 





for presence to be experienced, this is what he has omitted in his phenomenological 
reduction.  
Derrida again emphasizes mediation as he cites Husserl trying to examine a 
heart sensation. This heart sensation is a phenomenological localization which is 
distinct from the intuition of extension. As Derrida notes, Husserl seems embarrassed 
to admit the affective warmth the heart sensation connotes as it would imply 
mediation and contradict everything his solipsistic transcendental reduction reduces 
phenomena to in negating the movement of iterability and mediation.  Derrida 
emphasizes that this mediation is a tactile localization. Derrida notes this as an 
experience of touch with touches the untouchable, feels through bodily surfaces, and 
thus can only be enabled through mediation of intuition in sense, or repetition of the 
transcendental in the empirical. 
Derrida examines the debate between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl: 147
Merleau-Ponty argues that experience has to be incarnated in the flesh.  Husserl, with 
his purifying reductionist tendencies, would never concede to his. As Derrida 
appropriates Merleau-Ponty, meaning is figurative and metaphorical, rather than 
idealism or existing in a transcendental solipsistic vacuum devoid of mediation, 
embodiment, incarnation or iterability. Derrida argues that Merleau-Ponty inverts and 
reverses Husserl only to repeat Husserl. While Husserl and Merleau-Ponty take on 
positions which seem directly antithetical to each other- truth is rather quasi-
transcendental, or the space between transcendental and empirical. Derrida argues that 
Merleau-Ponty reappropriates Husserl’s intuitionism of the ego into an Other directed 
and intersubjective phenomenology of corporeality. Derrida argues that this 
substitution of ego with Other is a repetition, no substitution is possible, rather if 
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substitution takes place it is the substitution of non-substitutables as a paradox,  of 
unique egos and unique others, this is Nancy’s paradox of the singular plural. Derrida 
argues that self is not reducible to Other just as the Other is not reducible to the same.
Yet these are related through repetition and iterability. Self is a function of the Other 
as the same and repetition rather than being wholly Other or wholly distinct, as 
Derrida argues with his notion of auto-affection, relation to self as other is the 
foundation and condition of possibility for relating to Others.
On incarnation, Derrida notes that the word leibhaftig turns up in both Husserl 
and Heidegger, 148and yet paradoxically their philosophies do not embrace its 
implications- incarnation implies mediation rather than entailing a privileging of 
transcendental idealism for Husserl or empirical anthropologism like Heidegger. 
Incarnation implies the mediation of the transcendent in living flesh, it is the bridge 
between transcendental and the empirical as the transcendental has to be incarnated as 
living flesh in the empirical in order to exist through iterability, it knows no other 
form of existence. While eidetic intuition is separable from body or flesh, it knows no 
existence outside of it as it has to be incarnated in the empirical to come into being, 
just as Husserl’s history is the incarnation of the condition of possibility of the 
transcendental rather than something reducible, contingent and accidental. Incarnation 
implies iterability- it is not an intertwining of mind with body like Merleau-Ponty 
who is more interested in embodiment and corporeal living conditions of perception, 
but a mediation of the transcendental in the empirical which is the condition of 
possibility for metaphysics  and thus phenomenological thought. Phenomenology has 
failed to recognize this necessity of incarnation, or iterability, and the space beween 
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the transcendental and empirical which mediates both as the quasi-transcendental as 
its very condition of possibility.
Derrida argues that divinity and logos is expressed and incarnated in the 
empirical – God is incarnate through his Son as man. 149Divinity and grace from the 
Father can only be concretely manifested through acts of love exchanged between 
humans and Christ. Chretien acknowledges this when he speaks of veiling, mediacy, 
and the immediacy of human touching. According to Aristotle, man is a tactile being, 
man experiences divinity and the transcendental through touch and empirical acts of 
love.Through his discussion of incarnation, Derrida further highlights iterability as the 
condition of possibility of transcendental genesis. Transcendental has to be incarnated 
through the empirical through repetition with a difference, the transcendental knows 
no existence outside this incarnation or iteration.
Derrida argues that philosophy is constituted by non-philosophy, or differance. 
150It is the experience of the tactile, for example in kissing, that constitutes divininity 
and transcendental experience. It brings into communication two beings through auto-
hetero-affection, for example, through the meeting of eyes, speech and the declaration 
of love, all concrete manifestations of love. Paradoxically as we have examined 
before, the authentic philosophical act is suicide: the condition of life is death as its 
limit, philosophy is determined by non-philosophy, love is constituted by acts of love. 
Through all these run the notion of mediation and the repetition of the transcendental 
in the empirical. This is the quasi-transcendental nature of truth- presence has to be 
bifurcated a priori through absence and determined by non-presence in order to come 
into being. Non-presence, or differance, is the condition and source of philosophy 
rather than its shadow. 




Derrida notes that metaphysics has been characterized by the thinking of limit 
from Aristotle, Hegel and Kant and philosophy, through mediation, brings about the 
thinking of the impossible, the inclusion of outside in the inside, conjoining the 
untouchable with the touchable, the thinking of the intangible. 151To touch is to gain 
access to what otherwise remains a limit and a border, and to transgress to the other 
side, much like deconstruction transgresses philosophy with its thinking of aporia and 
the delimiting of limit, to render accessible and make possible what had been 
previously impossible, deconstruction is the thinking of the impossible possible. 
While Nancy argues that touch is finitude, Derrida argues that touch is a thinking of 
transcendence because touch renders accessible the untouchable, renders tangible acts 
of love as the impossible mediated into the possible, with kissing and the touching of 
eyes. Derrida affirms the paradox of translation and iterability of the infinite in the 
finite with Nancy’s work, as he has done with so many of the phenomenologists we 
have been reading in this thesis. Derrida affirms the aporia of metaphysics that the 
untouchable is rendered only through touch and intangible love is rendered only 
through physical or embodied acts of love. This aporia translates as iterability, or the 
mediation of the transcendental in the empirical which we have been discussing 
extensively in this thesis.
In this chapter we have discussed Derrida’s extensive exploration of 
phenomenology in On Touching Jean-Luc Nancy. Derrida’s position is that 
phenomenology is caught in an aporia, between Christian and platonic and Non-
Christian and material thought, while Derrida negotiates the differance between these 
as the space of truth and the condition of possibility for both. As this thesis argues, 
truth is neither transcendental nor empirical but quasi-transcendental, a space between 
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the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both.  Truth is the 
differance between Christian and Non-Christian thought rather than localizable to 
either because transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. Truth is thus the 
mediation between transcendental and empirical, Christian and non-Christian thought, 
occupying a space between rather than belonging to either side.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have examined the aporia that has come to pass in 
phenomenology: phenomenology has divided itself into either transcendental idealism 
or radical empiricism, and an impasse has occurred as to where truth is to be located, 
as idealism or empiricism. Phenomenology has traditionally assumed that the 
transcendental and empirical are divisible and ontologically separate. Traditionally, 
the transcendental has been understood to be the ground of the empirical, whereas the 
empirical is thought to be but the simulacrum of the transcendental. Phenomenology, 
in its divide into transcendental idealism and radical empiricism, assumes these are 
distinct ontological spheres. Hence Husserl with his transcendental reduction strives 
to bracket the empirical to reduce indication to expression, while empiricists, though 
they may not easily recognize themselves as such, such as Heidegger, Levinas, 
Ricouer, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot, have taken the transcendental as a site of 
exclusion or negation for their phenomenologies. In their reverse reduction they seek 
to exclude the transcendental as they view this purification as being faithful to 
phenomena, returning to the things themselves. 
This thesis has problematized the relationship between the transcendental and 
empirical, because it has demonstrated that the transcendental is simultaneously the 
empirical. The transcendental is nothing outside the empirical and vice versa, because 
the transcendental needs to be iterated as the empirical to come into being, just as the 
empirical needs the mediation of the transcendental through iterability to come about.
For instance, we would not grasp the object without the transcendental properties of 
space and time. Yet we would also not grasp the object if there were no empirical 
instantiation of the object. Hence the transcendental needs to be iterated as the 
empirical to come into being. Hence a pure idealism such as Husserl’s or a pure 
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empiricism such as Levinas’ cannot stand, because delineating the transcendental 
requires the exclusion of the empirical to define itself, just as delineating the empirical 
requires the exclusion of the transcendental to define itself. Transcendental and 
empirical exist only through a dynamic relation of differance and iterability, as the 
transcendental is and is not the empirical, their difference translates into sameness. 
This is because the transcendental and empirical remain separated and distinguished 
by nothing, as demonstrated in the Husserl chapters. Were the transcendental 
separable from the empirical, no phenomenological reduction would be able to take 
place, hence the difference between the transcendental is an illusion as the 
transcendental does not exist outside the dynamic relationship of iterability to the 
empirical. Were the empirical separable from the transcendental, this would also 
translate as a paradox as the radical empiricists we discussed throughout this thesis 
have taken the transcendental as a point of contention and exclusion. Heidegger 
deliberately excludes Christian Theology from his philosophy, just as Levinas and 
Ricoeur privilege the Other and embodiment over the Self, excluding the Absolute in 
their phenomenology. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot emphasize corporeality 
and Other-directed phenomenologies, which I have argued are negative or inverse 
phenomenologies, and take the transcendental as a point of dissociation from their 
philosophies. I have demonstrated that this separation of the transcendental and 
empirical is thus not coherent as these phenomenologists require the transcendental as 
a site of exclusion to define their philosophies. Hence, defining the empirical in 
absence of the transcendental does not make sense. As we have demonstrated through 
readings of transcendental idealism and radical empiricism, both are repetitions of the 
same through iterability. Heidegger’s radical empiricism does not differ from 
Husserl’s transcendental idealism, because their ontological structure is essentially the 
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same. Metaphysics and post-Metaphysics are doublings rather than negations of each 
other, as we see Christian theology and Heidegger’s post-metaphysics share the same 
ontological and metaphysical structure, because reversed Platonism remains a form of 
Platonism. Heidegger’s post-metaphysics requires the exclusion of the transcendental 
while Husserl’s idealism requires the exclusion of the empirical, hence both exist only 
in dynamic relation to each other through iterability and are essentially the same. No 
phenomenological reduction would take place were the transcendental and empirical 
separable, hence empiricism and idealism are repetitions rather than divergences from 
each other. The transcendental is and is not the empirical, their difference translates 
into sameness as we demonstrated in the Husserl chapters, and hence transcendental 
idealism and radical empiricism are repetitions of the same through iterability and 
differance. As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth would be 
neither transcendental nor empirical. Rather the difference or differance between 
transcendental and empirical would be its meta-condition and that which enables the 
thinking of its structurality. Truth is neither presence nor absence, Jew or Greek, 
being or non-being, self or other but the difference and differance between these two 
extremes, Derrida emphasizes the importance of iterability or repetition of both 
extremes as essentially the same, truth is thus quasi-transcendental or the interval 
between transcendental and empirical which enables both.
The transcendental requires the empirical to be defined and vice versa, while 
their difference translates into a paradoxical sameness because as we have 
demonstrated in the Husserl chapters, transcendental-empirical difference is an 
illusion. This thesis has thus demonstrated the necessity of the quasi-transcendental to 
conceiving the relationship between the transcendental and empirical, that which is 
neither transcendental nor empirical, but is prior to both as it is the anterior difference 
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that enables us to think and conceptualize both transcendental and empirical. In place 
of transcendental or empirical privilege hence, this thesis has argued that the quasi-
transcendental and differance are the conditions necessary for conceiving 
phenomenology as it is transcendental-empirical difference, the point of distinction 
between the transcendental and empirical, that enables us to think both as each term 
requires the illumination of the opposing term in order to be upheld. Truth is thus not 
localizable to either transcendental or empirical, but translates as differance and the 
quasi-transcendental as we require transcendental-empirical difference to 
conceptualize phenomenology in the first place. Every designation of the 
transcendental requires its distinction from the empirical to be upheld in Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism, whereas the radical empiricists, as I have previously 
mentioned, take their point of departure from the transcendental, making it a point to 
negate or exclude Christian theology or the ontology of the Absolute and the same in 
order to define their phenomenologies. This thesis has thus negotiated the space 
between the transcendental and empirical as the difference and necessary a priori 
condition that is necessary to thinking and conceptualizing phenomenology in its 
totality, as an idealism without the empirical or an empiricism without the ideal 
translates into an absurdity or incoherence. 
Phenomenology’s divide into transcendental idealism or radical empiricism, 
with its subsequent crisis over origin and truth and where it is to be located, thus
presents a false conflict because the transcendental is simultaneously the empirical. 
Their difference is an illusion or a sameness. The transcendental is nothing outside the 
empirical and vice versa.This is because transcendental and empirical only come into 
being through the structure of iterability and differance. Without the transcendental, it 
would be impossible to conceive of the empirical, and vice versa. Hence 
296
phenomenology is based upon the aporia of the quasi-transcendental, that which is 
neither transcendental nor empirical but is the difference that allows the thinking of 
both. The transcendental is the empirical because the distinction is an illusory 
distinction, as we demonstrated in the Husserl chapters, because the 
phenomenological reduction would not be able to take place if the distinction were 
ontological and substantive. The privilege of either transcendental or empirical upheld 
by both camps of idealists and empiricists hence generates aporia as the 
transcendental and empirical are divided by nothing, their difference translates into 
sameness. Transcendental idealism requires the empirical to be a site of exclusion, 
whereas radical empiricism requires the transcendental to be a site of exclusion. 
Hence both terms are empty terms when defined in isolation from each other because 
the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, just as the empirical is the 
repeated trace of the transcendental.  Transcendental and empirical are thus historical 
names derived from metaphysics, based upon an illusory distinction, which can only 
be defined in dynamic relation to each other as each term requires the exclusion of the 
opposing term for the distinction to be upheld. 
The transcendental and empirical can only come into being through iterability 
and differance, as the transcendental is simultaneously the empirical, and does not 
exist outside the dynamic relation to it. This is because the transcendental translates 
into the empirical, the aporia of metaphysics is that their difference translates into a 
repetition of the same, or iterability. Hence, we know of no transcendental that can be 
defined in isolation from the empirical and vice versa. The debate over the source of 
truth as transcendental idealism or radical empiricism is thus misled.  In place, this 
thesis has argued that truth is neither transcendental nor empirical but quasi-
transcendental, the space between the transcendental and empirical. This quasi-
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transcendental is the differance between them, which gives rise to the distinguishing 
movement of the trace, retrospectively producing both transcendental and empirical.
I began with a survey of secondary sources to locate the aporia that had 
occurred in phenomenology and outlined Derrida’s intervention. In my chapters on 
Husserl, I argued that there was no presentation but only representation; ideality has 
to be repeated with a difference or iterated in order to be constituted. In my chapters 
on Heidegger, I argued that Heidegger’s non-metaphysics was essentially a repetition 
of it, and that there was no substantial difference between metaphysics and non-
metaphysics or representational and post-representational thinking. In my chapters on 
Ricoeur, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot, I argued that their reversals of 
phenomenology to embrace a negative phenomenology or radical empiricism ended 
up being a repetition of metaphysics rather than an overcoming of it as they remain 
bound to its ontological structure by negating metaphysics and thus repeat it like 
Heidegger. Through this thesis, I have argued that iterability and signature form the 
conditions of possibility for the perpetuation of phenomenology and metaphysics. 
Derrida’s discovery is thus the a priori condition of possibility for conceptuality – its 
iterability and mediation, or signature. Derrida’s meta-phenomenology is a tracing to 
the roots of its conditions of possibility for conceptuality, and in this thesis I have 
located these conditions as differance and the quasi-transcendental. My readings do 
not intend to elevate Derrida to absolute status, but rather I wish to suggest that 
Derrida has discovered the grounding conditions for metaphysics as differance and 
the quasi-transcendental. Indeed, such a reading strengthens rather than destroys the 
metaphysical project because of its meta-phenomenological status as inquiry.
Derrida, through humour, subtlety and irony, demonstrates that the traditional 
hierarchies in phenomenology and metaphysics, be they empirical or transcendental 
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idealism, simply do not hold as phenomenology always lands in an aporia when one 
seeks to privilege the transcendental or empirical. In place, as we have seen in our 
discussions throughout this thesis, phenomenology is conditioned by the fundamental 
phenomena of iterability and signature, transcendental and empirical are not separable 
or distinct as these concepts have to be irrevocably mediated. An idealism without 
empiricism or an empiricism without idealism translates into an absurdity. Rather, it is 
repetition of the transcendental in the empirical, deconstruction as a double science 
and double writing, which produces the economy of both the transcendental and 
empirical through the movement of the trace. 
In this thesis, we have examined various aporias that afflict phenomenology-
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction cannot hold if the transcendental is separate 
from the empirical, indeed, nothing separates the transcendental and the empirical and 
thus they are essentially the same. We demonstrated that Heidegger’s repeated 
attempts to inverse to negate metaphysics only reproduced metaphysics as a ghostly 
double that returned to haunt his anti-metaphysics which remained bound to its 
ontological structure and vocabulary. We showed through readings of Levinas, 
Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot that their radical empiricisms and privilege of 
Other over the same repeated metaphysics like Heidegger, in negating it and reversing 
its structure, thus reproducing and affirming it paradoxically. In all these 
demonstrations we have shown that the impossibility of a text is precisely its site of 
possibility, deconstruction proceeds by exposing the limit of a text and then de-
limiting it towards the Other that it had repressed, its method is thus transgression and 
exceeding of limits imposed by a text towards its blindspots through exposing an 
aporia, and then proceeding to show the unthought of a text that needs to be thought 
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in order to address this aporia. Transcendental and empirical are related through a 
dynamic relation of iterability and repetition with a difference. Hence metaphysics is 
based fundamentally upon an aporia or the conditionality of the quasi-transcendental, 
which is neither transcendental nor empirical but the condition that enables the 
thinking of both. Derrida thus inscribes phenomenology in a more powerful form 
through naming its condition of possibility as the quasi-transcendental, thus bringing 
to phenomenology reflexivity about its method of production and functioning.
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